Bidding Behavior In Asymmetric Auctions
Download Bidding Behavior In Asymmetric Auctions full books in PDF, epub, and Kindle. Read online free Bidding Behavior In Asymmetric Auctions ebook anywhere anytime directly on your device. Fast Download speed and no annoying ads. We cannot guarantee that every ebooks is available!
Author | : Werner Güth |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 0 |
Release | : 2017 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions, in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more aggressively than the strong and then test bidders' preference for first- vs. second-price auctions.
Author | : Werner Güth |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : |
Release | : 2005 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Werner Güth |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 29 |
Release | : 2001 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Shraman Banerjee |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 0 |
Release | : 2023 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
Author | : John H. Kagel |
Publisher | : Princeton University Press |
Total Pages | : 424 |
Release | : 2009-04-11 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 1400830133 |
An invaluable account of how auctions work—and how to make them work Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies such as eBay. Winners end up cursing when they realize that they won because their estimates were overly optimistic, which led them to bid too much and lose money as a result. The authors first unveil a fresh survey of experimental data on the winner's curse. Melding theory with the econometric analysis of field data, they assess the design of government auctions, such as the spectrum rights (air wave) auctions that continue to be conducted around the world. The remaining chapters gauge the impact on sellers' revenue of the type of auction used and of inside information, show how bidders learn to avoid the winner's curse, and present comparisons of sophisticated bidders with college sophomores, the usual guinea pigs used in laboratory experiments. Appendixes refine theoretical arguments and, in some cases, present entirely new data. This book is an invaluable, impeccably up-to-date resource on how auctions work--and how to make them work.
Author | : Paul Pezanis-Christou |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 35 |
Release | : 2005 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
We report on a series of experiments that examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric and asymmetric bidders. To study the extent of strategic behavior, we use an experimental design that elicits bidders complete bid functions in each round (auction) of the experiment. In the aggregate, behavior is consistent with the basic equilibrium predictions for risk neutral or homogenous risk averse bidders (extent of bid shading, average seller's revenues and deviations from equilibrium). However, when we look at the extent of best reply behavior and the shape of bid functions, we find that individual behavior is not in line with the received equilibrium models, although it exhibits strategic sophistication.
Author | : Clemens van Dinther |
Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
Total Pages | : 245 |
Release | : 2007-01-10 |
Genre | : Computers |
ISBN | : 3764381132 |
This is one of the first books on the use of software agents to simulate bidding behavior in electronic auctions. It introduces market theory and computational economics together, and gives an overview on the most common and up-to-date agent-based simulation methods. The book will help the reader learn more about simulations in economics in general and common agent-based methods and tools in particular.
Author | : Paul Pezanis-Christou |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 52 |
Release | : 1995 |
Genre | : Auctions |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Mr.Robert Alan Feldman |
Publisher | : International Monetary Fund |
Total Pages | : 34 |
Release | : 1995-05 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : |
This paper evaluates the importance of auction format on bidding behavior and seller revenue, focusing on differences in performance under uniform-price and discriminatory-price formats. The analysis is based on a standard benchmark model from which empirically-testable hypotheses are derived on the optimal amount of bid shading that generates revenue equivalence between the two formats. Applying this model to data from the IMF gold auctions run in 1976-80, we find evidence of statistically significant shading in excess of the theoretically-derived optimum under the discriminatory format. This evidence suggests greater seller revenue under the uniform-price format.
Author | : Emmanuel Morales-Camargo |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 55 |
Release | : 2012 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
An experimental approach is used to compare bidding behavior and auction performance in uniform-price and discriminatory auctions when there is incomplete information concerning the common value of the auctioned good. In a symmetric information environment, the different auction formats provide the same average revenue. However, when information is asymmetric the discriminatory auction results in higher average revenue than the uniform-price auction. The volatility of revenue is higher in the uniform-price auctions in all treatments. The results, therefore, provide support for the use of the discriminatory format. Subject characteristics and measures of experience in recent auctions are found to be useful in explaining bidding behavior.