Epistemic Game Theory
Author | : Andrés Perea |
Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
Total Pages | : 581 |
Release | : 2012-06-07 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 1107008913 |
The first textbook to explain the principles of epistemic game theory.
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Author | : Andrés Perea |
Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
Total Pages | : 581 |
Release | : 2012-06-07 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 1107008913 |
The first textbook to explain the principles of epistemic game theory.
Author | : Paul Weirich |
Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
Total Pages | : 283 |
Release | : 2009-12-01 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 019974145X |
Groups of people perform acts that are subject to standards of rationality. A committee may sensibly award fellowships, or may irrationally award them in violation of its own policies. A theory of collective rationality defines collective acts that are evaluable for rationality and formulates principles for their evaluation. This book argues that a group's act is evaluable for rationality if it is the products of acts its members fully control. It also argues that such an act is collectively rational if the acts of the group's members are rational. Efficiency is a goal of collective rationality, but not a requirement, except in cases where conditions are ideal for joint action and agents have rationally prepared for joint action. The people engaged in a game of strategy form a group, and the combination of their acts yields a collective act. If their collective act is rational, it constitutes a solution to their game. A theory of collective rationality yields principles concerning solutions to games. One principle requires that a solution constitute an equilibrium among the incentives of the agents in the game. In a cooperative game some agents are coalitions of individuals, and it may be impossible for all agents to pursue all incentives. Because rationality is attainable, the appropriate equilibrium standard for cooperative games requires that agents pursue only incentives that provide sufficient reasons to act. The book's theory of collective rationality supports an attainable equilibrium-standard for solutions to cooperative games and shows that its realization follows from individuals' rational acts. By extending the theory of rationality to groups, this book reveals the characteristics that make an act evaluable for rationality and the way rationality's evaluation of an act responds to the type of control its agent exercises over the act. The book's theory of collective rationality contributes to philosophical projects such as contractarian ethics and to practical projects such as the design of social institutions.
Author | : Renée Elio |
Publisher | : Oxford University Press, USA |
Total Pages | : 289 |
Release | : 2002 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 0195147669 |
While common sense and rationality have often been viewed as two distinct features in a unified cognitive map, this volume engages with this notion and comes up with novel and often paradoxical views of this relationship.
Author | : Alfred R. Mele |
Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
Total Pages | : 498 |
Release | : 2004-01-08 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 9780198033240 |
Rationality has long been a central topic in philosophy, crossing standard divisions and categories. It continues to attract much attention in published research and teaching by philosophers as well as scholars in other disciplines, including economics, psychology, and law. The Oxford Handbook of Rationality is an indispensable reference to the current state of play in this vital and interdisciplinary area of study. Twenty-two newly commissioned chapters by a roster of distinguished philosophers provide an overview of the prominent views on rationality, with each author also developing a unique and distinctive argument.
Author | : Michael Suk-Young Chwe |
Publisher | : Princeton University Press |
Total Pages | : 152 |
Release | : 2013-04-28 |
Genre | : Mathematics |
ISBN | : 0691158282 |
"Why do beer commercials dominate Super Bowl advertising? How do political ceremonies establish authority? Why were circular forms favored for public festivals during the French Revolution? This book answers these questions using a single concept: common knowledge. Game theory shows that in order to coordinate its actions, a group of people must form "common knowledge." Each person wants to participate only if others also participate. Members must have knowledge of each other, knowledge of that knowledge, and so on. Michael Chwe applies this insight, with striking erudition, to analyze a range of rituals across history and cultures. He shows that public ceremonies are powerful not simply because they transmit meaning from a central source to each audience member but because they let audience members know what other members know. In a new afterword, Chwe delves into new applications of common knowledge, both in the real world and in experiments, and considers how generating common knowledge has become easier in the digital age." -- From the jacket.
Author | : Robert Audi |
Publisher | : OUP Oxford |
Total Pages | : 272 |
Release | : 2011-09-22 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 0191619523 |
Rationality and Religious Commitment shows how religious commitment can be rational and describes the place of faith in the postmodern world. It portrays religious commitment as far more than accepting doctrines—it is viewed as a kind of life, not just as an embrace of tenets. Faith is conceived as a unique attitude. It is irreducible to belief but closely connected with both belief and conduct, and intimately related to life's moral, political, and aesthetic dimensions. Part One presents an account of rationality as a status attainable by mature religious people—even those with a strongly scientific habit of mind. Part Two describes what it means to have faith, how faith is connected with attitudes, emotions, and conduct, and how religious experience may support it. Part Three turns to religious commitment and moral obligation and to the relation between religion and politics. It shows how ethics and religion can be mutually supportive even though ethics provides standards of conduct independently of theology. It also depicts the integrated life possible for the religiously committed—a life with rewarding interactions between faith and reason, religion and science, and the aesthetic and the spiritual. The book concludes with two major accounts. One explains how moral wrongs and natural disasters are possible under God conceived as having the knowledge, power, and goodness that make such evils so difficult to understand. The other account explores the nature of persons, human and divine, and yields a conception that can sustain a rational theistic worldview even in the contemporary scientific age.
Author | : Christopher McMahon |
Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
Total Pages | : 266 |
Release | : 2001-08-06 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 9780521011785 |
"This book examines the issue of rational cooperation, especially cooperation between people with conflicting moral commitments. The first part considers how the two main aspects of cooperation - the choice by a group of a particular cooperative scheme and the decision by each member to contribute to that scheme - can be understood as guided by reason. The second part explores how the activity of reasoning itself can take a cooperative form. The book is distinctive in offering an account of what people can accomplish by reasoning together, of the role of deliberation in democratic decision making, and of the negotiation of the proper use of concepts. Presenting for the first time a detailed analysis of the general problem of cooperation and collective reasoning between people with different moral commitments, this book will be of particular interest to philosophers of the social sciences and to students in political science, sociology and economics." --Cambridge Press.
Author | : Steve Tadelis |
Publisher | : Princeton University Press |
Total Pages | : 416 |
Release | : 2013-01-06 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 0691129088 |
The definitive introduction to game theory This comprehensive textbook introduces readers to the principal ideas and applications of game theory, in a style that combines rigor with accessibility. Steven Tadelis begins with a concise description of rational decision making, and goes on to discuss strategic and extensive form games with complete information, Bayesian games, and extensive form games with imperfect information. He covers a host of topics, including multistage and repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, rent-seeking games, mechanism design, signaling games, reputation building, and information transmission games. Unlike other books on game theory, this one begins with the idea of rationality and explores its implications for multiperson decision problems through concepts like dominated strategies and rationalizability. Only then does it present the subject of Nash equilibrium and its derivatives. Game Theory is the ideal textbook for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students. Throughout, concepts and methods are explained using real-world examples backed by precise analytic material. The book features many important applications to economics and political science, as well as numerous exercises that focus on how to formalize informal situations and then analyze them. Introduces the core ideas and applications of game theory Covers static and dynamic games, with complete and incomplete information Features a variety of examples, applications, and exercises Topics include repeated games, bargaining, auctions, signaling, reputation, and information transmission Ideal for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students Complete solutions available to teachers and selected solutions available to students
Author | : Michel Zouboulakis |
Publisher | : Routledge |
Total Pages | : 188 |
Release | : 2014-01-21 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 1317817494 |
The concept of economic rationality is important for the historical evolution of Economics as a scientific discipline. The common idea about this concept -even between economists- is that it has a unique meaning which is universally accepted. This new volume argues that "economic rationality" is not not a universal concept with one single meaning, and that it in fact has different, if not conflicting, interpretations in the evolution of discourse on economics. In order to achieve this, the book traces the historical evolution of the concept of economic rationality from Adam Smith to the present, taking in thinkers from Mill to Friedman, and encompassing approaches from neoclassical to behavioural economics. The book charts this history in order to reveal important instances of conceptual transformation of the meaning of economic rationality. In doing so, it presents a uniquely detailed study of the historical change of the many faces of the homo oeconomicus .
Author | : Jennifer J. Halpern |
Publisher | : Cornell University Press |
Total Pages | : 312 |
Release | : 1997 |
Genre | : Decision-making |
ISBN | : 9780801433788 |
"Debating Rationality is a terrific collection of essays written by an obviously first rate set of scholars. Several recent books have attempted to make similar points, but this volume pushes the ideas in new directions, rather than simply restating what are now established themes."--Roderick M. Kramer, co-author of Trust in OrganizationsDecision makers strive to be rational. Traditionally, rational decisions maximize an appropriate return. The contributors to this book challenge the common assumption that good decisions must be rational in this economic sense. They emphasize that the decision-making process is influenced by social, organizational, and psychological considerations as well as by economic concerns. Relationships, time pressure, external demands for specific types of performance, contractual expectations, human biases, and reactions to unfair treatment alter the decision-making context and the resulting decision outcomes.