The development of the judicial control of the European Communities is perhaps best illustrated by comparing the first decision the Court of Justice rendered in December 1954, under the ECSC Treaty, with its preliminary rulings van Gend & Loos (1962), ENEL (1964) and Simmenthal II (1978) rendered under the EEC Treaty. In the first case the Court quashed a decision of the High Authority impugned by an annulment action of a Member State for an illegal exercise of Community powers - a judicial control which at the time already represented a spectacular legal in novation introduced by the ECSC Treaty. At that time the Court was, for evident reasons, still reserved as to its role within the unprecedented institutional structure of the Community. In van Gend, ENEL and Simmenthal II, on the other hand, the Court resolutely pursued a judicial policy intended to ensure an effective operation of the Community legal order, a problem hardly envisaged in 1954. In these rulings the Court characterized the emerging legal order and stated its fundamental and indispensable requirements: the unlimited supremacy of Community law and its direct effect. The development of a superior and autonomous Community legal order was finally completed by the Court's recognition of fundamental Communiry rights of individuals. This development from an initially reserved stand of the Court searching for its proper role and its potentialities to a bold and determined judicial policy is truly remarkable.