Regulating Power: The Economics of Electrictiy in the Information Age

Regulating Power: The Economics of Electrictiy in the Information Age
Author: Carl Pechman
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Total Pages: 234
Release: 2012-12-06
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 1461532582

Modem industrial society functions with the expectation that electricity will be available when required. By law, electric utilities have the obligation to provide electricity to customers in a "safe and adequate" manner. In exchange for this obligation, utilities are granted a monopoly right to provide electricity to customers within well-defmed service territories. However, utilities are not unfettered in their monopoly power; public utility commissions regulate the relationship between a utility and its customers and limit profits to a "fair rate of return on invested capital. " From its inception through the late 1970s, the electric utility industry's opera tional paradigm was to continue marketing electricity to customers and to build power plants to meet customer needs. This growth was facilitated by a U. S. energy policy predicated upon the assumption that sustained electric growth was causally linked to social welfare (Lovins, 1977). The electric utility industry is now in transition from a vertically integrated monopoly to a more competitive market. Of the three primary components (generation, transmission, and distribution) of the traditional vertically integrated monopoly, generation is leading this transformation. The desired outcome is a more efficient market for the provision of electric service, ultimately resulting in lower costs to customers. This book focuses on impediments to this transformation. In partiCUlar, it argues that information control is a form of market power that inhibits the evolution of the market. The analysis is presented within the context of the transformation of the U. S.

Regulating Power

Regulating Power
Author: Carl Pechman
Publisher: Kluwer Academic Pub
Total Pages: 229
Release: 1993-01-01
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 0792393473

This book examines the economics of an industry that has become a critical component of modern life - the electric utility industry. The public nature of electricity has affected the development of the industry, both private and public. While this book focuses on private utilities, it recognizes the potential for a resurgence of public ownership. The objective of the book is to examine factors that will affect the evolution of markets for power. Of critical importance is the role of information, which is required for making and evaluating decisions in power markets. This book demonstrates that utilities can exploit information as a source of market power, impeding the development of more competitive and efficient markets. To a large extent the source of the utilities' market power is the ability to specify computer models used in the planning, pricing and operation of markets for electricity. A number of concepts related to the use and control of information and models are developed in this book.

The Virtual Utility

The Virtual Utility
Author: Shimon Awerbuch
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Total Pages: 407
Release: 2012-12-06
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 1461561671

In the winter of 1996, after 4 years of planning and research, the Symposium on the Virtual Utility was held in Saratoga Springs, New York. It was sponsored by Niag ara Mohawk Power Corporation, Co-sponsored by CSC Index and the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority and hosted by Rensselaer Poly technic Institute, Troy, NY. The symposium sought to identify new areas of inquiry by presenting cutting-edge academic and practitioner research intended to further our understanding of the strategic, technologically-driven issues confronting the elec tricity production and distribution process. The program sought to offer new in sights into rapid changes in the utility industry, in part, by examining analogues from manufacturing and telecommunications. In addition to identifying new research areas, the symposium yielded a number of important findings and conclusions. This volume contains the presented papers of the meeting, the discussant reports and two special papers prepared by the meet ing rapporteurs who performed superbly in analyzing, synthesizing, explaining and generally bringing a cohesive perspective to the interesting yet complex set of ideas presented at this unique meeting. We would like to acknowledge the people and organizations that contributed to this effort. We thank Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation and Albert Budney, its President & Chief Operating Officer for sponsoring this project, and Andrew Vesey, Vice President, I whose vision, support and championing made this project possible.

Managing Change in the Postal and Delivery Industries

Managing Change in the Postal and Delivery Industries
Author: Michael A. Crew
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Total Pages: 428
Release: 2012-12-06
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 1461563216

Managing Change in the Postal and Delivery Industries brings together practitioners, postal administrators, the express industry, regulators, economists and lawyers to examine the important policy and regulatory issues facing the postal and delivery industries. This volume reviews such topics as international postal policy, the universal service obligation, regulation and competition, entry and the role of scale and scope economics, cost analysis in postal services, and service standards. This book provides a unique perspective on the problems facing postal and delivery networks.

Opening Networks to Competition

Opening Networks to Competition
Author: David Gabel
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Total Pages: 246
Release: 2012-12-06
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 1461554837

David Gabel and David F. Weiman The chapters in this volwne address the related problems of regulating and pricing access in network industries. Interconnection between network suppliers raises the important policy questions of how to sustain competition and realize economic efficiency. To foster rivalry in any industry, suppliers must have access to customers. But unlike in other sectors, the very organization of network industries creates major impediments to potential entrants trying to carve out a niche in the market. In traditional sectors such as gas, electric, rail, and telephone services, these barriers take the form of the large private and social costs necessary to duplicate the physical infrastructure of pipelines, wires, or tracks. Few firms can afford to finance such an undertaking, because the level of sunk costs and the very large scale economies make it extremely risky. In other newer sectors, entrants face less tangible but no less pressing constraints. In the microcomputer industry, for example, high switching costs can prevent users from experimenting with alternative, but perhaps more efficient hardware platforms or operating systems. Although gateway technologies can reduce these barriers, the installed base of an incumbent can create powerful bandwagon effects that reinforce its advantage (such as the greater availability of compatible peripherals and software applications). In the era of electronic banking, entrants into the automated teller machine· (A TM) and credit card markets face a similar problem of establishing a ubiquitous presence.

Regulation and Economic Analysis

Regulation and Economic Analysis
Author: R.L. Gordon
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Total Pages: 279
Release: 2013-03-09
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 1461526205

Regulation and Economic Analysis: A Critique Over Two Centuries argues that long experience with the practice of regulation creates a broad anti-intervention consensus among economists. This consensus is based on comparison of real intervention to real markets rather than an ideological preconception. It is shown that economic theory can support all possible positions on intervention. Much theory is too abstract to support any policy position; many arguments about how intervention might help contain qualifications expressing doubts about whether the potential can be realized; many theories illustrate the drawbacks of intervention. The vast literature on these issues concentrates either on specific cases or polemics that exaggerate both sides of the argument. Regulation and Economic Analysis seeks to show the depth of the discontent, develop interpretations of economic theory that follow from skepticism about statism and provide selected illustrations. The discussion begins with examination of general equilibrium theory and proceeds to discuss market failure with stress on monopoly and particularly what is deemed excessive concern with predatory behavior. International trade issues, transaction costs, property rights, economic theories of government, the role of special institutions such as contracts, the defects of macroeconomic and equity arguments for regulating individual markets, environmental economics and the defects of public land management policies are examined.

Incentive Regulation and the Regulation of Incentives

Incentive Regulation and the Regulation of Incentives
Author: Glenn Blackmon
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Total Pages: 138
Release: 2012-12-06
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 1461527066

The class is theory of price regulation assumed that the regulator knows the fIrm's costs, the key piece of information that enables regulators to pressure fmns to choose appropriate behaviors. The "regulatory problem" was reduced to a mere pricing problem: the regulator's goal was to align price with marginal cost, subject to the constraint that revenues must cover costs. Elegant and important insights ensued. The most important was that regulation was inevitably a struggle to achieve second-best outcomes. (Ramsey pricing was a splendid example. ) Reality proved harsh to regulatory theory. The fmn's costs are by no means known to the regulator. At best, the regulator may know how much is currently spent to provide services, but hardly what costs would be if the fmn vigorously pursued effIciency. Even if the current cost curve were known to the regulator, technologies change so swiftly that today's costs are a very poor indicator of tomorrow's, and those are the costs that will determine the fIrm's future decisions. With the burgeoning attention to information considerations and game theory in economics, the regulator's problem of eliciting host information about cost has received considerable attention. In most cases, however, it has been in context that are both static and stylized; such analyses rarely capture many of the essential elements of real world regulatory issues. This volume represents a fresh approach. It reflects Glenn Blackmon's twin strengths, a keen analytic mind and important experience in the regulatory arena.

Health Care Policy and Regulation

Health Care Policy and Regulation
Author: Thomas A. Abbott III
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Total Pages: 260
Release: 2012-12-06
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 1461522196

5 care reforms. Part II: Price Regulation The second partofthis volume examines the role ofprice regulation in controlling health care costs. It contains three chapters. In chapter seven, I examine the alternatives for regulating pharmaceutical prices. In chapter eight, Jack Hadley examines the impactofvarious forms ofhospital price regulation; while in chapter nine,MarkPaulyexaminestheroleofpriceregulation incontrollingphysician fees. Chapter seven focuses on the issue of regulating pharmaceutical prices. There are two key issues examined in this paper. First, is there a clear need for price regulation, and second, can price regulation work in this industry? In response to the first question, I come to the conclusion that the proponents ofprice regulation have not really proven their case. Although the financial returns in the pharmaceu tical industry have been slightly higher than expected during the 1970s and 1980s, there is not overwhelming evidence of"price gouging" or excessive profits on the part of the industry. In response to the second question, the answer is clearly no. The traditional approaches to price regulation will not have the intended affect of eliminating excess profits from the industry while maintaining the incentives for research and development. First, rate-of-return regulation, the most natural approach, would result in many adverse incentives-includingexcessive investment in research and developmentinorderto inflatetheratebaseused tocalculatedtheallowablereturns.

The Historiography of Contemporary Science and Technology

The Historiography of Contemporary Science and Technology
Author: Thomas Söderquist
Publisher: Routledge
Total Pages: 278
Release: 2013-01-11
Genre: History
ISBN: 1135851670

More than ninety percent of all scientific history has been made during the last half century. So far, however, only a fraction of historical scholarship has dealt with this period. Merely a decade ago, most scientific historians considered recent science - the scientific culture created, lived and remembered by contemporary scientists - an area of study best left to the historical actors themselves.

Regulation and Macroeconomic Performance

Regulation and Macroeconomic Performance
Author: Brian L. Goff
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Total Pages: 152
Release: 2012-12-06
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 1461313430

This project grew out of a recognition that I could fmd no aggregate measure of the amount of regulation beyond crude proxies such as the number of pages in the Federal Register. As I began to address this specific issue. I became much more aware of two things -- the enormity of regulation in the u.s. economy and the relative absence of economic research into the macroeconomic consequences of those regulations. While I would have readily granted the idea that many economist'> knew more about regulation than I did, I would have thought my knowledge of regulation to be at least up to the average economist's. My graduate training in the early to mid 1980s included special attention to the field of "public choice" and related topics, all of which occasionally explored regulatory topics. Moreover. I had at least a passing knowledge of the debates concerning deregulation in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Because of this, my own ignorance of regulation's actual expanse and its aggregate consequences startled me and heightened my interest in expanding empirical research into regulation as a macroeconomic influence. The more I thought about graduate macroeconomics classes and texts, the more that I realized the exclusion of regulation as a macroeconomic topic in spite of its massive scale and far-reaching tentacles.