The Relation Between Earnings Management And Non Gaap Reporting
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| Author | : Ervin L. Black |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : |
| Release | : 2019 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
Managers have a variety of tools at their disposal to influence stakeholder perceptions. Earnings management and the strategic reporting of non-GAAP earnings are just two of the available menu choices. We explore how real earnings management and accruals management influence the probability that a company will disclose a non-GAAP adjusted earnings metric in its earnings press release and the likelihood that it will do so aggressively. We first investigate situations where managers already meet analysts' expectations either based on strong operating performance or after employing real and accruals management. We find that when solid operating performance alone allows firms to meet expectations, managers do not employ earnings management or non-GAAP reporting. However, when managers meet expectations using real and accruals management, they are significantly less likely to report a non-GAAP earnings metric. Next, we explore scenarios where companies fall short of expectations. We find that when they just miss expectations after managing GAAP earnings, they are significantly more likely to employ non-GAAP reporting, suggesting that the timing and relatively costless nature of non-GAAP reporting allows managers to appear to meet expectations on a non-GAAP basis when managed GAAP earnings fall short. Moreover, we find that companies are more likely to report non-GAAP earnings (and to do so aggressively) when (i) they are unable to use real or accruals earnings management, (ii) are constrained by prior-period accruals management, and (iii) their operating performance is poor. Taken together, our results are consistent with a substitute relation between non-GAAP reporting and both real and accruals management.
| Author | : David Onditi |
| Publisher | : GRIN Verlag |
| Total Pages | : 9 |
| Release | : 2019-09-23 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 3346020452 |
Essay from the year 2017 in the subject Business economics - Accounting and Taxes, grade: A, University of Nairobi, language: English, abstract: This paper discusses the motives behind earnings management and explains some of the methods used by firms to manage their earnings. Earnings management has been defined differently by a number of scholars. It is important to note that there is a thin line between fraud and earnings management. Hamid, Hashim and Salleh citing the works of Brown, Perols and Lounge and Erickson, Hanlon and Maydew noted the difference in the definitions that are offered by the scholars. According to Perols and Lounge organizations will engage in fraud due to the constraints on earnings management. The research found out that the firms that had engaged in earnings management will be more likely to be involved in cases of fraud. Brown and Erickson et al noted that the difference between earnings management and fraud is that earnings management is usually within the scope of the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) while fraud is outside of the boundaries of GAAP. Earnings management has been defined as the manipulation of the financial statements and reports by the managers so that the firms can earn extra profit. It has also been defined as the action where the management of the organizations apply their own self-assessment in the communication of the financial information and transactions to modify the financial data for two main reasons: 1) influencing contractual businesses that solely rely on the financial information or 2) providing the stakeholders with a wrong impression about the financial position of the firm.
| Author | : Malek El Diri |
| Publisher | : Springer |
| Total Pages | : 120 |
| Release | : 2017-08-20 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 3319626868 |
This book provides researchers and scholars with a comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of earnings management theory and literature. While it raises new questions for future research, the book can be also helpful to other parties who rely on financial reporting in making decisions like regulators, policy makers, shareholders, investors, and gatekeepers e.g., auditors and analysts. The book summarizes the existing literature and provides insight into new areas of research such as the differences between earnings management, fraud, earnings quality, impression management, and expectation management; the trade-off between earnings management activities; the special measures of earnings management; and the classification of earnings management motives based on a comprehensive theoretical framework.
| Author | : Shin-Rong Shiah-Hou |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 29 |
| Release | : 2018 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
In this study, I examine whether disclosing Non-GAAP earnings is a signal of experiencing accounting restatement. I propose a scenario in which earnings are managed within the constraints of GAAP guidelines, as long as there is sufficient leeway to permit income-increasing accounting choices. Managers usually avoid issuing Non-GAAP earnings because of severe penalties. If this becomes no longer possible within GAAP earning management, managers have incentives to cross the line into Non-GAAP territory. At this point, disclosing Non-GAAP earnings is positively associated with accounting restatement because of the great magnitude of earnings management. I find that firms with restatements experience a significant increase in the relative use of disclosing Non-GAAP earnings with positive other exclusions. Firms with the positive other exclusions excluded from Non-GAAP earnings may exhibit increased likelihood of fraud or core-earnings restatement. Finally, firms disclosing Non-GAAP earnings and having high accounting complexity are more likely to restate than those disclosing Non-GAAP earnings and having low accounting complexity.
| Author | : Jeff Coulton |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : |
| Release | : 2016-11-24 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : 9780994369734 |
| Author | : Joshua Ronen |
| Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
| Total Pages | : 587 |
| Release | : 2008-08-06 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 0387257713 |
This book is a study of earnings management, aimed at scholars and professionals in accounting, finance, economics, and law. The authors address research questions including: Why are earnings so important that firms feel compelled to manipulate them? What set of circumstances will induce earnings management? How will the interaction among management, boards of directors, investors, employees, suppliers, customers and regulators affect earnings management? How to design empirical research addressing earnings management? What are the limitations and strengths of current empirical models?
| Author | : Wenming Kang |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 101 |
| Release | : 2015 |
| Genre | : Corporations |
| ISBN | : |
This paper attempts to shed light upon management choice to engage in earnings management beyond the bounds of Generally Acceptable Accounting Practice. I examine how limitations in accrual earnings management capabilities and unexpected variations in real earnings management can drive more prominent use in non-GAAP earnings management (NGEM). NGEM is approximated using restatements as result of irregularities and AAER enforcements. I have conducted my analyses in three stages. First, I examine a subsample of firms with high probability in engaging in NGEM and conduct a longitudinal analysis on the REM behavior of these firms leading to the period of high probability of restatement. I find that there is indeed more aggressive use of REM leading to the period of high probability of restatement. Next I examined whether firms with unexpected REM fluctuations and constrained AEM behavior are more likely to engage in NGEM behavior. I find weak evidence of constraints in AEM drives NGEM. Finally I examine whether the use of industry specialist auditors can help deter constrained AEM firms from resorting to the use of NGEM. I find no evidence suggesting industry specialist auditors can restrain the use of NGEM for firms with constrained AEM.
| Author | : Nicola Moscariello |
| Publisher | : Cambridge Scholars Publishing |
| Total Pages | : 420 |
| Release | : 2019-11-25 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1527543978 |
The use of alternative performance indicators (APMs) (also known as ‘Non-GAAP’ earnings) is a widespread phenomenon, and the increased reliance on APMs has recently triggered a strong debate among regulators, managers and investors on the nature of these ‘tailored’ earnings and on the economic reasons behind them. On one hand, APMs might reflect managers’ attempt to offer useful information to predict companies’ future sustainable cash-flows and earnings (information hypothesis), while, on the other, the non-standardized nature of these metrics impacts on the comparability of the financial results, and reduces the reliability and the faithful representation of financial information (opportunistic hypothesis). By collecting several theoretical and empirical contributions on APMs, this book provides a number of interesting and useful insights on the economics of APMs and their impact on financial markets.
| Author | : |
| Publisher | : GRIN Verlag |
| Total Pages | : 81 |
| Release | : 2024-01-31 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 3964875953 |
Master's Thesis from the year 2019 in the subject Business economics - Accounting and Taxes, University of Duisburg-Essen, course: Master Thesis, language: English, abstract: This paper delves into various theories and approaches, aiming to define and differentiate earnings management from related concepts such as fraud, expectation management, and impression management. It explores the goals and incentives driving earnings management, including maximizing or minimizing earnings, beating targets, and smoothing. At the onset of the new millennium, corporate scandals rocked the business world, eroding trust in management, boards of directors, and the accounting profession. In response, regulations and policies aimed at enhancing corporate governance and financial reporting were swiftly implemented. The credibility, clarity, and consistency of financial reporting practices play a pivotal role in enabling investors to make informed decisions. Accurate and fair financial performance representations, as opposed to inflated and misleading figures, are essential for market players, including shareholders and creditors. Investors rely on audited financial reports to guide their investment decisions, underscoring the critical importance of accuracy and reliability in publicly available financial disclosures. Auditors, by reducing the risk of material misstatement, ensure the integrity of the information disclosed in a company's financial statements. Management, with the goal of achieving promised targets and ensuring the company's existence, may engage in earnings management as a strategic contribution to corporate policy. Financial reporting serves as a means to distinguish well-performing companies from their counterparts, facilitating efficient resource allocation and empowering stakeholders to make effective decisions. The disclosed earnings results significantly impact a firm's overall business activities and management decisions, particularly in satisfying analysts' expectations, which can influence equity value. While accounting standards play a role, the quality of financial statements is more influenced by company-specific and institutional factors shaping managers' incentives. These factors lead to financial reporting practices being viewed as the outcome of a cost-benefit assessment.
| Author | : Wei Yu |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : |
| Release | : 2008 |
| Genre | : Accounting |
| ISBN | : |
In the first essay, I examine the association between auditor industry specialization and earnings management choices. Prior research suggests that industry specialist auditors constrain accounting-based earnings management. But such actions may cause client companies to seek alternative means to manage earnings. Specifically, companies that hire industry specialist auditors may alter operating decisions to meet earnings targets, referred to as real activities manipulation. This essay investigates whether clients of industry specialist auditors that have an incentive to manage earnings are constrained from managing earnings through accruals manipulation and, therefore, are more likely to engage in real activities manipulation. Further, I examine whether operating performance declines for firms suspected of real activities manipulation. My findings indicate that clients of industry specialist auditors with incentives to manage earnings have lower absolute value of accruals relative to firms with incentives to manage earnings that do not hire industry specialist auditors. These clients of industry specialist auditors are also more likely to engage in real activities manipulation, suggesting this is a possible unintended consequence of hiring an industry specialist auditor. I also document evidence that firms suspected of real activities manipulation have lower future operating performance relative to firms not suspected of real activities manipulation.
