Bank Ownership Structure, Market Discipline and Risk

Bank Ownership Structure, Market Discipline and Risk
Author: Thierno Barry
Publisher:
Total Pages: 27
Release: 2012
Genre:
ISBN:

The objective of this paper is to analyze the influence of ownership structure on the risk taking behavior of European commercial banks. We consider five categories of shareholders (managers/directors, institutional investors, non financial companies, individuals and families, and banks). Controlling for various factors, we find that asset risk is lower for banks where a higher proportion of total stocks is held by families and individuals who have less diversified portfolios. We also find that the probability of default of banks is higher when non financial companies or institutional investors hold a higher proportion of total equity. However, these results do not hold for listed banks in which non financial companies hold higher stakes suggesting that the market might be limiting the risk-taking incentives of such shareholders. We further show that market forces might be more effective in influencing risk in banks with a higher involvement of non financial companies than in banks with a higher portion of stock held by institutional investors.

Ownership Structure and Bank Risk

Ownership Structure and Bank Risk
Author: Dung Tran
Publisher:
Total Pages: 41
Release: 2019
Genre:
ISBN:

Using a large panel of US BHC over the 2001:Q1-2015:Q4, we investigate the risk-taking behaviors of banks within a comparison perspective - between public and private banks - where there exists substantial differences of asymmetry information and agency problems. We document evidence of greater stability of public banks versus their private peers. However, public banks become riskier than private banks during the last crisis. These findings suggest a mixed evidence of risk-taking mitigating role of listing status. Regulatory pressure is effective in limiting risk taking by undercapitalized public banks before, but not during the crisis, casting doubt the effectiveness of regulators during the turmoil times. Public banks with high franchise value expose to risk less than others during the crisis. Debtholders discipline is ineffective in curbing the risk-taking behavior of banks. Our study is of interest for regulators, policymakers who are in search of improving bank risk-taking behavior.

Global Financial Development Report 2019/2020

Global Financial Development Report 2019/2020
Author: World Bank
Publisher: World Bank Publications
Total Pages: 281
Release: 2019-11-22
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 1464814961

Over a decade has passed since the collapse of the U.S. investment bank, Lehman Brothers, marked the onset of the largest global economic crisis since the Great Depression. The crisis revealed major shortcomings in market discipline, regulation and supervision, and reopened important policy debates on financial regulation. Since the onset of the crisis, emphasis has been placed on better regulation of banking systems and on enhancing the tools available to supervisory agencies to oversee banks and intervene speedily in case of distress. Drawing on ten years of data and analysis, Global Financial Development Report 2019/2020 provides evidence on the regulatory remedies adopted to prevent future financial troubles, and sheds light on important policy concerns. To what extent are regulatory reforms designed with high-income countries in mind appropriate for developing countries? What has been the impact of reforms on market discipline and bank capital? How should countries balance the political and social demands for a safety net for users of the financial system with potentially severe moral hazard consequences? Are higher capital requirements damaging to the flow of credit? How should capital regulation be designed to improve stability and access? The report provides a synthesis of what we know, as well as areas where more evidence is still needed. Global Financial Development Report 2019/2020 is the fifth in a World Bank series. The accompanying website tracks financial systems in more than 200 economies before, during, and after the global financial crisis (http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/gfdr) and provides information on how banking systems are regulated and supervised around the world (http://www.worldbank.org/en/research/brief/BRSS).

A Primer on Market Discipline and Governance of Financial Institutions for Those in a State of Shocked Disbelief

A Primer on Market Discipline and Governance of Financial Institutions for Those in a State of Shocked Disbelief
Author: Joseph P. Hughes
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2012
Genre: Banks and banking
ISBN:

Self regulation encouraged by market discipline constitutes a key component of Basel II's third pillar. But high-risk investment strategies may maximize the expected value of some banks. In these cases, does market discipline encourage risk-taking that undermines bank stability in economic downturns? This paper reviews the literature on corporate control in banking. It reviews the techniques for assessing bank performance, interaction between regulation and the federal safety net with market discipline on risk-taking incentives and stability, and sources of market discipline, including ownership structure, capital market discipline, product market competition, labor market competition, boards of directors, and compensation.

Market Discipline Across Countries and Industries

Market Discipline Across Countries and Industries
Author: C. E. V. Borio
Publisher: MIT Press
Total Pages: 472
Release: 2004
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 9780262025751

Leading academics and policymakers address the theory of market discipline and consider evidence across different industries and countries. The effectiveness of market discipline -- the strong built-in incentives that encourage banks and financial systems to operate soundly and efficiently -- commands much attention today, particularly in light of recent accounting scandals. As government discipline, in the form of regulation, seems to grows less effective as the banking industry and financial markets grow more complex, the role of market discipline becomes increasingly important. In this collection, which grew out of a conference cosponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland, a diverse group of academics and policymakers address different aspects of the ability of market discipline to affect corporate behavior and performance. A major purpose of the book is to develop evidence on how market discipline operates across non-government regulated industries and in different countries, how successful it has been, and how it may transfer to a regulated industry. The chapters examine such topics as the theory of market discipline, evidence of market discipline in banking and other industries, evidence of market discipline for countries, the current state of corporate governance, and the interaction of market discipline and public policy.

Bank Ownership, Market Structure and Risk

Bank Ownership, Market Structure and Risk
Author: Gianni De Nicoló
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
Total Pages: 50
Release: 2007-09
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN:

This paper presents a model of a banking industry with heterogeneous banks that delivers predictions on the relationship between banks' risk of failure, market structure, bank ownership, and banks' screening and bankruptcy costs. These predictions are explored empirically using a panel of individual banks data and ownership information including more than 10,000 bank-year observations for 133 non-industrialized countries during the 1993-2004 period. Four main results obtain. First, the positive and significant relationship between bank concentration and bank risk of failure found in Boyd, De Nicolò and Al Jalal (2006) is stronger when bank ownership is taken into account, and it is strongest when state-owned banks have sizeable market shares. Second, conditional on country and firm specific characteristics, the risk profiles of foreign (state-owned) banks are significantly higher than (not significantly different from) those of private domestic banks. Third, private domestic banks do take on more risk as a result of larger market shares of both state-owned and foreign banks. Fourth, the model rationalizes this evidence if both state-owned and foreign banks have either larger screening and/or lower bankruptcy costs than private domestic banks, banks' differences in market shares, screening or bankruptcy costs are not too large, and loan markets are sufficiently segmented across banks of different ownership.

The Regulation and Supervision of Banks Around the World

The Regulation and Supervision of Banks Around the World
Author: James R. Barth
Publisher: World Bank Publications
Total Pages: 92
Release: 2001
Genre: Banking law
ISBN:

This new and comprehensive database on the regulation and supervision of banks in 107 countries should better inform advice about bank ewgulation and supervision and lower the marginal cost of empirical research.

Deposit Insurance Coverage, Ownership, and Banks' Risk-Taking in Emerging Markets

Deposit Insurance Coverage, Ownership, and Banks' Risk-Taking in Emerging Markets
Author: Apanard Penny Prabha
Publisher:
Total Pages: 45
Release: 2010
Genre:
ISBN:

We ask how deposit insurance systems and ownership of banks affect the degree of market discipline on banks' risk-taking. Market discipline is determined by the extent of explicit deposit insurance, as well as by the credibility of non-insurance of groups of depositors and other creditors. Furthermore, market discipline depends on the ownership structure of banks and the responsiveness of bank managers to market incentives. An expected U-shaped relationship between explicit deposit insurance coverage and banks' risk-taking is influenced by country specific institutional factors, including bank ownership. We analyze specifically how government ownership, foreign ownership and shareholder rights affect the disciplinary effect of partial deposit insurance systems in a cross-section analysis of industrial and emerging market economies, as well as in emerging markets alone. The coverage that maximizes market discipline depends on country-specific characteristics of bank governance. This quot;risk-minimizingquot; deposit insurance coverage is compared to the actual coverage in a group of countries in emerging markets in Eastern Europe and Asia.

Market Discipline in Banking

Market Discipline in Banking
Author: George G. Kaufman
Publisher: Elsevier
Total Pages: 464
Release: 2003-12-16
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 9780762310807

Contains papers which consider the basic role of market discipline, how it may be applied to banking and more broadly to large financial institutions of various types.