This research paper explores the history of U.S. security cooperation programs in Central Asia from 1993 to the present, identifying five distinct phases of development as those programs sought to achieve U.S. objectives in denuclearization and proliferation prevention, democratization and military reform, regional cooperation, and improvement of military capabilities. These security cooperation efforts were limited by a variety of factors, including the lack of political and economic reform in the region, Russian influence through bilateral cooperation agreements and multilateral security institutions, constrained resources, diffuse objectives and multiplying recipients, and U.S. policies that restrained commitment to Central Asia. Each of the programs available to U.S. planners had strengths and weaknesses, but these programs were not always integrated in a fashion to achieve the best results. The linkages between the specific activities and the ultimate objectives have not always been constant and still may not always be clear. As a result, the United States has had mixed results in building relationships, developing capabilities, and providing access. The United States should focus its efforts on Kazakhstan, more closely integrate the existing security cooperation programs within the Defense Department and across the U.S. government, leverage the assistance programs of North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners, and seek to employ a strategy of persistent engagement against a limited number of clearly defined objectives.