Us Air Force Lessons In Counterinsurgency Exposing Voids In Doctrinal Guidance
Download Us Air Force Lessons In Counterinsurgency Exposing Voids In Doctrinal Guidance full books in PDF, epub, and Kindle. Read online free Us Air Force Lessons In Counterinsurgency Exposing Voids In Doctrinal Guidance ebook anywhere anytime directly on your device. Fast Download speed and no annoying ads. We cannot guarantee that every ebooks is available!
United States Air Force Lessons in Counterinsurgency: Exposing Voids in Doctrinal Guidance
| Author | : |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 59 |
| Release | : 2000 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
As it has so often in the past, the United States (US) military and the US Air Force (USAF) will undoubtedly provide support across the globe to countries combating insurgents in the future. The host-nation political and military organization and command and control structure governing the deployment and employment of air forces in these wars will have a large impact on the success or failure of air operations and perhaps the national counterinsurgency (COIN) effort overall. Because of the delicate political nature of wars of insurgency, US involvement in these COIN operations may be indirect or direct and may include actual combat operations. Whichever the case, US airmen may be asked to step into either an existing structure or help develop a COIN air operations architecture and strategy to direct the actions of host nation and/or US air assets.
United States Air Force Lessons in Counterinsurgency
| Author | : John W. Doucette |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 72 |
| Release | : 2000 |
| Genre | : Counterinsurgency |
| ISBN | : |
US Air Force Lessons in Counterinsurgency
| Author | : John W. Doucette |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 94 |
| Release | : 1999 |
| Genre | : Counterinsurgency |
| ISBN | : |
As it has so often in the past, the United States military and the Air Force will undoubtedly provide support across the globe to countries combating insurgents in the future. The host nation political and military organization and command and control structure governing the deployment and employment of air forces in these wars will have a large impact on the success or failure of air operations, and perhaps the national counterinsurgency effort overall. Because of the delicate political nature of wars of insurgency, US involvement in these counterinsurgency operations may be indirect or direct, and may include actual combat operations. Whichever the case, US airmen may be asked to step into either an existing structured, or help develop a counterinsurgency air operations architecture and strategy to direct the actions of host nation and/or US air assets. To help educate airmen about the realities of counterinsurgency, this study addresses how insurgent warfare is fundamentally different from conventional wars, develops lessons from two case studies, highlights the challenges that US airmen face, and examines the adequacy of Air Force and Joint doctrine for counterinsurgency operations.
Learning to Forget
| Author | : David Fitzgerald |
| Publisher | : Stanford University Press |
| Total Pages | : 298 |
| Release | : 2013-06-26 |
| Genre | : Political Science |
| ISBN | : 0804786429 |
Learning to Forget analyzes the evolution of US counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine over the last five decades. Beginning with an extensive section on the lessons of Vietnam, it traces the decline of COIN in the 1970s, then the rebirth of low intensity conflict through the Reagan years, in the conflict in Bosnia, and finally in the campaigns of Iraq and Afghanistan. Ultimately it closes the loop by explaining how, by confronting the lessons of Vietnam, the US Army found a way out of those most recent wars. In the process it provides an illustration of how military leaders make use of history and demonstrates the difficulties of drawing lessons from the past that can usefully be applied to contemporary circumstances. The book outlines how the construction of lessons is tied to the construction of historical memory and demonstrates how histories are constructed to serve the needs of the present. In so doing, it creates a new theory of doctrinal development.
Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era
| Author | : Alan Vick |
| Publisher | : Rand Corporation |
| Total Pages | : 205 |
| Release | : 2006 |
| Genre | : History |
| ISBN | : 0833039636 |
United States has engaged in counterinsurgency around the globe for more than a century. But insurgencies have rarely been defeated by outside powers. Rather, the afflicted nation itself must win the war politically and militarily, and the best way to help is to offer advice, training, and equipment. Air power, and the U.S. Air Force, can play an important role in such efforts, which suggests making them an institutional priority.
Defending Air Bases in an Age of Insurgency
| Author | : Shannon Caudill |
| Publisher | : Military Bookshop |
| Total Pages | : 444 |
| Release | : 2014-08 |
| Genre | : History |
| ISBN | : 9781782666851 |
This anthology discusses the converging operational issues of air base defense and counterinsurgency. It explores the diverse challenges associated with defending air assets and joint personnel in a counterinsurgency environment. The authors are primarily Air Force officers from security forces, intelligence, and the office of special investigations, but works are included from a US Air Force pilot and a Canadian air force officer. The authors examine lessons from Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other conflicts as they relate to securing air bases and sustaining air operations in a high-threat counterinsurgency environment. The essays review the capabilities, doctrine, tactics, and training needed in base defense operations and recommend ways in which to build a strong, synchronized ground defense partnership with joint and combined forces. The authors offer recommendations on the development of combat leaders with the depth of knowledge, tactical and operational skill sets, and counterinsurgency mind set necessary to be effective in the modern asymmetric battlefield.
The New Counterinsurgency Era
| Author | : David H. Ucko |
| Publisher | : Georgetown University Press |
| Total Pages | : 270 |
| Release | : 2009-07-02 |
| Genre | : Political Science |
| ISBN | : 1589017285 |
Confronting insurgent violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has recognized the need to “re-learn” counterinsurgency. But how has the Department of Defense with its mixed efforts responded to this new strategic environment? Has it learned anything from past failures? In The New Counterinsurgency Era, David Ucko examines DoD’s institutional obstacles and initially slow response to a changing strategic reality. Ucko also suggests how the military can better prepare for the unique challenges of modern warfare, where it is charged with everything from providing security to supporting reconstruction to establishing basic governance—all while stabilizing conquered territory and engaging with local populations. After briefly surveying the history of American counterinsurgency operations, Ucko focuses on measures the military has taken since 2001 to relearn old lessons about counterinsurgency, to improve its ability to conduct stability operations, to change the institutional bias against counterinsurgency, and to account for successes gained from the learning process. Given the effectiveness of insurgent tactics, the frequency of operations aimed at building local capacity, and the danger of ungoverned spaces acting as havens for hostile groups, the military must acquire new skills to confront irregular threats in future wars. Ucko clearly shows that the opportunity to come to grips with counterinsurgency is matched in magnitude only by the cost of failing to do so.
The U. S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual
| Author | : David H. Petraeus |
| Publisher | : Silver Rock Publishing |
| Total Pages | : 244 |
| Release | : 2015-12-31 |
| Genre | : Technology & Engineering |
| ISBN | : 9781626544567 |
This field manual establishes doctrine for military operations in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. It is based on lessons learned from previous counterinsurgencies and contemporary operations. It is also based on existing interim doctrine and doctrine recently developed. Counterinsurgency operations generally have been neglected in broader American military doctrine and national security policies since the end of the Vietnam War over 40 years ago. This manual is designed to reverse that trend. It is also designed to merge traditional approaches to COIN with the realities of a new international arena shaped by technological advances, globalization, and the spread of extremist ideologies--some of them claiming the authority of a religious faith. This is a comprehensive manual that details every aspect of a successful COIN operation from intelligence to leadership to diplomacy. It also includes several useful appendices that provide important supplementary material.
Eliminating the Rhetoric
| Author | : Mark C. Nowland |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 100 |
| Release | : 2001 |
| Genre | : Aeronautics, Military |
| ISBN | : |
"The purpose of this study is to identify criteria that will provide objective analysis of a Halt Phase strategy. The study identifies the key criteria by examining air combat in three operations: the Battle of Bismarck Sea, the 1973 Golan Heights battles of the Yom Kippur War, and finally the Iraqi Republican Guard "escape" from Basra. The examination focuses on air operations looking for tactics, tactical innovations, and operational circumstances that inhibit or enhance air operations designed to halt the advance or retreat of significant ground formations. The study evaluates each case in three major phases: pre-hostility preparation, conduct of combat operations and finally the results and analysis of the operation. Pre-hostility operations specifically examine the doctrine, organization, equipment and technology, and the training of friendly forces. The conduct of operations phase explores the contextual elements, including a summary of the operation, and investigates intelligence, command and control and logistical factors. Finally, the results of each case are analyzed to discover factors that contribute positively, negatively, or not significantly to the outcome of the operation. Each case study's unique circumstances shaped the result; however, the criteria of organization and training appear dominant with command and control, doctrine and technology being recurrent in allowing air forces to halt an enemy surface force. The specific context of the battle, the intelligence preparation, and logistics of each conflict cannot be ignored, but were not determined as recurrent factors in all three case studies, although intelligence was significant in the Bismarck Sea. The study concludes with three major lessons. First, people make the Air Force successful; second, the halt strategy is appropriate for certain circumstances, but some sister service critiques of the strategy are valid; third, the Air Force should acknowledge the limitations of airpower, but it should also develop methods to minimize the limits in the application of airpower in order to make 'halt' the strategy even more effective in the future than it has been in the past."--Air University Library.
