Corporate Payout Policy

Corporate Payout Policy
Author: Harry DeAngelo
Publisher: Now Publishers Inc
Total Pages: 215
Release: 2009
Genre: Corporations
ISBN: 1601982046

Corporate Payout Policy synthesizes the academic research on payout policy and explains "how much, when, and how". That is (i) the overall value of payouts over the life of the enterprise, (ii) the time profile of a firm's payouts across periods, and (iii) the form of those payouts. The authors conclude that today's theory does a good job of explaining the general features of corporate payout policies, but some important gaps remain. So while our emphasis is to clarify "what we know" about payout policy, the authors also identify a number of interesting unresolved questions for future research. Corporate Payout Policy discusses potential influences on corporate payout policy including managerial use of payouts to signal future earnings to outside investors, individuals' behavioral biases that lead to sentiment-based demands for distributions, the desire of large block stockholders to maintain corporate control, and personal tax incentives to defer payouts. The authors highlight four important "carry-away" points: the literature's focus on whether repurchases will (or should) drive out dividends is misplaced because it implicitly assumes that a single payout vehicle is optimal; extant empirical evidence is strongly incompatible with the notion that the primary purpose of dividends is to signal managers' views of future earnings to outside investors; over-confidence on the part of managers is potentially a first-order determinant of payout policy because it induces them to over-retain resources to invest in dubious projects and so behavioral biases may, in fact, turn out to be more important than agency costs in explaining why investors pressure firms to accelerate payouts; the influence of controlling stockholders on payout policy --- particularly in non-U.S. firms, where controlling stockholders are common --- is a promising area for future research. Corporate Payout Policy is required reading for both researchers and practitioners interested in understanding this central topic in corporate finance and governance.

The Evolving Relation between Earnings, Dividends, and Stock Repurchases

The Evolving Relation between Earnings, Dividends, and Stock Repurchases
Author: Douglas J. Skinner
Publisher:
Total Pages: 60
Release: 2006
Genre:
ISBN:

There have been fundamental changes in corporate dividend policy over the last several decades (Fama and French, 2001; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner, 2000). To shed new light on the disappearance of dividends, this paper examines how the relation between earnings and corporate payout policy changes over the last 50 years. Since 1980, two groups of payers emerge: firms that both pay dividends and make repurchases and firms that only make repurchases. For firms that both pay dividends and make repurchases, managers increasingly coordinate dividend and repurchase decisions in a way that maps total payouts into earnings. Because managers use repurchases to pay out earnings increases, this helps to explain why dividend policy becomes increasingly conservative. The large majority of these firms have paid dividends for decades. Earnings do a good job of explaining payouts for firms that only make repurchases as well, suggesting that newer firms without a dividends history use repurchases in place of dividends. Overall, the evidence suggests that corporate earnings now drive total firm payouts - dividends and repurchases - and that repurchases play an increasingly important role, which helps to explain the disappearance of dividends.

Payout Policy

Payout Policy
Author:
Publisher:
Total Pages: 83
Release: 2007
Genre: Corporations
ISBN: 9781846632563

Dividend policy continues to be among the premier unsolved puzzles in finance. A number of theories have been advanced to explain dividend policy. This e-book briefly reviews the principal theories of payout policy and dividend policy and summarizes the empirical evidence on these theories. Empirical evidence is equivocal and the search for new explanation for dividends continues.

Accounting Disclosures and Corporate Payout Policy

Accounting Disclosures and Corporate Payout Policy
Author: David Gelb
Publisher:
Total Pages:
Release: 2000
Genre:
ISBN:

This study examines whether the choice of stock repurchases versus special dividends for one-time cash distributions is related to the level of a firm?s accounting disclosures. The results indicate that firms providing more informative accounting disclosures are more likely to announce stock repurchase programs as a means for one-time cash distributions. In contrast, firms that provide less informative accounting disclosures tend to rely on special dividends for one-time cash distributions. These findings are consistent with prior studies that argue that information costs associated with stock repurchases limit their use as a payout method.

Payout Composition and Investors' Reaction to Dividend and Stock Repurchase Announcements

Payout Composition and Investors' Reaction to Dividend and Stock Repurchase Announcements
Author: David Gelb
Publisher:
Total Pages: 28
Release: 2000
Genre:
ISBN:

This study investigates the relative magnitude of the market reactions to dividend and stock repurchase announcements. Prior studies motivate conflicting predictions as to how investors perceive dividend distributions versus stock repurchase announcements as signals about future cash flows. Lucas and McDonald (1998) predict that firms with more favorable private information will pay less dividends and repurchase more shares. Other studies (Brickley [1983], Jagannathan et al. [1999]) argue that an increase in the regular dividend, because it entails an implicit commitment to maintain the higher payout level in future periods, represents a more positive signal about future cash flows. These studies predict that firms anticipating a more quot;permanentquot; increase in cash flows are more likely to distribute dividends than stock repurchases.I test these competing hypotheses by investigating how the market reaction to an announced distribution is affected by the composition of the firm's total (year-to-date) announced cash payout during the fiscal year. Lucas and McDonald (1998) argue that firms employ a combination of dividends and stock repurchases to minimize their total signaling costs and the market reaction to an announced cash distribution depends on the composition of the total payout (the proportion of the announced stock repurchase program to the sum of the announced value of the stock repurchase program and the dividend increase). I find that after controlling for the magnitude of the distribution and the information environment, the market reaction is more favorable when regular (but not one-time) dividends comprise a larger proportion of the total payout. My findings suggest that regular dividends are a more positive signal about future cash flows and elicit a more favorable market reaction than stock repurchases.Key Words: Corporate signaling; Dividends; Stock repurchases.

Corporate Dividends

Corporate Dividends
Author: Donald Kehl
Publisher: Ayer Publishing
Total Pages: 367
Release: 1976-01-01
Genre: Law
ISBN: 9780405075551

The author provides a history and analysis of the statutes and judicial decisions relating to dividend payments in both Great Britain and the United States.

Evidence on How Companies Choose Between Dividends and Open-Market Stock Repurchases

Evidence on How Companies Choose Between Dividends and Open-Market Stock Repurchases
Author: Eli Bartov
Publisher:
Total Pages:
Release: 2013
Genre:
ISBN:

Dividends and open-market stock repurchases are by far the two most common mechanisms for distributing excess cash to shareholders. This article identifies and then tests three potentially important factors for the corporate choice between increasing cash dividends and initiating openmarket stock repurchases. More specifically, the authors argue that companies are more likely to distribute cash to investors through open-market repurchases than through dividend increases when (1) management believes its stock is undervalued, (2) management compensation packages include stock options, and (3) the company's stockholder base is dominated by institutional investors.To test these three explanations, the authors use a matched-pair design in which each company announcing an open market repurchase program in a given year is matched with a comparable-size firm from the same industry that increased its cash dividends but did not initiate an open-market repurchase program. As predicted, the results suggest that equity undervaluation, management compensation, and the level of institutional holdings are all important contributors to corporate choices between dividend increases and open-market repurchases.

Stock repurchase and abnormal returns in den USA and Germany

Stock repurchase and abnormal returns in den USA and Germany
Author: Jan Heise
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
Total Pages: 21
Release: 2008-02-26
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 3638012379

Seminar paper from the year 2006 in the subject Business economics - Investment and Finance, grade: A+, University of Massachusetts - Dartmouth (Charlton Business School), course: Masters Kurs: Finance for Decision Making, language: English, abstract: Two of the most prominent trends in corporate finance in the U.S. during the past 15 years are the growing popularity of share repurchases and the decreasing popularity of dividends. Repurchasing stocks is another way for managers to distribute money to shareholders, thus it plays an equivalent role as dividend payments. Consistent with Grullon and Michaely (2002) U.S. corporations distribute cash by rather repurchasing stock than by paying dividends to shareholders. Fama and French (2001) argue in the same direction. Their study provides evidence that the proportion of corporations paying cash dividends fell from 66.5% in 1978 to 20.8% in 1999. According to Grullon’s (2000) findings the total of share repurchases exceeded the total of dividend payment for industrial firms in 1998. In Germany share repurchases were highly restricted until 1998. As a consequence the volume of repurchases was small. The popularity of repurchases in the U.S. and in other countries was a strong argument for lifting the restrictions. These days, German companies announce buybacks regularly. Although capital markets in the USA and Germany are efficient the impact of stock repurchase programs differ, resulting in higher stock performance after buyback announcements in Germany than in the USA.

Increasing Shareholder Value

Increasing Shareholder Value
Author: Harold Bierman Jr.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Total Pages: 149
Release: 2012-12-06
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 146151505X

Corporations earn incomes and amass wealth. There are many books offering advice how to increase the profitability of corporations by achieving excellence in operations and choosing the correct strategic path. Increasing Shareholder Value: Distribution Policy, A Corporate Finance Challenge is concerned with how the corporation should reward its shareholders after the incomes are earned. Investment decisions, capital structure, and dividend policy must be coordinated so that the well being of the firm's stockholders is considered in the planning process. The corporate planners should realize that the individual investors are also making plans, and the corporation can assist this planning process by making its own financial plans and strategies well known.