Contract Renegotiation Under Asymmetric Information
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Handbook of Insurance
| Author | : Georges Dionne |
| Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
| Total Pages | : 1133 |
| Release | : 2013-12-02 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1461401550 |
This new edition of the Handbook of Insurance reviews the last forty years of research developments in insurance and its related fields. A single reference source for professors, researchers, graduate students, regulators, consultants and practitioners, the book starts with the history and foundations of risk and insurance theory, followed by a review of prevention and precaution, asymmetric information, risk management, insurance pricing, new financial innovations, reinsurance, corporate governance, capital allocation, securitization, systemic risk, insurance regulation, the industrial organization of insurance markets and other insurance market applications. It ends with health insurance, longevity risk, long-term care insurance, life insurance financial products and social insurance. This second version of the Handbook contains 15 new chapters. Each of the 37 chapters has been written by leading authorities in risk and insurance research, all contributions have been peer reviewed, and each chapter can be read independently of the others.
Can Blockchain Solve the Hold-up Problem in Contracts?
| Author | : Richard Holden |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 94 |
| Release | : 2021-11-18 |
| Genre | : Political Science |
| ISBN | : 100902017X |
A vexing problem in contract law is modification. Two parties sign a contract but before they fully perform, they modify the contract. Should courts enforce the modified agreement? A private remedy is for the parties to write a contract that is robust to hold-up or that makes the facts relevant to modification verifiable. Provisions accomplishing these ends are renegotiation-design and revelation mechanisms. But implementing them requires commitment power. Conventional contract technologies to ensure commitment – liquidated damages – are disfavored by courts and themselves subject to renegotiation. Smart contracts written on blockchain ledgers offer a solution. We explain the basic economics and legal relevance of these technologies, and we argue that they can implement liquidated damages without courts. We address the hurdles courts may impose to use of smart contracts on blockchain and show that sophisticated parties' ex ante commitment to them may lead courts to allow their use as pre-commitment devices.
Voluntary Debt Reduction
| Author | : International Monetary Fund |
| Publisher | : International Monetary Fund |
| Total Pages | : 22 |
| Release | : 1988-11-07 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1451949359 |
This paper provides empirical evidence on the determinants of long-term growth performance in a sample of 55 developing countries grouped by income levels. The evidence indicates that a model incorporating the savings rate, export performance, expenditures on human capital development, the growth of population, and the real interest rate on external debt, explains the growth performance of these countries remarkably well. The model also suggests policies that would lead to higher long-run rates of growth.
Contract Theory
| Author | : Patrick Bolton |
| Publisher | : MIT Press |
| Total Pages | : 746 |
| Release | : 2004-12-10 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 9780262025768 |
A comprehensive introduction to contract theory, emphasizing common themes and methodologies as well as applications in key areas. Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.
Breach of Contract
| Author | : Oliver Hofmann |
| Publisher | : Springer Nature |
| Total Pages | : 268 |
| Release | : 2021-02-11 |
| Genre | : Law |
| ISBN | : 3030625257 |
“Efficient breach” is one of the most discussed topics in the literature of law and economics. What remedy incentivizes the parties of a contract to perform contracts if and only if it is efficient? This book provides a new perception based on an in-depth analysis of the impact the market structure, asymmetry of information, and deviations from the rational choice model have, comprehensively. The author compares the two predominant remedies for breach of contract which have been adopted by most jurisdictions and also found access to international conventions like the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CiSG): Specific performance and expectation damages. The book illustrates the complexity such a comparison has under more realistic assumptions. The author shows that no simple answer is possible, but one needs to account for the circumstances. The comparison takes an economic approach to law applying game theory. The game-theoretic models are consistent throughout the entire book which makes it easy for the reader to understand what effects different assumptions about the market structure, the distribution of information, and deviations from the rational choice model have, and how they are intertwined.
Advanced Microeconomics for Contract, Institutional, and Organizational Economics
| Author | : W. Bentley MacLeod |
| Publisher | : MIT Press |
| Total Pages | : 417 |
| Release | : 2022-04-05 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 0262046873 |
A graduate textbook on microeconomics, covering decision theory, game theory, and the foundations of contract theory, with a unique focus on the empirical. This graduate-level text on microeconomics, covering such topics as decision theory, game theory, bargaining theory, contract theory, trade under asymmetric information, and relational contract theory, is unique in its emphasis on the interplay between theory and evidence. It reviews the microeconomic theory of exchange “from the ground up,” aiming to produce a set of models and hypotheses amenable to empirical exploration, with particular focus on models that are useful for the study of contracts, institutions, and organizations. It explores research that extends price theory to the exchange of commodities when markets are incomplete, discussing recent developments in the field. Topics covered include the relationship between theory and evidence; decision theory as it is used in contract theory and institutional design; game theory; axiomatic and strategic bargaining theory; agency theory and the class of models that are considered to constitute contract theory, with discussions of moral hazard and trade with asymmetric information; and the theory of relational contracts. The final chapter offers a nontechnical review that provides a guide to which model is the most appropriate for a particular application. End-of-chapter exercises help students expand their understanding of the material, and an appendix provides brief introduction to optimization theory and the welfare theorem of general equilibrium theory. Students are assumed to be familiar with general equilibrium theory and basic constrained optimization theory.
Information Asymmetries in Developing Country Financing
| Author | : Mr.George C. Anayotos |
| Publisher | : International Monetary Fund |
| Total Pages | : 28 |
| Release | : 1994-07-01 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1451955782 |
This paper assesses the impact of information asymmetries on developing country financing and considers alternative techniques to reduce the adverse implications of such asymmetries. Following an introduction, Section II examines in general terms the role of information in financial markets and analyzes the incentive and risk sharing properties of alternative financial contracts. Information asymmetries which are present in domestic finance are more prevalent in international finance, in particular in developing country financing. Section III reviews measures aiming to resolve information asymmetries. Borrowing and creditor country regulations and policies, as well as innovative contractual agreements help to resolve a range of issues related to information asymmetries. However, despite their contribution, residual problems remain unresolved. The international financial institutions, and in particular the Fund, have an important role to play in alleviating information asymmetries.
The Organizational Contract
| Author | : Stefan Grundmann |
| Publisher | : Routledge |
| Total Pages | : 384 |
| Release | : 2016-02-17 |
| Genre | : Law |
| ISBN | : 1317022181 |
This book introduces and develops the paradigm of the organisational contract in European contract law. Suggesting that a more radical distinction should be made between contracts which regulate single or spot exchanges and contracts that organize complex economic activities without creating a new legal entity, the book argues that this distinction goes beyond that between spot and relational contracts because it focuses on the organizational dimension of contracting and its governance features. Divided into six parts, the volume brings together a group of internationally renowned experts to examine the structure of long-term contractual cooperation; networks of contracts; knowledge exchange in long-term contractual cooperation; remedies and specific governance rules in long-term relationships; and the move towards legislation. The book will be of value to academics and researchers in the areas of private law, economic theory and sociology of law, and organizational theory. It will also be a useful resource for practitioners working in international contract law and international business transaction law.
The Economics of Contracts
| Author | : Bernard Salanié |
| Publisher | : MIT Press |
| Total Pages | : 257 |
| Release | : 2005-03-11 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 0262195259 |
A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition.
