Three Essays on Hedge Fund Fee Contracts, Managerial Incentives and Risk Taking Behaviors

Three Essays on Hedge Fund Fee Contracts, Managerial Incentives and Risk Taking Behaviors
Author: Gong Zhan
Publisher:
Total Pages: 139
Release: 2011
Genre: Hedge funds
ISBN:

Essay One: Under the principal-agent framework, we study and compare different compensation schemes commonly adopted by hedge fund and mutual fund managers. We find that the option-like performance fee structure prevalent among hedge funds is suboptimal to the symmetric performance fee structure. However, the use of high water mark (HWM) mitigates the suboptimality, though to a very limited extent. Both our theoretical models and simulation results show that HWM will induce more managerial efforts only when a fund is slightly under the water but it will unfavorably dampen incentives when a fund is too deep under the water and when the manager's skill is poor. Allowing managers to invest personal wealth in their own funds, however, helps align interests and provides positive managerial incentives. Essay Two: Existing literature has detected a "tournament behavior" among mutual fund managers that mid-year underperformers tend to take relatively higher risk than peers in the second half-year. We reexamine this issue and provide empirical evidence that such behavior does not exist among hedge fund managers, either at fund level or risk style level. Instead, hedge fund managers shift risk at mid-year in response to the moneyness of their incentive contracts. Also, risk shifting decisions are more driven by underperformance than by outperformance. HighWater Mark can strongly rein in excess risk-taking and therefore better aligns interests. Last, risk shifting on average does not improve either performance, moneyness of incentive contracts, or cash inflows. Essay Three: We use factor models and optimal change point regression models to capture the intra-year risk dynamics of hedge fund managers. Those risk shifting managers are further divided into 'Informed', 'Uninformed' and 'Misinformed' groups, according to their post-shifting risk adjusted performance. We find evidence that supports the existence of an Adverse Selection' problem of managers compensation schemes. Namely, incentive contracts, designed to share risks and align interests, induce the strongest risk taking from the least informed or skilled hedge fund managers, whose risk-shifting decisions result in undesired or even deteriorated risk-adjusted returns for investors. We also find that the High Water Mark has only limited influence on mitigating excessive risk shifting.

Essays on Mutual Funds

Essays on Mutual Funds
Author: Xiang Kang
Publisher:
Total Pages: 270
Release: 2020
Genre:
ISBN:

This dissertation is composed of two empirical studies on mutual funds. Chapter 1 studies the implication of the timing of mutual fund entry for subsequent long-term fund performance. As fund companies choose when to open new funds and what investment styles they practice, these choices may be informative about the fund qualities. I empirically explore the relation between entrant fund performance and past style performance. By examining a sample of 2,801 mutual fund entrant during the period of 1991--2015, I find that entrant funds with investment styles that have recently performed well tend to underperform in the future. The post-entry performance of hot style entrants is worse than both the post-entry performance of cold style entrants and the concurrent performance of incumbents in the same style categories. The empirical findings are unlikely to be driven by stock-level return reversals or competition among mutual funds, but consistent with fund investors practicing style investing and extrapolating their beliefs on style returns, leading to lower entry thresholds for fund managers in hot investment styles. Chapter 2 includes my joint work with David Xiaoyu Xu on how regulations in the Chinese stock market can affect investor behavior in the mutual fund market. We show that trading suspension, a regulatory policy on stock trading activities, gives rise to stale mutual fund NAVs and indirectly affects fund investors' behavior. Using a sample of 3,205 long-term trading suspension events in China during 2004--2018, we find that opportunistic investors combine firm-specific news and fund portfolio reports to make investment decisions. Quarterly fund flows positively respond to suspended portfolio stocks' unrealized impact on fund NAVs. Such responses are stronger for impactful good news, and portfolio disclosure plays a key role in this mechanism. Our findings suggest the need for a better integrated financial regulatory framework in emerging markets

Three Essays on Mutual Funds

Three Essays on Mutual Funds
Author: Xuemei Guo
Publisher:
Total Pages: 312
Release: 2017
Genre:
ISBN:

This dissertation investigates the determinants of mutual fund flows and mutual fund performance. The first chapter examines the response of fund investors to style volatility and the impact of style volatility on the flow-performance relationship. Three main empirical findings are obtained using both a portfolio approach and a multivariate regression approach. First, I find that there is a significant positive relationship between the style volatility and the subsequent fund flows to mutual funds. This finding can be interpreted as either fund managers having style timing ability or fund managers catering to investors preferences or tastes. Second, the positive relationship between past style volatility and fund flows is less pronounced for funds with superior past performance. Lastly, fund style volatility has a dampening effect on the flow-performance relationship: the flow-performance sensitivity weakens by 12% when the past style volatility increases by one standard deviation. It is likely that performance is perceived as a less informative signal of investment ability for fund managers who follow inconsistent styles over time. The second chapter studies how the response of fund investors to past risk varies over business cycles. I employ the NBER boom indicator, the Consumer Sentiment Index, and the National Activity Index to proxy for economic conditions. I find that mutual fund investors react differently to risk across economic environments. Funds with more volatile past returns discourage fund investors. The investors’ demand for actively managed funds is higher under good market conditions. Fund flows are less responsive to risk during expansionary economic periods. This finding may indicate that fund investors are risk averse and become less risk averse in good market states. The third chapter empirically examines whether mutual fund performance is affected by prior family performance. I propose two testable hypotheses: the information and resource sharing hypothesis and the cross-fund subsidization hypothesis. The empirical findings suggest that there is a significant positive relationship between prior family performance and subsequent fund performance. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that mutual funds in the same family share informational resources. This positive relation also justifies the finding in the mutual fund flow literature that fund flows are higher for funds with higher past family performance. Furthermore, I find that the predictive power of the prior family performance is stronger in larger fund families.