U.S. Relations with Iraq was initially begun as an introductory piece for a larger work on U.S./coalition involvement in Operation Iraqi Freedom. It covers U.S. interaction with Iraq dating back to the Ottoman Empire, through the British mandate after World War I and the rise of U.S. oil interests; relations with the Hashemite monarchy until its overthrow in 1958; increasing tensions in the 1960s and 1970s; an uneasy alliance against Iran in the 1980s; Operation Desert Storm; and ongoing contention with Saddam Hussein in the 1990s and early 2000s over Iraq's weapons programs that ultimately resulted in multinational military action in 2003.Relations between the United States and Iraq have ebbed and flowed throughout the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, from their zenith in the 1950s to their nadir between 1990 and 2003. Interestingly, the state of diplomatic relations has often been a poor indicator of the strength of other ties between the countries. For example, trade grew significantly during the late 1970s and early 1980s when no official diplomatic relations existed, while productive diplomatic connections in the 1940s and 1950s rarely reflected the growing popular resentment in Iraq toward the United States.This work gives a brief overview, largely from the U.S. perspective, of how the United States interacted with Iraq through the twentieth century, providing background for understanding of the Gulf War (Desert Shield/ Desert Storm) and conflict in Iraq in the twenty-first century. It was written as an introductory piece for a larger study of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The book draws heavily on primary sources in U.S. foreign relations materials and references secondary works for readers seeking more detail on particular subjects.1 The topic of oil recurs throughout the story, as do themes of wider relations among Middle Eastern states, the Arab-Israeli question, and, for the second half of the twentieth century, conflicting U.S.- Soviet Cold War interests and alliances. The study deals only cursorily with Iraqi internal affairs and ethnosectarian issues. It does not go into detail on the decisions for war in 1991 and 2003, as those deliberations are widely documented.