Wage Dispersion In The Search And Matching Model With Intra Firm Bargaining
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| Author | : Dale T. Mortensen |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2009 |
| Genre | : Labor market |
| ISBN | : |
Matched employer-employee data exhibits both wage and productivity dispersion across firms and suggest that a linear relationship holds between the average wage paid and a firm productivity. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that these facts can be explained by a search and matching model when firms are heterogenous with respect to productivity, are composed of many workers, and face diminishing returns to labor given the wage paid to identical workers is the solution to the Stole-Zwiebel bilateral bargaining problem. Helpman and Iskhoki (2008) show that a unique single wage (degenerate) equilibrium solution to the model exists in this environment. In this paper, I demonstrate that another equilibrium exists that can be characterized by a non-degenerate distribution of wages in which more productive firms pay more if employed workers are able to search. Generically this dispersed wage equilibrium is unique and exists if and only if firms are heterogenous with respect to factor productivity. Finally, employment is lower in the dispersed wage equilibrium than in the single wage equilibrium but this fact does not imply that welfare is higher in the single wage equilibrium.
| Author | : Pierre Cahuc |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2008 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
This article provides a model of labor market equilibrium with search and within-firm strategic bargaining. We yield explicit closed form solutions with heterogeneous labor inputs and capital. The solution exhibits overemployment. We show that higher relative bargaining power for some groups of workers may lead to overemployment relative to other groups, with such other groups being underemployed instead if they have a lower relative bargaining power. Similarly, the hold-up problem between capitalists and employees does not necessarily lead to underinvestment in physical capital.
| Author | : Damien Gaumont |
| Publisher | : International Monetary Fund |
| Total Pages | : 30 |
| Release | : 2005 |
| Genre | : Labor market |
| ISBN | : |
We analyze labor market models where the law of one price does not hold-that is, models with equilibrium wage dispersion. We begin by assuming workers are ex ante heterogeneous, and highlight a flaw with this approach: if search is costly, the market shuts down. We then assume workers are homogeneous, but matches are ex post heterogeneous. This model is robust to search costs, and it delivers equilibrium wage dispersion. However, we prove the law of two prices holds: generically, we cannot get more than two wages. We explore several other models, including one combining ex ante and ex post heterogeneity, which is robust and can deliver more than two-point wage distributions.
| Author | : Fernando Galindo-Rueda |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 40 |
| Release | : 2002 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
| Author | : |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : |
| Release | : 2007 |
| Genre | : Unemployment |
| ISBN | : |
Standard search and matching models of equilibrium unemployment, once properly calibrated, can generate only a small amount of frictional wage dispersion, i.e., wage differentials among ex-ante similar workers induced purely by search frictions. We derive this result for a specific measure of wage dispersion -- the ratio between the average wage and the lowest (reservation) wage paid. We show that in a large class of search and matching models this statistic (the "mean-min ratio") can be obtained in closed form as a function of observable variables (i.e., the interest rate, the value of leisure, and statistics of labor market turnover). Various independent data sources suggest that actual residual wage dispersion (i.e., inequality among observationally similar workers) exceeds the model's prediction by a factor of 20. We discuss three extensions of the model (risk aversion, volatile wages during employment, and on-the-job search) and find that, in their simplest versions, they can improve its performance, but only modestly. We conclude that either frictions account for a tiny fraction of residual wage dispersion, or the standard model needs to be augmented to confront the data. In particular, the last generation of models with on-the-job search appears promising.
| Author | : Jesper Bagger |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2014 |
| Genre | : Economics |
| ISBN | : |
This paper studies wage dispersion in an equilibrium on-the-job-search model with endogenous search intensity. Workers differ in their permanent skill level and firms differ with respect to productivity. Positive (negative) sorting results if the match production function is supermodular (submodular). The model is estimated on Danish matched employer-employee data. We find evidence of positive assortative matching. In the estimated equilibrium match distribution, the correlation between worker skill and firm productivity is 0.12. The assortative matching has a substantial impact on wage dispersion. We decompose wage variation into four sources: Worker heterogeneity, firm heterogeneity, frictions, and sorting. Worker heterogeneity contributes 51% of the variation, firm heterogeneity contributes 11%, frictions 23%, and finally sorting contributes 15%. We measure the output loss due to mismatch by asking how much greater output would be if the estimated population of matches were perfectly positively assorted. In this case, output would increase by 7.7%.
| Author | : Andreas Hornstein |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 56 |
| Release | : 2007 |
| Genre | : Labor market |
| ISBN | : |
Standard search and matching models of equilibrium unemployment, once properly calibrated, can generate only a small amount of frictional wage dispersion, i.e., wage differentials among ex-ante similar workers induced purely by search frictions. We derive this result for a specific measure of wage dispersion -- the ratio between the average wage and the lowest (reservation) wage paid. We show that in a large class of search and matching models this statistic (the "mean-min ratio") can be obtained in closed form as a function of observable variables (i.e., the interest rate, the value of leisure, and statistics of labor market turnover). Various independent data sources suggest that actual residual wage dispersion (i.e., inequality among observationally similar workers) exceeds the model's prediction by a factor of 20. We discuss three extensions of the model (risk aversion, volatile wages during employment, and on-the-job search) and find that, in their simplest versions, they can improve its performance, but only modestly. We conclude that either frictions account for a tiny fraction of residual wage dispersion, or the standard model needs to be augmented to confront the data. In particular, the last generation of models with on-the-job search appears promising.
| Author | : Daniel Le Maire |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : |
| Release | : 2009 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
| Author | : Carlos Carrillo-Tudela |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 34 |
| Release | : 2014 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
This paper examines wage dispersion and wage dynamics in a stock-flow matching economy with on-the-job search. Under stock-flow matching, job seekers immediately become fully informed about the stock of viable vacancies. If only one option is available, monopsony wages result. With more than one firm bidding, Bertrand wages arise. The initial and expected threat of competition determines the evolution of wages and thereby introduces a novel way of understanding wage differences among similar workers. The resulting wage distribution has an interior mode and prominent, well-behaved tails. The model also generates job-to-job transitions with both wage cuts and jumps.
| Author | : Uwe Jirjahn |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2007 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
Empirical studies examining the impact of intra-firm wage dispersion on firm performance report extremely mixed results. Yet, almost all of the studies implicitly assume that there is a uniform relationship between wage dispersion and firm performance across all types of firms. In contrast, we argue that the effects of wage dispersion depend on the industrial relations regime and the type of incentive scheme employed. Using data on a sample of manufacturing establishments in Germany, our findings confirm that wage dispersion interacts with internal promotions, individual and group piece rates, works council presence and collective bargaining coverage. This strongly supports the notion that moderating factors play an important role in the relationship between intra-firm wage dispersion and productivity.
