Volition Agent
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Author | : Richard Flores IV |
Publisher | : Plasma Spyglass Press |
Total Pages | : 204 |
Release | : 2013-06-25 |
Genre | : Fiction |
ISBN | : 1311576231 |
Lexia is an ordinary person, with no special training or unique skills. That is until Lance, her handler, jumps in and takes full control of her every action. With Lance, Lexia is one of the deadliest government agents. Without him, she is a useless civilian who is completely disposable. When one of her missions goes wrong quickly, Lexia finds herself scrambling to escape capture. The agency she works for disavows any knowledge of her existence and leaves her for local authorities to arrest her on murder charges. Lexia must fend for herself if she wants to survive. With no clues, minimal training, and an unlikely ally she searches for answers. The agency wants her dead. Can Lexia stop them? Or are they still in control?
Author | : Avi Sion |
Publisher | : Avi Sion |
Total Pages | : 410 |
Release | : 2004-07-15 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 2970009161 |
Volition and Allied Causal Concepts is a work of aetiology and metapsychology. Aetiology is the branch of philosophy and logic devoted to the study of causality (the cause-effect relation) in all its forms; and metapsychology is the study of the basic concepts common to all psychological discourse, most of which are causal. This is a work of ambitious scope, intent on finally resolving philosophical and logical issues that have always impeded progress in psychology.
Author | : Andrew Escobedo |
Publisher | : University of Notre Dame Pess |
Total Pages | : 324 |
Release | : 2017-04-30 |
Genre | : Literary Criticism |
ISBN | : 0268101698 |
Modern readers and writers find it natural to contrast the agency of realistic fictional characters to the constrained range of action typical of literary personifications. Yet no commentator before the eighteenth century suggests that prosopopoeia signals a form of reduced agency. Andrew Escobedo argues that premodern writers, including Spenser, Marlowe, and Milton, understood personification as a literary expression of will, an essentially energetic figure that depicted passion or concept transforming into action. As the will emerged as an isolatable faculty in the Christian Middle Ages, it was seen not only as the instrument of human agency but also as perversely independent of other human capacities, for example, intellect and moral character. Renaissance accounts of the will conceived of volition both as the means to self-creation and the faculty by which we lose control of ourselves. After offering a brief history of the will that isolates the distinctive features of the faculty in medieval and Renaissance thought, Escobedo makes his case through an examination of several personified figures in Renaissance literature: Conscience in the Tudor interludes, Despair in Doctor Faustus and book I of The Faerie Queen, Love in books III and IV of The Faerie Queen, and Sin in Paradise Lost. These examples demonstrate that literary personification did not amount to a dim reflection of “realistic” fictional character, but rather that it provided a literary means to explore the numerous conundrums posed by the premodern notion of the human will. This book will be of great interest to faculty and graduate students interested in medieval studies and Renaissance literature.
Author | : Richard Flores |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 140 |
Release | : 2013-06-25 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : 9780615840802 |
Lexia is an ordinary person, with no special training or unique skills. That is until Lance, her handler, jumps in and takes full control of her every action. With Lance, Lexia is one of the deadliest government agents. Without him, she is a useless civilian who is completely disposable. When one of her missions goes wrong quickly, Lexia finds herself scrambling to escape capture. The agency she works for disavows any knowledge of her existence and leaves her for local authorities to arrest her on murder charges. Lexia must fend for herself if she wants to survive. With no clues, minimal training, and an unlikely ally she searches for answers. The agency wants her dead. Can Lexia stop them? Or are they still in control?
Author | : Christian Chiarcos |
Publisher | : Walter de Gruyter |
Total Pages | : 289 |
Release | : 2011-05-26 |
Genre | : Language Arts & Disciplines |
ISBN | : 3110241021 |
The volume addresses the role of salience in discourse and provides broad coverage of various perspectives on and functions of discourse salience. The range of multidisciplinary approaches adopted in the volume differ with regard to the underlying theoretical proposals and foci of research. The topics range from (i) entity-based salience to (ii) discourse-structural salience of utterances to (iii) extra-linguistic factors of salience in discourse. Accordingly, the volume is organized into three sections. Part I focuses on discourse referents and the choice of referring expressions. The contributions cover issues such as salience and demonstrativity in Russian, discourse salience and grammatical voice in the West Siberian language Eastern Khanty, the joined information of syntactic and semantic prominence, and a computational framework of salience metrics. The contributions to Part II are concerned with linguistic structures at or above the clause level. The salience of discourse segments is addressed with respect to the translation of discourse relations and position of verb arguments in Old High German. Part III extends the scope beyond purely linguistic phenomena and deals with the role of extra-linguistic salience in discourse processing. Visual salience in a situated-dialog context, salience marking by hypertextual links, and extra-linguistic salience derived from a mental representation of the described situation are all discussed here. The notion of salience is of relevance to discourse studies in theoretical linguistics, computational linguistics, as well as psycholinguistics.
Author | : Stuart C. Hackett |
Publisher | : Wipf and Stock Publishers |
Total Pages | : 420 |
Release | : 2009-03-01 |
Genre | : Religion |
ISBN | : 1725244659 |
Stuart Hackett's The Rediscovery of the Highest Good, originally handwritten in spiral notebooks, is a masterwork of philosophical ethics that guides readers through 2300 years of discourse on the issue of morality, from Plato through Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. "It is the destiny of every human person to decide," Hackett opens. "Whether our choices are genuinely free or inevitably determined, invariably trivial or occasionally momentous, carelessly settled or reflectively reasoned, at least in one sense all this makes no difference: for the one thing about which persons have no choice is that we unavoidably and necessarily must choose, and cannot therefore escape our responsibility to do so." From this matter-of-fact beginning, Hackett builds a coherent case for "a modified teleological position" while providing fleeting personal glimpses into his "lifelong romance with philosophical contemplation." From the opening page, all the arguments are set down in a steady line of development, aimed unerringly toward a preconceived goal. At various points Hackett's summations produce a cerebral satisfaction that could almost be described as aesthetic, a kind of sheer intellectual pleasure akin to beauty. Recovery of the Highest Good is the culmination of forty years of reflection from a theistic perspective and is likely to be an invaluable handbook for inquirers in future generations.
Author | : E. J. Lowe |
Publisher | : OUP Oxford |
Total Pages | : 240 |
Release | : 2008-09-04 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 0191550906 |
Personal Agency consists of two parts. In Part II, a radically libertarian theory of action is defended which combines aspects of agent causalism and volitionism. This theory accords to volitions the status of basic mental actions, maintaining that these are spontaneous exercises of the will—a 'two-way' power which rational agents can freely exercise in the light of reason. Lowe contends that substances, not events, are the causal source of all change in the world—with rational, free agents like ourselves having a special place in the causal order as unmoved movers, or initiators of new causal chains. And he defends a thoroughgoing externalism regarding reasons for action, holding these to be mind-independent worldly entities rather than the beliefs and desires of agents. Part I prepares the ground for this theory by undermining the threat presented to it by physicalism. It does this by challenging the causal closure argument for physicalism in all of its forms and by showing that a dualistic philosophy of mind—one which holds that human mental states and their subjects cannot be identified with bodily states and human bodies respectively—is both metaphysically coherent and entirely consistent with known empirical facts.
Author | : Matthew Stuart |
Publisher | : OUP Oxford |
Total Pages | : 541 |
Release | : 2013-07-18 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 0191662828 |
Though John Locke set out to write a book that would resolve questions about the origin and scope of human knowledge, his Essay Concerning Human Understanding is also a profound contribution to metaphysics, full of arguments about the fundamental features of bodies, the notions of essence and kind, the individuation of material objects, personal identity, the nature and scope of volition, freedom of action, freedom of will, and the relationship between matter and mind. Matthew Stuart examines a broad range of these arguments, and explores the relationships between them. He offers fresh interpretations of such familiar material as the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, and Locke's account of personal identity; and he also takes us deeper into less familiar territory, including Locke's case against materialism and his philosophy of action. Locke's Metaphysics shows Locke to be a more consistent, systematic and interesting metaphysician than is generally appreciated. It defends him against charges of muddling the definition of 'quality', of waffling between two conceptions of secondary qualities, and of vacillating in his commitment to mechanism. It shows how his rejection of essentialism leads him to embrace relativism about identity, and that his relativism about identity is the key to defending his account of personal identity against several objections. Yet the picture of Locke that emerges is not always a familiar one. Stuart's account reveals that he is a philosopher who denies the existence of relations, who takes bodies to be colored only so long as we are looking at them, and who is not committed to mechanism. He shows that Locke takes persons to be three-dimensional beings whose pasts are 'gappy' rather than continuous. Finally, he shows that Locke is a volitionist who holds that we can will only our own thoughts and bodily motions, and not such episodes as lighting a candle or turning the pages of a book.
Author | : Ishtiyaque Haji |
Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
Total Pages | : 285 |
Release | : 1998-02-26 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 0195354168 |
This book explores a central question of moral philosophy, addressing whether we are morally responsible for certain kinds of actions, intentional omissions, and the consequences deriving therefrom. Haji distinguishes between moral responsibility and a more restrictive category, moral appraisability. To say that a person is appraisable for an action is to say that he or she is deserving either of praise or blame for that action. One of Haji's principal aims is to uncover conditions sufficient for appraisability of actions. He begins with a number of puzzles that serve to structure and organize the issues, each one of which motivates a condition required for appraisability. The core of Haji's analysis involves his examination of three primary types of conditions. According to a control condition, a person must control the action in an appropriate way in order to be appraisable. An autonomy condition permits moral appraisability for an action only if it ultimately derives from a person's authentic evaluative scheme. On Haji's epistemic requirement, moral praiseworthiness or blameworthiness demands belief on the part of the agent in the rightness or wrongness of an action. Haji concludes this portion of his argument by incorporating these conditions into a general principle which outlines sufficient conditions for appraisability. Haji offers a fascinating discussion of the implications of his analysis. He demonstrates that his appraisability concept is applicable to a variety of non-moral kinds of appraisal, such as those involving legal, prudential and etiquette considerations. He looks at crosscultural attributions of blameworthiness and argues that such attributions are frequently mistaken. He considers the case of addicts and suggests that they may not be morally responsible for actions their addictions are said to cause. He even takes up the intriguing question of whether we can be blamed for the thoughts of our dream selves. Engaging with a central metaphysical question in his conclusion, Haji argues that the conditions of moral responsibility he defends are neither undermined by determinism nor threatened by certain varieties of incompatibilism. Addressing a range of little-discussed topics and forging crucial connections between moral theory and moral responsibility, Moral Appraisability is vital reading for students and scholars of moral philosophy, metaphysics, and the philosophy of law.
Author | : Derk Pereboom |
Publisher | : OUP Oxford |
Total Pages | : 228 |
Release | : 2014-01-31 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 0191508721 |
Derk Pereboom articulates and defends an original conception of moral responsibility. He argues that if determinism were true we would not be morally responsible in the key basic-desert sense at issue in the free will debate, but that we would also lack this kind of moral responsibility if indeterminism were true and the causes of our actions were exclusively states or events. It is possible that if we were undetermined agent causes—if we as substances had the power to cause decisions without being causally determined to cause them—we would have this kind of free will. But although our being undetermined agent causes has not been ruled out as a coherent possibility, it's not credible given our best physical theories. Pereboom then contends that a conception of life without the free will required for moral responsibility in the basic-desert sense would nevertheless allow for a different, forward-looking conception of moral responsibility. He also argues that our lacking this sort of free will would not jeopardize our sense of ourselves as agents capable of rational deliberation, that it is compatible with adequate measures for dealing with crime and other threatening behavior, and that it allows for a robust sense of achievement and meaning in life. Pereboom's arguments for this position are reconfigured relative to those presented in Living without Free Will (2001), important objections to these arguments are answered, and the development of the positive view is significantly embellished.