Epistemic Blame
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| Author | : Cameron Boult |
| Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
| Total Pages | : 230 |
| Release | : 2024-07-12 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0192890611 |
Epistemic Blame is the first book-length philosophical examination of our practice of criticizing one another for epistemic failings. People clearly evaluate and critique one another for forming unjustified beliefs, harbouring biases, and pursuing faulty methods of inquiry. But what is the nature of this criticism? Does it ever amount to a kind of blame? And should we blame one another for epistemic failings? Through careful analysis of the concept of blame, and the nature of epistemic normativity, this book argues that there are competing sources of pressure inherent in the increasingly prominent notion of "epistemic blame". The more genuinely blame-like a response is, the less fitting in the epistemic domain it seems; but the more fitting in the epistemic domain a response is, the less genuinely blame-like it seems. These competing sources of pressure comprise a puzzle about epistemic blame. The most promising resolution of this puzzle lies in the interpersonal side of epistemic normativity. Drawing on work by T. M. Scanlon, R. J. Wallace, and others, Cameron Boult argues that members of epistemic communities stand in "epistemic relationships", and epistemic blame just is a way of modifying these relationships. By thinking of epistemic blame as a distinctive kind of relationship modification, we locate a response that is both robustly blame-like, and distinctly epistemic. The result is a ground-breaking new theory of epistemic blame, the relationship-based account. With a solution to the puzzle of epistemic blame in hand, a new project for social epistemology comes into view: the ethics of epistemic blame. Boult demonstrates the power of the relationship-based account to contribute to this project, develops a systematic analysis of standing to epistemically blame, and defends the value of epistemic blame in our social and political lives. He shows that epistemic relationships can also be used to illuminate foundational questions about epistemic normativity, responsibility for our beliefs and assertions, and a wide range of epistemic harms, such as epistemic exploitation and gaslighting. Throughout the investigation, a more structured and precise understanding of the parallels and points of interaction between the epistemic and practical domains emerges.
| Author | : Rik Peels |
| Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
| Total Pages | : 289 |
| Release | : 2017 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0190608110 |
This book develops and defends a theory of responsible belief. The author argues that we lack control over our beliefs, but that we can nonetheless influence them. It is because we have intellectual obligations to influence our beliefs that we are responsible for them.
| Author | : Paul K. Moser |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 304 |
| Release | : 1989 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 9780521423632 |
Philosophers have sought to define knowledge since the time of Plato. This inquiry outlines a theory of rational belief by challenging prominent skeptical claims that we have no justified beliefs about the external world.
| Author | : Jan Willem Wieland |
| Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
| Total Pages | : 312 |
| Release | : 2017 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0198779666 |
Philosophers have long agreed that moral responsibility might not only have a freedom condition, but also an epistemic condition. Moral responsibility and knowledge interact, but the question is exactly how. Ignorance might constitute an excuse, but the question is exactly when. Surprisingly enough, the epistemic condition has only recently attracted the attention of scholars. This volume sets the agenda. Sixteen new essays address the following central questions: Does the epistemic condition require akrasia? Why does blameless ignorance excuse? Does moral ignorance sustained by one's culture excuse? Does the epistemic condition involve knowledge of the wrongness or wrongmaking features of one's action? Is the epistemic condition an independent condition, or is it derivative from one's quality of will or intentions? Is the epistemic condition sensitive to degrees of difficulty? Are there different kinds of moral responsibility and thus multiple epistemic conditions? Is the epistemic condition revisionary? What is the basic structure of the epistemic condition?
| Author | : Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen |
| Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
| Total Pages | : 273 |
| Release | : 2023-11-03 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0197544592 |
""Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam out of thine own eye; and then shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy brother's eye" (Matthew 7:3-5), says the Bible. The "porridge-pot calls the kettle black-arse," says the non-religious proverb, making its first known literary appearance in Cervantes' (2008, 736) Don Quixote. Both sayings point to the same deep fact about the nature of blame-i.e., that blame is interpersonal in that there is something problematic about one person blaming another when the blamer's faults are similar (the pot is black too) or even greater (one would rather have a mote than have a beam in one's eye). Such blaming is hypocritical and, typically, we see ourselves as entitled to dismiss any hypocritical blame that is directed at us. In fact, we often react quite strongly to being subjected to hypocritical blame. When we dismiss hypocritical blame, we might not deny that we have done something blameworthy (though, of course, we might). Accordingly, nor need we think that we would be entitled to dismiss blame from those who have a better moral record than our blamer. After all, those who dismiss their hypocritical brother's blame in the biblical saying do have a mote in their eye. Some think this renders our typical responses to hypocritical blame puzzling. If we have done something blameworthy, should not others-even people worse than us-be in a position to blame"--
| Author | : Quassim Cassam |
| Publisher | : Oxford University Press, USA |
| Total Pages | : 217 |
| Release | : 2019 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0198826907 |
Quassim Cassam introduces the idea of epistemic vices, character traits that get in the way of knowledge, such as closed-mindedness, intellectual arrogance, wishful thinking, and prejudice. Using examples from politics to illustrate the vices at work, he considers whether we are responsible for such failings, and what we can do about them.
| Author | : Abrol Fairweather |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 281 |
| Release | : 2014-03-27 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 1139867687 |
An epistemic virtue is a personal quality conducive to the discovery of truth, the avoidance of error, or some other intellectually valuable goal. Current work in epistemology is increasingly value-driven, but this volume presents the first collection of essays to explore whether virtue epistemology can also be naturalistic, in the philosophical definition meaning 'methodologically continuous with science'. The essays examine the empirical research in psychology on cognitive abilities and personal dispositions, meta-epistemic semantic accounts of virtue theoretic norms, the role of emotion in knowledge, 'ought-implies can' constraints, empirically and metaphysically grounded accounts of 'proper functioning', and even applied virtue epistemology in relation to education. Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue addresses many core issues in contemporary epistemology, presents new opportunities for work on epistemic abilities, epistemic virtues and cognitive character, and will be of great interest to those studying virtue ethics and epistemology.
| Author | : Sebastian Schmidt |
| Publisher | : Taylor & Francis |
| Total Pages | : 213 |
| Release | : 2024-11-25 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 1040260896 |
This book develops the foundations of an ethics of mind by investigating the responsibility that is presupposed by the requirements of rationality that govern our attitudes. It thereby connects the most recent research on responsibility and rationality in a unifying dialectic. How can we be responsible for our attitudes if we cannot normally choose what we believe, desire, feel, and intend? This problem has received much attention during the last decades, both in epistemology and ethics. Yet, its connections to discussions about reasons and rationality have been largely overlooked. The book has five main goals. First, it reinterprets the problem of responsibility for attitudes as a problem about the normativity of rationality. Second, it connects substantive and structural rationality by drawing on debates about responsibility. Third, it supports recent accounts of the normativity of rationality by explicitly defending the view that epistemic reasons and other ‘right‐kind’ reasons are genuine normative reasons, and it does so by drawing on recent discussions about epistemic blame. Fourth, it breaks the stalemate between rationalist and voluntarist accounts of mental responsibility by proposing a hybrid view. Finally, it argues that being irrational can warrant moral blame, thus revealing an unnoticed normative force of rational requirements. Responsibility for Rationality is an original and essential resource for scholars and advanced students interested in connecting strands of normative theory within epistemology, metaethics, and moral psychology.
| Author | : Deborah K. Heikes |
| Publisher | : Springer Nature |
| Total Pages | : 237 |
| Release | : 2023-10-23 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 3031418581 |
This book considers whether we can be epistemically responsible for undesirable beliefs, such as racist and sexist ones. The problem with holding people responsible for their undesirable beliefs is: first, what constitutes an “undesirable belief” will differ among various epistemic communities; second, it is not clear what responsibility we have for beliefs simpliciter; and third, inherent in discussions of socially constructed ignorance (like white ignorance) is the idea that society is structured in such a way that white people are made deliberately unaware of their ignorance, which suggests their racial beliefs are not epistemically blameworthy. This book explores each of these topics with the aim of establishing the nature of undesirable beliefs and our responsibility for these beliefs with the understanding that there may well be (rare) occasions when undesirable beliefs are not epistemically culpable.
| Author | : Kevin McCain |
| Publisher | : Routledge |
| Total Pages | : 446 |
| Release | : 2020-10-11 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0429638620 |
There are arguably moral, legal, and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. It features a wide variety of positions, ranging from arguments for and against the existence of purely epistemic requirements, reductions of epistemic requirements to moral or prudential requirements, the biological foundations of epistemic requirements, extensions of the scope of epistemic requirements to include such things as open-mindedness, eradication of implicit bias and interpersonal duties to object, to new applications such as epistemic requirements pertaining to storytelling, testimony, and fundamentalist beliefs. Anyone interested in the nature of responsibility, belief, or epistemic normativity will find a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas in this cutting-edge anthology. Chapter 14 of this book is freely available as a downloadable Open Access PDF at http://www.taylorfrancis.com under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives (CC-BY-NC-ND) 4.0 license.
