On Incentives To Help In Multi Agent Situations
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Author | : Hideshi Itō |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 50 |
Release | : 1988 |
Genre | : Incentives in industry |
ISBN | : |
This paper concerns moral hazard problems in multi-agent situations where cooperation is an issue. Each agent chooses his own effort, which improves stochastically the outcome of his own job. Agents also choose the amount of 'help' to extend to other agents, which improves the performance of other agents. By selecting appropriate compensation schemes, the principal can design the task structure of the firm: The principal may prefer an unambiguous division labor, where each agent is inclined not to help other agents and specializes in his own job. Or the principal may prefer teamwork where each agent is motivated to help other agents. The analysis identifies two important determinants in choosing the optimal task structure; the effect of 'interpersonal interaction' and the attitude of the agents in providing 'small' amounts of help.
Author | : Susan Pickard Ravenscroft |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 356 |
Release | : 1989 |
Genre | : Bonuses (Employee fringe benefits) |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Matthew G. Springer |
Publisher | : Rowman & Littlefield |
Total Pages | : 348 |
Release | : 2009-12-01 |
Genre | : Education |
ISBN | : 0815701950 |
The concept of pay for performance for public school teachers is growing in popularity and use, and it has resurged to once again occupy a central role in education policy. Performance Incentives: Their Growing Impact on American K-12 Education offers the most up-to-date and complete analysis of this promising—yet still controversial—policy innovation. Performance Incentives brings together an interdisciplinary team of experts, providing an unprecedented discussion and analysis of the pay-for-performance debate by • Identifying the potential strengths and weaknesses of tying pay to student outcomes; • Comparing different strategies for measuring teacher accomplishments; • Addressing key conceptual and implemen - tation issues; • Describing what teachers themselves think of merit pay; • Examining recent examples in Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, and Texas; • Studying the overall impact on student achievement.
Author | : Robert S. Gibbons |
Publisher | : Princeton University Press |
Total Pages | : 1248 |
Release | : 2013 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 0691132798 |
(E-book available via MyiLibrary) In even the most market-oriented economies, most economic transactions occur not in markets but inside managed organizations, particularly business firms. Organizational economics seeks to understand the nature and workings of such organizations and their impact on economic performance. The Handbook of Organizational Economics surveys the major theories, evidence, and methods used in the field. It displays the breadth of topics in organizational economics, including the roles of individuals and groups in organizations, organizational structures and processes, the boundaries of the firm, contracts between and within firms, and more.
Author | : Jed DeVaro |
Publisher | : Emerald Group Publishing |
Total Pages | : 327 |
Release | : 2011-09-20 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 0857247603 |
Contains a stimulating collection of original papers spanning a variety of topics. This title contains three papers on the subject of job design and organizational performance, covering the determinants of multiskilling from a theoretical perspective and also the empirical effect of multiskilling and teams on financial performance.
Author | : David M. Kreps |
Publisher | : Princeton University Press |
Total Pages | : 869 |
Release | : 2020-06-23 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 069121574X |
David M. Kreps has developed a text in microeconomics that is both challenging and "user-friendly." The work is designed for the first-year graduate microeconomic theory course and is accessible to advanced undergraduates as well. Placing unusual emphasis on modern noncooperative game theory, it provides the student and instructor with a unified treatment of modern microeconomic theory--one that stresses the behavior of the individual actor (consumer or firm) in various institutional settings. The author has taken special pains to explore the fundamental assumptions of the theories and techniques studied, pointing out both strengths and weaknesses. The book begins with an exposition of the standard models of choice and the market, with extra attention paid to choice under uncertainty and dynamic choice. General and partial equilibrium approaches are blended, so that the student sees these approaches as points along a continuum. The work then turns to more modern developments. Readers are introduced to noncooperative game theory and shown how to model games and determine solution concepts. Models with incomplete information, the folk theorem and reputation, and bilateral bargaining are covered in depth. Information economics is explored next. A closing discussion concerns firms as organizations and gives readers a taste of transaction-cost economics.
Author | : Leon A. Petrosjan |
Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
Total Pages | : 410 |
Release | : 2013-04-17 |
Genre | : Mathematics |
ISBN | : 3662052199 |
Since the first Congress in Zürich in 1897, the ICM has been an eagerly awaited event every four years. Many of these occasions are celebrated for historie developments and seminal contributions to mathematics. 2002 marks the year of the 24th ICM, the first of the new millennium. Also historie is the first ICM Satellite Conference devoted to game theory and applications. It is one of those rare occasions, in which masters of the field are able to meet under congenial surroundings to talk and share their gathered wisdom. As is usually the case in ICM meetings, participants of the ICM Satellite Conference on Game Theory and Applications (Qingdao, August 2(02) hailed from the four corners of the world. In addition to presentations of high qual ity research, the program also included twelve invited plenary sessions with distinguished speakers. This volume, which gathers together selected papers read at the conference, is divided into four sections: (I) Foundations, Concepts, and Structure. (II) Equilibrium Properties. (III) Applications to the Natural and Social Sciences. (IV) Computational Aspects of Games.
Author | : Nicolai J. Foss |
Publisher | : Taylor & Francis |
Total Pages | : 344 |
Release | : 2000 |
Genre | : Business enterprises |
ISBN | : 9780415196390 |
Author | : Bernard Salanie |
Publisher | : MIT Press |
Total Pages | : 257 |
Release | : 2005-03-11 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 0262257874 |
A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition. The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries. This popular text, revised and updated throughout for the second edition, serves as a concise and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists. The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard. It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics. The goal is to give readers the tools to understand the basic models and create their own. For the second edition, major changes have been made to chapter 3, on examples and extensions for the adverse selection model, which now includes more thorough discussions of multiprincipals, collusion, and multidimensional adverse selection, and to chapter 5, on moral hazard, with the limited liability model, career concerns, and common agency added to its topics. Two chapters have been completely rewritten: chapter 7, on the theory of incomplete contracts, and chapter 8, on the empirical literature in the theory of contracts. An appendix presents concepts of noncooperative game theory to supplement chapters 4 and 6. Exercises follow chapters 2 through 5. Praise for the previous edition: “The Economics of Contracts offers an excellent introduction to agency models. Written by one of the leading young researchers in contact theory, it is rigorous, clear, concise, and up-to-date. Researchers and students who want to learn about the economics of incentives will want to read this primer.”—Jean Tirole, Institut D'Économie Industrielle, Universite des Sciences Sociales, France “Students will find this a very useful introduction to the ideas of contract theory. Salanié has managed to summarize a large amount of material in a relatively short number of pages in a highly accessible and readable manner.”—Oliver Hart, Professor of Economics, Harvard University
Author | : Liza Vertinsky |
Publisher | : Routledge |
Total Pages | : 236 |
Release | : 2019-01-15 |
Genre | : Law |
ISBN | : 0429876491 |
First published in 1999. This book provides a law and economics approach towards criminal gangs which integrates the tools of economic modelling with criminal law in order to understand and address a contemporary law enforcement problem. The book draws upon ideas from economics, law and law enforcement to investigate the nature and organizational structure of criminal gangs. Law and economics are employed in varying combinations and at varying levels of specificity to generate insights into the organization and behaviour of criminal gangs. These insights are applied to evaluate alternative legal approaches and to inform the design of a new criminal law approach towards criminal gangs. Attention is focused on the organization of criminal street gangs, both because the growth and increasing sophistication of these gangs offer special challenges for law enforcement and because of the potential contributions which such an understanding could yield for economists who have traditionally focused on the organizational structure of legitimate enterprises.