This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1883 edition. Excerpt: ... TITLE II. OPINIONS ON IDENTITY. CHAPTER I. IDENTITY OF PERSONS AND THINGS. RULE 45.--The opinion of an ordinary witness concerning the identity of a person (A) or thing (B) is admissible. Illustration. A. I. A. is indicted for a burglary in the house of B. B. had conversed with A. the day before. On the night of the crime he did not see A., but heard him speak. The opinion of B. as to the identity of A., based on hearing his voice in the two instances, is admissible.1 Personal identity is a matter of opinion or belief founded on facts which may be, and frequently are, inexplicable and incommunicable to a stranger; and, therefore, as to such fact, opinion is competent evidence.' On questions of the identification of persons, a witness may give his opinion, provided he has any knowledge of the person. The opinion or belief must be based upon this knowledge. It is not necessary that it should be formed at the time the person sought to be identified was seen by the witness; 1 Com. v. Williams, 105 Mass. 63 (1870). i Gentry v. McMinnls, 3 Dana, 383 (1835); State v. Morris, 47 Conn. 179 (1879); Bevealy p. Williams, 4 Dev. & B. 237 (1839). 18 ( 273 ) but when formed, it must be the result of the recollection of the person seen, and of the facts connected with the seeing, and not from information derived from others.' As said in a Texas case: "I may feel a strong conviction, not, however, amounting to certainty, that a man who stands before me in the court-room to-day, is the same man whom I knew ten years ago in a distant part of the world; I cannot explain to others the grounds of my strong belief, yet this belief amounts to a species of knowledge. If called as a witness, I may express my opinion that the man before me is the same man whom I...