Two events in particular pushed the Soviet Union and India into concluding a treaty in August 1971: (1) Dr. Kissinger's mission to Peking; and (2) the developing crisis in East Pakistan. The Soviets saw the Treaty as a diplomatic riposte to the US move to improve relations with China. Because the implicit US pledge of support against China was no longer valid, the Indians could look only to the Soviet Union to restrain China in the event of a clash with Pakistan. With few exceptions, Indian freedom of action is not circumscribed by the wording of the operative articles of the Treaty. The Soviet Union so positioned itself that it could render effective support to India, if it chose to do so, but would not automatically have rally to India's assistance in the event of another Sino-Indian conflict or another Pak-Indian conflict. The treaty partners have not taken on any obligation to provide military assistance to each other; they have merely agreed not to take any action to cause military damage to the other or to provide assistance to an enemy of each other. A comparison on a pre-treaty and post-treaty basis, between such quantifiable indices of cooperation as levels of trade, economic and military assistance reveals that Indo-Soviet trade has shown a substantial, although not spectacular, increase in recent years. The Treaty had not converted India into a Soviet ally, let alone a Soviet satellite. (Author).