Two Part Tariff Competition In Duopoly
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| Author | : Xiangkang Yin |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2003 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
This paper investigates the market equilibrium and welfare effects of two-part tariff competition. When consumers are uniformly distributed on a Hotelling line, equilibrium prices are equal to marginal costs if and only if the demand of the marginal consumer is equal to the average demand. Entry fees are socially optimal in a symmetric equilibrium if all consumers participate in the market. In comparison with uniform pricing, two-part tariffs tend to have lower prices, higher profits and social welfare. In the logit model, marginal cost pricing holds but entry fees are higher than the social optimum. Two-part tariffs also lead to lower aggregate net consumer surplus but higher profits than uniform pricing.
| Author | : Krina Griva |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 35 |
| Release | : 2012 |
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| ISBN | : |
| Author | : Fouad Sabry |
| Publisher | : One Billion Knowledgeable |
| Total Pages | : 316 |
| Release | : 2024-04-15 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : |
What is Two Part Tariff A two-part tariff (TPT) is a form of price discrimination wherein the price of a product or service is composed of two parts - a lump-sum fee as well as a per-unit charge. In general, such a pricing technique only occurs in partially or fully monopolistic markets. It is designed to enable the firm to capture more consumer surplus than it otherwise would in a non-discriminating pricing environment. Two-part tariffs may also exist in competitive markets when consumers are uncertain about their ultimate demand. Health club consumers, for example, may be uncertain about their level of future commitment to an exercise regimen. Two-part tariffs are easy to implement when connection or entrance fees can be charged along with a price per unit consumed. How you will benefit (I) Insights, and validations about the following topics: Chapter 1: Two-part tariff Chapter 2: Microeconomics Chapter 3: Monopoly Chapter 4: Monopolistic competition Chapter 5: Perfect competition Chapter 6: Imperfect competition Chapter 7: Deadweight loss Chapter 8: Economic surplus Chapter 9: Price discrimination Chapter 10: Profit maximization Chapter 11: Economic equilibrium Chapter 12: Monopoly profit Chapter 13: Allocative efficiency Chapter 14: Marginal revenue Chapter 15: Ramsey problem Chapter 16: Pricing strategies Chapter 17: Market distortion Chapter 18: Profit (economics) Chapter 19: Monopoly price Chapter 20: Markup (business) Chapter 21: Double marginalization (II) Answering the public top questions about two part tariff. (III) Real world examples for the usage of two part tariff in many fields. Who this book is for Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Two Part Tariff.
| Author | : Solange Berstein J. |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 42 |
| Release | : 2002 |
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| Author | : Xiangkang Yin |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2006 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
This note compares monopoly equilibrium outcomes with those of duopoly when firms price their products with two-part tariffs. Although a monopolistic firm never charges a lower marginal price than imperfectly competitive firms, it sets a lower entry fee under certain market conditions. In turn, monopoly is likely to result in greater aggregate consumer surplus, net of all purchasing costs, than duopoly. This implies that in the process of opening a monopolistic market to competition, the regulator must carefully examine the market conditions to ensure that deregulation can reduce deadweight loss and improve consumer surplus as well.
| Author | : Sissel Jensen |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 32 |
| Release | : 2009 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
We analyze two-part tariffs in an oligopoly, where each firm commits to a quantity and a fixed fee prior to the determination of unit prices. In the case of homogeneous consumers, Harrison and Kline (2001) showed that the equilibrium involves marginal cost pricing and that increased competition affects industry profit and the tariff structure solely by reducing the fixed fee. We show that firms' pricing strategies may change when we allow for demand side heterogeneity. In particular, we find that the price per unit can be either above or below marginal cost, and that the fixed fee increases with increased competition. Finally, some numerical examples show that full market coverage may arise as an equilibrium feature in cases where a monopolist would exclude low-demand types. Hence, fostering competition may contribute to the fulfillment of the Universal Service requirement that is common in industries such as telecommunications, which applies nonlinear pricing on a normal basis.
| Author | : Yong Chao |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2015 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
A three-part tariff refers to a pricing scheme consisting of a fixed fee, a free allowance of units up to which the marginal price is zero, and a positive per-unit price for additional demand beyond that allowance. The three-part tariff and its variations are commonly used in both final-goods and intermediate-goods markets. Recently, the offering of three-part tariffs and the like by dominant firms has become a prominent antitrust issue. Existing studies have focused on monopoly models, interpreting the three-part tariff as a price discrimination device. In this paper, I investigate the strategic effects of three-part tariffs in a sequential-move game and offer an equilibrium theory of three-part tariffs in a competitive context. I show that, compared with linear pricing equilibrium and two-part tariff equilibrium, a three-part tariff always strictly increases the dominant firm's (the leader's) profit when competing against a rival (the follower) with substitute products, in the absence of usual price discrimination motive. To explore the effects of a three-part tariff on welfare, I further perform comparative statics analysis using general differentiated linear demand system. I show that the competitive effect of a three-part tariff in contrast to linear pricing depends on the degree of substitutability between products: Competition is intensified when two products are more differentiated, yet softened when two products are more substitutable. This is in stark contrast with the competitive scenario posed by a two-part tariff: A two-part tariff always enhances competition and gives the highest total surplus of these three pricing schemes. Moreover, the rival firm always gets hurt in both profit and quantity sale when the dominant firm switches from linear pricing to a two-part tariff, yet it enjoys higher profit when the dominant firm moves from a two-part tariff to the more ornate three-part tariff, despite the fact that its quantity and market share are decreased even further. My findings offer a new perspective on three-part tariffs, a perspective which could help antitrust enforcement agencies distinguish the exclusionary three-part tariff from the procompetitive one.
| Author | : Fouad Sabry |
| Publisher | : One Billion Knowledgeable |
| Total Pages | : 374 |
| Release | : 2024-03-27 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : |
What is Price Discrimination Price discrimination is a microeconomic pricing strategy where identical or largely similar goods or services are sold at different prices by the same provider in different market segments. Price discrimination is distinguished from product differentiation by the more substantial difference in production cost for the differently priced products involved in the latter strategy. Price differentiation essentially relies on the variation in the customers' willingness to pay and in the elasticity of their demand. For price discrimination to succeed, a firm must have market power, such as a dominant market share, product uniqueness, sole pricing power, etc. All prices under price discrimination are higher than the equilibrium price in a perfectly competitive market. However, some prices under price discrimination may be lower than the price charged by a single-price monopolist. Price discrimination is utilized by the monopolist to recapture some deadweight loss. This Pricing strategy enables firms to capture additional consumer surplus and maximize their profits while benefiting some consumers at lower prices. Price discrimination can take many forms and is prevalent in many industries, from education and telecommunications to healthcare. How you will benefit (I) Insights, and validations about the following topics: Chapter 1: Price discrimination Chapter 2: Monopoly Chapter 3: Monopolistic competition Chapter 4: Oligopoly Chapter 5: Perfect competition Chapter 6: Imperfect competition Chapter 7: Deadweight loss Chapter 8: Two-part tariff Chapter 9: Pricing Chapter 10: Barriers to entry Chapter 11: Yield management Chapter 12: Market power Chapter 13: Non-price competition Chapter 14: Market structure Chapter 15: Pricing strategies Chapter 16: Dynamic pricing Chapter 17: Revenue management Chapter 18: Value-based pricing Chapter 19: Rental value Chapter 20: Profit (economics) Chapter 21: Monopoly price (II) Answering the public top questions about price discrimination. (III) Real world examples for the usage of price discrimination in many fields. Who this book is for Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Price Discrimination.
| Author | : Haitao Qu |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2022 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
In this paper, a vertical mixed oligopoly framework is used to select the endogenous competition modes with a two-part tariff input price bargaining. We get the following result: First, the public firm does not have the dominant strategy and the private firm's strictly dominant strategy is price competition; Second, due to that the upstream firm's profit maximization, the public firm choosing quantity competition while the private firm choosing price competition is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium which is in sharp with Matsumura and Ogawa (2012) and Choi (2012, 2019).
| Author | : Christophe Deissenberg |
| Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
| Total Pages | : 351 |
| Release | : 2005-11-03 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 0387258051 |
Optimal Control and Dynamic Games has been edited to honor the outstanding contributions of Professor Suresh Sethi in the fields of Applied Optimal Control. Professor Sethi is internationally one of the foremost experts in this field. He is, among others, co-author of the popular textbook "Sethi and Thompson: Optimal Control Theory: Applications to Management Science and Economics". The book consists of a collection of essays by some of the best known scientists in the field, covering diverse aspects of applications of optimal control and dynamic games to problems in Finance, Management Science, Economics, and Operations Research. In doing so, it provides both a state-of-the-art overview over recent developments in the field, and a reference work covering the wide variety of contemporary questions that can be addressed with optimal control tools, and demonstrates the fruitfulness of the methodology.
