Interchange Fee Economics

Interchange Fee Economics
Author: Jakub Górka
Publisher: Springer
Total Pages: 196
Release: 2018-11-29
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 3030030415

Interchange fees have been the focal point for debate in the card industry, among competition authorities and policy makers, as well as in the economic literature on two-sided markets and on the regulation of market failures. This book offers insight into the economics of interchange fees. First, it explains the nature of two-sided markets/platforms/networks and elaborates on four-party schemes and on the rationale behind interchange fees according to Baxter’s model and its later refinements. It also includes the debate about the optimum level of interchange fees and its determination (“tourist test”), and presents the original framework for assessing the impact of interchange fee regulatory reductions for the market participants: consumers, merchants, acquirers, issuers, and card organisations. The framework addresses three areas of concern in reference to the transmission channels of interchange fee reductions (pass-through) and the card scheme domain (triangle: payment organisation, issuer, acquirer). The book discusses the effects of regulatory interchange fee reductions in Australia, USA, Spain, and, most specifically, Poland. It will be of interest to policy makers, card and payments industry practitioners, academics, and students.

Interchange Fees

Interchange Fees
Author: David S. Evans
Publisher: CreateSpace
Total Pages: 226
Release: 2011-09-22
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 9781466368576

Interchange fees have become increasingly controversial. These fees constitute the bulk of the cost that merchants incur for taking cards because most consumers pay with a card from a four-party system that assesses these fees. The total interchange fees paid by merchants have increased dramatically as consumers have switched to electronic payments. Merchants have complained, have filed lawsuits, and have lobbied governments to do something about this. Meanwhile governments around the world have intensified their examination of these fees. For example, the US Congress passed legislation in 2010 that required the Federal Reserve Board to regulate debit card interchange fees; the Reserve Bank of Australia decided to regulate credit card interchange fees in 2002 after concluding that a market failure had resulted in merchants paying fees that were too high; and in 2007 the European Commission ruled that MasterCard's interchange fees violated the EU's antitrust laws. The controversy raises two broad issues. The first relates to how payment card systems decide how much merchants should pay for taking cards either through the interchange fee for four-party systems or the merchant discount for three party systems. The second concerns whether the setting of interchange fees by private businesses results in a market failure and if so what if any regulation should be adopted to correct this market failure. This interchange fee debate helped stimulate a new literature on multi-sided platforms or what are sometimes called two-sided markets. Payment card systems serve as intermediaries between merchants and consumers and operate a platform that enables these two different kinds of customers to interact. It turns out that there are many other businesses that have similar features including software platforms like the iPhone OS, shopping malls, search engines, and exchanges. Economists have developed general models of multi-sided businesses and applied them to payment cards.

The Economics of Payment Card Interchange Fees and the Limits of Regulation

The Economics of Payment Card Interchange Fees and the Limits of Regulation
Author: Todd J. Zywicki
Publisher:
Total Pages: 64
Release: 2014
Genre:
ISBN:

Fresh off of the most substantial national liquidity crisis of the last generation and the enactment of sweeping credit card regulation in the form of the Credit CARD Act, Congress continues to deliberate, with a continuing drumbeat of support from lobbyists, a set of new regulations for credit card companies. These proposals, offered in the name of consumer protection, seek to constrain the setting of “interchange fees” - transaction charges integral to payment card systems - through a range of proposed political interventions. This article identifies both the theoretical and actual failings of such regulation. Payment cards are a secure, inexpensive, welfare-increasing payment mechanism largely unlike any other in history. Rather than increasing consumer welfare in any meaningful sense, interchange fee legislation represents an attempt by some merchants to shift costs away from their businesses and onto card issuing banks and cardholders. In particular, bank-issued credit cards offer a dramatic improvement in the efficiency and availability of consumer credit by shifting credit risk from merchants onto banks in exchange for the cost of the interchange fee - currently averaging less than 2% of purchase value. Merchants' efforts to cabin these fees would harm not only consumers but also the merchants themselves as commerce would depend more heavily on less-efficient paper-based payment systems. The consequence of interchange fee legislation, as Australia's experiment with such regulation demonstrates, would be reduced access to credit, higher interest rates for consumers, and the return of the much-loathed annual fee for credit cards. Interchange fee regulation threatens to constrain credit for consumers and small businesses as the American economy begins to convalesce from a serious “credit crunch,” and should be accordingly rejected.

The Law and Economics of Interchange Fees

The Law and Economics of Interchange Fees
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Energy and Commerce. Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection
Publisher:
Total Pages: 122
Release: 2006
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN:

Interchange Fees

Interchange Fees
Author: Richard Schmalensee
Publisher:
Total Pages: 20
Release: 2005
Genre:
ISBN:

This paper summarizes the key contributions to the literature on the economics of interchange fees. The older literature tries to address the issue without rigorous modeling. Thus, it was possible even after Baxter's seminal contribution to suggest, as did Carlton and Frankel, that society might be better off mandating a zero interchange fee. The more recent literature still leaves many theoretical and empirical questions unanswered. However, several conclusions can be drawn from the efforts to model interchange fees formally by Rochet and Tirole, Schmalensee, and Wright.The cost and demand factors driving private fee-setting are closely related to those that determine socially optimal fees. Moreover, any deviation from social optimality will be the result of subtle differences between the two sides of the market - not from market power leading to excess profits for association members. No rigorous analysis supports the idea that a zero interchange fee or a fee set by regulators based on cost would generally raise welfare. Furthermore, while there is no guarantee that interchange fees set by associations will maximize social welfare, this does not imply that collective rate-setting is appropriate grist for antitrust scrutiny. The hallmark of anticompetitive pricing is excess profits and less-than-optimal output. Yet, there is no reason to believe that private setting of interchange fees generates excess profits for the colluding parties since competition in acquiring and issuing activities can be expected to dissipate any surplus revenue. The interchange fee has the effect of lowering costs on one side of the market and raising them on the other. Nor will interchange fees set above the socially optimal level generally restrict output.

The Impact of the U.S. Debit Card Interchange Fee Regulation on Consumer Welfare

The Impact of the U.S. Debit Card Interchange Fee Regulation on Consumer Welfare
Author: David Sparks Evans
Publisher:
Total Pages: 60
Release: 2013
Genre: Banks and banking
ISBN:

The cost to merchants of taking payment on debit cards declined by more than 7 billion dollars annually as a result of the Durbin Amendment to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, while the effective cost to issuers of providing debit card services to consumers increased by a corresponding amount. This paper reports an event-study analysis of stock prices to determine the impact on consumers of the Durbin Amendment. Did consumers gain more from cost savings passed on by merchants, in the form of lower prices and better services, than they lost from cost increases passed on by banks, in the form of higher prices or less service? We find that consumers lost more on the bank side than they gained on the merchant side. Our estimate is that, based on the expectations of investors, the present discounted value of the losses for consumers as a result of the implementation of the Durbin Amendment is between 22 and 25 billion dollars.

Payment Systems and Interchange Fees

Payment Systems and Interchange Fees
Author: Richard Schmalensee
Publisher:
Total Pages: 31
Release: 2001
Genre: Credit card fees
ISBN:

In a typical bank credit card transaction, the merchant's bank pays an interchange fee, collectively determined by all participating banks, to the cardholder's bank. This paper shows how the interchange fee balances charges between cardholders and merchants under imperfect competition. The privately optimal fee depends mainly on differences between cardholders' and merchants' banks, not their collective market power. In a non-extreme case, the profit-maximizing interchange fee also maximizes total output and producers' plus consumers' surplus. There is no economic basis for favoring proprietary payment systems, which do not need interchange fees to balance charges, over the cooperative bank card systems

The Law and Economics of Interchange Fees

The Law and Economics of Interchange Fees
Author: United States. Congress
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
Total Pages: 116
Release: 2018-02-08
Genre:
ISBN: 9781985164291

The law and economics of interchange fees : hearing before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, second session, February 15, 2006.