A new translation of Martin Heidegger's early work "The Basic Problems of Phenomenology" (original German "Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie"), originally published in 1926. This edition contains a new afterword by the Translator, a timeline of Heidegger's life and works, a philosophic index of core Heideggerian concepts and a guide for terminology across 19th and 20th century Existentialists. This translation is designed for readability and accessibility to Heidegger's enigmatic and dense philosophy. Complex and specific philosophic terms are translated as literally as possible and academic footnotes have been removed to ensure easy reading. In this lecture, which focuses on the central theme of the third section of Part I of "Being and Time," Martin Heidegger explores the fundamental ontological question of the meaning of being. He emphasizes the role of "time" as the horizon that shapes our understanding of being. This exploration of the "temporality of being" is presented in a historically oriented approach, indicating that Heidegger's inquiry into the question of being is rooted in the broader tradition of metaphysical-ontological questioning rather than existential-philosophical or consciousness-phenomenological motives. While the lecture covers only the first part and the first chapter of the second part of the original plan, it provides insights into the unelaborated aspects of Heidegger's thought. The most significant chapter for discussing "Time and Being" is undoubtedly the first chapter of the second part, where the concept of the "ontological difference" is introduced for the first time, marking a pivotal moment in Heidegger's philosophical development. Integral to this philosophical exploration is the concept of ontology, which is presented as the backbone of phenomenological study. The paper rigorously analyzes the ontological dimensions and positions them as central to the understanding of phenomenology. This ontological focus is not limited to a narrow interpretation, but encompasses various facets, including the relationship between being and existence, the distinction between different modes of being, and the critical examination of traditional ontological theses. The complexity of the paper's discourse is evident in its treatment of phenomenology not as a mere philosophical subset, but as a methodological approach that encompasses the entire spectrum of scientific philosophy. This comprehensive approach extends to the evaluation of phenomenology's methodological aspects, where the paper examines phenomenology's triple methodological character, comprising reduction, construction, and destruction. This tripartite methodology underscores the depth and breadth of phenomenological inquiry and reaffirms its position as a fundamental tool in philosophical research.