Simplified Mechanisms With Applications To Sponsored Search And Package Auctions
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Author | : Paul R. Milgrom |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : |
Release | : 2015 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
A simplified mechanism is a direct mechanism modified by restricting the set of reports or bids. An example is the auction used to place ads on Internet search pages, in which each advertiser bids a single price to determine the allocation of eight or more ad positions on a page. If a simplified mechanism satisfies the quot;best-reply-closurequot; property, then all Nash equilibria of the simplified mechanism are also equilibria of the original direct mechanism. For search advertising auctions, suitable simplifications eliminate inefficient, low-revenue equilibria that are favored in the original direct mechanism when bidding costs are positive.
Author | : Paul R. Milgrom |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : |
Release | : 2007 |
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ISBN | : |
Author | : Martin Bichler |
Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
Total Pages | : 935 |
Release | : 2017-10-26 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 1107135346 |
An international team of experts covers the pros and cons of different auction formats and lessons learned in the field.
Author | : Nicholas Olenev |
Publisher | : Springer Nature |
Total Pages | : 296 |
Release | : 2023-12-13 |
Genre | : Mathematics |
ISBN | : 3031487516 |
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Advances in Optimization and Applications, OPTIMA 2023, held in Petrovac, Montenegro, during September 18–22, 2023. The 21 full papers included in this book were carefully reviewed and selected from 68 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows: mathematical programming; global optimization; continuous optimization; discrete and combinatorial optimization; optimal control; game theory and mathematical economics; optimization in economics and finance; and applications.
Author | : Paul Milgrom |
Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
Total Pages | : 378 |
Release | : 2004-01-12 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 1139449168 |
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Author | : Jan Krämer |
Publisher | : KIT Scientific Publishing |
Total Pages | : 126 |
Release | : 2009 |
Genre | : Telecommunication |
ISBN | : 3866443870 |
Author | : Renato Paes Leme |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 188 |
Release | : 2013 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
Auctions have become the standard way of allocating resources in electronic markets. Two main reasons why designing auctions is hard are the need to cope with strategic behavior of the agents, who will constantly adjust their bids seeking more items at lower prices, and the fact that the environment is highly dynamic and uncertain. Many market designs which became de-facto industrial standards allow strategic manipulation by the agents, but nevertheless display good behavior in practice. In this thesis, we analyze why such designs turned out to be so successful despite strategic behavior and environment uncertainty. Our goal is to learn from this analysis and to use the lessons learned to design new auction mechanisms, as well as fine-tune the existing ones. We illustrate this research line through the analysis and design of Ad Auctions mechanisms. We do so by studying the equilibrium behavior of a game induced by Ad Auctions, and show that all equilibria have good welfare and revenue properties. Next, we present new Ad Auction designs that take into account richer features such as budgets, multiple keywords, heterogeneous slots and online supply.
Author | : Sanmay Das |
Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
Total Pages | : 116 |
Release | : 2009-07-31 |
Genre | : Computers |
ISBN | : 3642038212 |
These proceedings present the technical contributions to the First Conference on A- tions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications (AMMA), held May 8-9, 2009 in Boston, Massachusetts, USA. The conference was devoted to issues that arise in all stages of deploying a market mechanism to solve a problem, including theoretical and empirical examinations. In addition to more traditional academic papers, the conf- ence placed emphasis on experiences from the real world, including case studies and new applications. The main goal of AMMA was to explore the synergy required for good mechanism design. This includes an understanding of the economic and game-theoretic issues, the ability to design protocols and algorithms for realizing desired outcomes, and the knowledge of specific institutional details that are important in practical applications. We were lucky enough to attract papers and talks from economists and computer scientists, theorists and empiricists, academics and practitioners. The program, as reflected in these proceedings, ranged from fundamental theory on auctions and m- kets to empirical design and analysis of matching mechanisms, peer-to-peer-systems, and prediction markets.
Author | : Paul Milgrom |
Publisher | : Columbia University Press |
Total Pages | : 222 |
Release | : 2017-05-23 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 023154457X |
Traditional economic theory studies idealized markets in which prices alone can guide efficient allocation, with no need for central organization. Such models build from Adam Smith’s famous concept of an invisible hand, which guides markets and renders regulation or interference largely unnecessary. Yet for many markets, prices alone are not enough to guide feasible and efficient outcomes, and regulation alone is not enough, either. Consider air traffic control at major airports. While prices could encourage airlines to take off and land at less congested times, prices alone do just part of the job; an air traffic control system is still indispensable to avoid disastrous consequences. With just an air traffic controller, however, limited resources can be wasted or poorly used. What’s needed in this and many other real-world cases is an auction system that can effectively reveal prices while still maintaining enough direct control to ensure that complex constraints are satisfied. In Discovering Prices, Paul Milgrom—the world’s most frequently cited academic expert on auction design—describes how auctions can be used to discover prices and guide efficient resource allocations, even when resources are diverse, constraints are critical, and market-clearing prices may not even exist. Economists have long understood that externalities and market power both necessitate market organization. In this book, Milgrom introduces complex constraints as another reason for market design. Both lively and technical, Milgrom roots his new theories in real-world examples (including the ambitious U.S. incentive auction of radio frequencies, whose design he led) and provides economists with crucial new tools for dealing with the world’s growing complex resource-allocation problems.
Author | : Panagiotis Kanellopoulos |
Publisher | : Springer Nature |
Total Pages | : 596 |
Release | : 2022-09-13 |
Genre | : Computers |
ISBN | : 3031157141 |
This book constitutes the proceedings of the 15th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2022, which took place in Colchester, UK, in September 2022. The 31 full papers included in this book were carefully reviewed and selected from 83 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows: Auctions, markets and mechanism design; computational aspects in games; congestion and network creation games; data sharing and learning; social choice and stable matchings.