The Metaphysics Of Self And World
Download The Metaphysics Of Self And World full books in PDF, epub, and Kindle. Read online free The Metaphysics Of Self And World ebook anywhere anytime directly on your device. Fast Download speed and no annoying ads. We cannot guarantee that every ebooks is available!
Author | : Quassim Cassam |
Publisher | : Clarendon Press |
Total Pages | : 217 |
Release | : 1997-02-20 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 0191518921 |
Self and World is an exploration of the nature of self-awareness. Quassim Cassam challenges the widespread and influential view that we cannot be introspectively aware of ourselves as objects in the world. In opposition to the views of many empiricist and idealist philosophers, including Hume, Kant, and Wittgenstein, he argues that the self is not systematically elusive from the perspective of self-consciousness, and that consciousness of our thoughts and experiences requires a sense of our thinking, experiencing selves as shaped, located, and solid physical objects in a world of such objects. Awareness of oneself as a physical object involves forms of bodily self-awareness whose importance has seldom been properly acknowledged in philosophical accounts of the self and self-awareness. The conception of self-awareness defended in this book helps to undermine the idealist thesis that the self does not belong to the world, and also the claim that the existence of subjects or persons is only a derivative feature of reality. In the final part of the book, Cassam argues that the existence of persons is a substantial fact about the world, and that it is not possible to give a complete description of reality without claiming that persons exist. This clear, original, and challenging treatment of one of the deepest of intellectual problems will demand the attention of all philosophers and cognitive scientists who are concerned with the self.
Author | : Teodros Kiros |
Publisher | : Rowman & Littlefield |
Total Pages | : 141 |
Release | : 2019-10-10 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 1793605955 |
Self Definition argues that sex, gender, and race are constructions by the ineffable self as it seeks to define its possibilities free of domination. The self’s embodiments are themselves performances of self definition. Teodros Kiros supports his argument by a careful reading of the literature from both the Global South and Global North that spans figures, works, and eras from antiquity to our late modern present. These readings demonstrate that race, gender, and sex are performed in the Global South radically differently from in the Global North. These three notions as markers of identity are fluid, open, and expansive, and Kiros brilliantly shows this through inquiry into thought rooted in Egypt, Ethiopia, India, and China. By the time that the Global North forges possibilities of the self in the modern period, race, gender, and sex become fixed. Biology and anatomy become understood as destinies, and the possibilities of the self are deeply constrained. This book approaches case studies of key figures and movements chronologically and thematically, and in doing so Kiros highlights the tensions between the openness of the Global South and the rigidity of the Global North through which human possibilities as exercises of self-definition become clear under conditions of freedom. Our views of self definition will forever be transformed after reading this important text.
Author | : Christopher Peacocke |
Publisher | : Oxford University Press, USA |
Total Pages | : 296 |
Release | : 2014-02 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 0199699569 |
Christopher Peacocke presents a new theory of subjects of consciousness, together with a theory of the nature of first person representation. He identifies three sorts of self-consciousness—perspectival, reflective, and interpersonal—and argues that they are key to explaining features of our knowledge, social relations, and emotional lives.
Author | : Stanley B. Klein |
Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
Total Pages | : 176 |
Release | : 2014 |
Genre | : Medical |
ISBN | : 0199349967 |
Our experience of a unified sense of the self is underwritten by a multiplicity of self-aspects having very different metaphysical commitments. Our experience of unity is provided by a process-which, under certain clinical conditions, is rendered inoperative-that enables a person to experience mental states as personally owned.
Author | : Geoffrey Madell |
Publisher | : Routledge |
Total Pages | : 269 |
Release | : 2014-11-20 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 1317584139 |
In this volume, Geoffrey Madell develops a revised account of the self, making a compelling case for why the "simple" or "anti-criterial" view of personal identity warrants a robust defense. Madell critiques recent discussions of the self for focusing on features which are common to all selves, and which therefore fail to capture the uniqueness of each self. In establishing his own view of personal identity, Madell proposes (a) that there is always a gap between ‘A is f and g’ and ‘I am f and g’; (b), that a complete description of the world offered without recourse to indexicals will fail to account for the contingent truth that I am one of the persons described; and (c), that an account of conscious perspectives on the world must take into account what it means for an apparently arbitrary one of these perspectives to be mine. Engaging with contemporary positions on the first person, embodiment, psychological continuity, and other ongoing arguments, Madell contends that there can be no such thing as a criterion of personal identity through time, that no bodily or psychological continuity approach to the issue can succeed, and that personal identity through time must be absolute, not a matter of degree. Madell’s view that the nature of the self is substantively different from that of objects in the world will generate significant discussion and debate among philosophers of mind.
Author | : Scott L. Marratto |
Publisher | : State University of New York Press |
Total Pages | : 256 |
Release | : 2012-06-05 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 1438442335 |
Challenging a prevalent Western idea of the self as a discrete, interior consciousness, Scott L. Marratto argues instead that subjectivity is a characteristic of the living, expressive movement establishing a dynamic intertwining between a sentient body and its environment. He draws on the work of the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty, contemporary European philosophy, and research in cognitive science and development to offer a compelling investigation into what it means to be a self.
Author | : James Kreines |
Publisher | : Oxford University Press, USA |
Total Pages | : 305 |
Release | : 2015 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 0190204303 |
This book defends a new interpretation of Hegel's theoretical philosophy, according to which it has a single organizing focus, giving philosophical force to his arguments in his central Science of Logic, and undercutting prominent worries. The focus is not epistemology or skepticism, but the metaphysics of reason in the world.
Author | : Andrea Christofidou |
Publisher | : Routledge |
Total Pages | : 277 |
Release | : 2013 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 0415501067 |
This book sheds new light on the role of freedom in Descartes' thought and defends the theory of an internal relation between freedom and reason in his metaphysics.
Author | : Bernardo Kastrup |
Publisher | : John Hunt Publishing |
Total Pages | : 292 |
Release | : 2019-03-29 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 1785357409 |
A rigorous case for the primacy of mind in nature, from philosophy to neuroscience, psychology and physics. The Idea of the World offers a grounded alternative to the frenzy of unrestrained abstractions and unexamined assumptions in philosophy and science today. This book examines what can be learned about the nature of reality based on conceptual parsimony, straightforward logic and empirical evidence from fields as diverse as physics and neuroscience. It compiles an overarching case for idealism - the notion that reality is essentially mental - from ten original articles the author has previously published in leading academic journals. The case begins with an exposition of the logical fallacies and internal contradictions of the reigning physicalist ontology and its popular alternatives, such as bottom-up panpsychism. It then advances a compelling formulation of idealism that elegantly makes sense of - and reconciles - classical and quantum worlds. The main objections to idealism are systematically refuted and empirical evidence is reviewed that corroborates the formulation presented here. The book closes with an analysis of the hidden psychological motivations behind mainstream physicalism and the implications of idealism for the way we relate to the world.
Author | : Alex Byrne |
Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
Total Pages | : 240 |
Release | : 2018-04-13 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 0192554735 |
Alex Byrne sets out and defends a theory of self-knowledge-knowledge of one's mental states. Inspired by Gareth Evans' discussion of self-knowledge in his The Varieties of Reference, the basic idea is that one comes to know that one is in a mental state M by an inference from a worldly or environmental premise to the conclusion that one is in M. (Typically the worldly premise will not be about anything mental.) The mind, on this account, is 'transparent': self-knowledge is achieved by an 'outward glance' at the corresponding tract of the world, not by an 'inward glance' at one's own mind. Belief is the clearest case, with the inference being from 'p' to 'I believe that p'. One serious problem with this idea is that the inference seems terrible, because 'p' is at best very weak evidence that one believes that p. Another is that the idea seems not to generalize. For example, what is the worldly premise corresponding to 'I intend to do this', or 'I feel a pain'? Byrne argues that both problems can be solved, and explains how the account covers perception, sensation, desire, intention, emotion, memory, imagination, and thought. The result is a unified theory of self-knowledge that explains the epistemic security of beliefs about one's mental states (privileged access), as well as the fact that one has a special first-person way of knowing about one's mental states (peculiar access).