Dual Labor Markets And The Equilibrium Distribution Of Firms
Download Dual Labor Markets And The Equilibrium Distribution Of Firms full books in PDF, epub, and Kindle. Read online free Dual Labor Markets And The Equilibrium Distribution Of Firms ebook anywhere anytime directly on your device. Fast Download speed and no annoying ads. We cannot guarantee that every ebooks is available!
Author | : Josep Pijoan-Mas |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 0 |
Release | : 2022 |
Genre | : Contracts for work and labor |
ISBN | : |
We study the effects of a dual labor market structure on firm dynamics, the firm size distribution, and aggregate productivity. Using rich Spanish administrative data, we document that the usage of fixed-term (FT) contracts is very heterogeneous across firms within narrowly defined sectors, and that the share of temporary workers increases monotonically with firm size. We write an equilibrium search-and-matching model of firm dynamics with FT and open-ended (OE) contracts to understand the choice of contract type by heterogeneous firms and the equilibrium joint distribution of employment and temporary share across firms. A key feature of the calibrated economy is that matching efficiency is much larger in the FT than in the OE market. Because of this, firms face a trade-off between the lower costs of attracting workers to FT contracts and the higher turnover of FT vacancies. With decreasing returns to scale, the opportunity cost of unfilled vacancies is lower for larger firms, so these firms hire a higher fraction of temporary workers. In equilibrium, the dual labor market structure makes it difficult for firms to become large because of the high turnover of FT contracts and the strong competition of smaller firms for OE contracts. In counterfactual exercises, we find that limiting the duration of FT contracts decreases the share of temporary employment and the unemployment rate, but at the expense of firm destruction and lower aggregate productivity. Instead, making FT contracts more similar to OE contracts by increasing their duration allows the economy to expand through a reduction in the unemployment rate and an increase in aggregate productivity.
Author | : Gilles Saint-Paul |
Publisher | : MIT Press |
Total Pages | : 248 |
Release | : 1996 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 9780262193764 |
Uses theoretical models to analyse the macroeconomic implications of the dual labour market. Includes an introduction to the techniques of dynamic programming and the matching function.
Author | : James W. Albrecht |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 38 |
Release | : 1991 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Thierry J. Noyelle |
Publisher | : Routledge |
Total Pages | : 139 |
Release | : 2019-04-11 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 0429721846 |
This book attempts to identify some principal dimensions of the process of market and job restructuring by means of case studies of service companies. It places special emphasis on the job restructuring issue and, in particular, on the decline of internal labor markets in the U.S. economy.
Author | : James B. Rebitzer |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : |
Release | : 2014 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
Dual labor market theory is an attempt to understand observed variation in wages and job quality. The theory argues that market processes tend to produce "primary" jobs characterized by high wages and longjob tenure, and "contingent" (or "secondary") jobs that typically offer low wages and short tenure. The key feature distinguishing dual labor market theory from such alternative explanations as human capital theory or the theory of compensating wage differentials, is the nature of the labor market equilibrium. In dual labor market theory, equilibrium is characterized by an excess supply of qualified workers to primary jobs. Mobility between contingent and primary jobs will therefore be limited, and "good" workers may be stuck in "bad" jobs.
Author | : Sherwin Rosen |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 70 |
Release | : 1983 |
Genre | : Division of labor |
ISBN | : |
This paper exposits the modern theory of equalizing differences, viewed as optimal assignments of workers to jobs. The basic ideas are first illustrated in a simple model with binary choices of work attributes. Multinominal choices are briefly considered after that. Empirical implications are stressed, with special emphasis on elements of selectivity and stratification by tastes and technology. Applications are sketched for certain aspects of the economics of discrimination, human capital, the value of safety and the theory of implicit contracts. Issues raised by assignment stratification according to worker traits and productivities are discussed, and the principle sorting model by comparative advantageis outlined. The implied valuation system on personal traits and its relationship to factor-analytic models, as well as selectivity issues in educational and occupational choice illustrate this aspect of the theory.
Author | : William A. Darity, Jr. |
Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
Total Pages | : 307 |
Release | : 2012-12-06 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 940112938X |
William Darity, Jr. In 1984 the Kluwer series in Modern Economic Thought, under the editorial direction of Warren Samuels, brought out a book under my editorship entitled Labor Economics: Modern Views. It consisted of a series of essays and commentaries that sought, in a critical fashion, to assess the state of the art in the field of labor economics with respect to several themes. These included methodology versus practice, the analysis of discrimination by gender and race, the phenomenon of persistent racial differences in un employment exposure, occupational safety and health regulation, dual versus segmented labor markets, and the remnants of the Phillips curve trade-off between unemployment and inflation. Nearly a decade later I was approached by Warren Samuels and Kluwer about editing a new book that would again address where things stand in labor economics. In proceeding with the development of this current book I was a struck by the extent to which the research thrust that was apparent in the early 1980s remains intact as we move toward the 21st century. The vast majority of scholarship in the labor subfield is dominated by the methodological orientation of applied neoclassical microeconomics, supplemented by incursions from the themes that occupy the so-called "pure theorists," particularly of the game theoretic variety.
Author | : Samuel Rosenberg |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 398 |
Release | : 1975 |
Genre | : Employment (Economic theory) |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Audra J. Bowlus |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 40 |
Release | : 1995 |
Genre | : Equilibrium (Economics) |
ISBN | : |
Author | : David H. Autor |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 44 |
Release | : 2008 |
Genre | : Industrial relations |
ISBN | : |
Labor Market Intermediaries (LMIs) are entities or institutions that interpose themselves between workers and firms to facilitate, inform, or regulate how workers are matched to firms, how work is accomplished, and how conflicts are resolved. This paper offers a conceptual foundation for analyzing the market role played by these understudied institutions, and to develop a qualitative and, in some cases, quantitative sense of their significance to market operation and welfare. Though heterogeneous, I argue that LMIs share a common function, which is to redress -- and in some cases exploit -- a set of endemic departures of labor market operation from the efficient neoclassical benchmark. At a rudimentary level, LMIs such as online job boards reduce search frictions by aggregating and reselling disparate information at a cost below which workers and firms could obtain themselves. Beyond passively supplying information, a set of LMIs forcibly redress adverse selection problems in labor markets by compelling workers and firms to reveal normally hidden credentials, such as criminal background, academic standing, or financial integrity. At their most forceful, LMIs such as labor unions and centralized job matching clearinghouses, resolve coordination and collective action failures in markets by tightly controlling -- even monopolizing -- the process by which workers and firms meet, match and negotiate. A unifying observation of the analytic framework is that participation in the activities of a given LMI are typically voluntary for one side of the market and compulsory for the other; workers cannot, for example, elect to suppress their criminal records and firms cannot opt out of collective bargaining. I argue that the nature of participation in an LMI's activities -- voluntary or compulsory, and for which parties -- is dictated by the market imperfection that it addresses and thus tells us much about its economic function.