Two Essays On Bidding In Multi Unit Common Value Auctions
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The Future of EMarkets
| Author | : Martin Bichler |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 266 |
| Release | : 2001 |
| Genre | : Electronic commerce |
| ISBN | : 9780521003834 |
Dynamic pricing and on-line auctions are emerging as the preferred models for e-business. Forrester Research predicts that business-to-business Internet auctions will grow to $52.6 billion by 2002, while dynamically priced business-to-business transactions will rise to $88 billion, representing 27% of the value of all business-to-business e-commerce transactions. This multi-disciplinary book presents a framework of negotiation protocols for electronic markets. It is the first book to combine economics with computer science and the first to describe multidimensional auction mechanisms - i.e. automated negotiations on multiple attributes and/or multiple units of a product. In addition it summarises the introductory economics needed to understand electronic markets, and surveys the literature on negotiation and auction theory. Case studies include the trading of financial derivatives. For use in the design, implementation and upgrade of electronic markets, for researchers in: economics, information systems and operations management, computer science and all students of the e-commerce phenomenon.
The Handbook of Market Design
| Author | : Nir Vulkan |
| Publisher | : Oxford University Press, USA |
| Total Pages | : 706 |
| Release | : 2013-08-29 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 0199570515 |
This Handbook brings together the latest research on applied market design. It surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as law clerks and judges or patients and kidney donors.
Bounded Rationality
| Author | : Sanjit Dhami |
| Publisher | : MIT Press |
| Total Pages | : 553 |
| Release | : 2022-07-12 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 0262369656 |
Two leaders in the field explore the foundations of bounded rationality and its effects on choices by individuals, firms, and the government. Bounded rationality recognizes that human behavior departs from the perfect rationality assumed by neoclassical economics. In this book, Sanjit Dhami and Cass R. Sunstein explore the foundations of bounded rationality and consider the implications of this approach for public policy and law, in particular for questions about choice, welfare, and freedom. The authors, both recognized as experts in the field, cover a wide range of empirical findings and assess theoretical work that attempts to explain those findings. Their presentation is comprehensive, coherent, and lucid, with even the most technical material explained accessibly. They not only offer observations and commentary on the existing literature but also explore new insights, ideas, and connections. After examining the traditional neoclassical framework, which they refer to as the Bayesian rationality approach (BRA), and its empirical issues, Dhami and Sunstein offer a detailed account of bounded rationality and how it can be incorporated into the social and behavioral sciences. They also discuss a set of models of heuristics-based choice and the philosophical foundations of behavioral economics. Finally, they examine libertarian paternalism and its strategies of “nudges.”
Putting Auction Theory to Work
| Author | : Paul Milgrom |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 378 |
| Release | : 2004-01-12 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1139449168 |
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Contemporary Issues in Economics and Econometrics
| Author | : Stan Hurn |
| Publisher | : Edward Elgar Publishing |
| Total Pages | : 264 |
| Release | : 2004-01-01 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 9781782543756 |
'All of the papers share a high level of practical relevance and usefulness that is sometimes missing in economic research. Indeed, the reader will find that very issue taken up as the theme of Paul Klemperer's delightful essay, and all five papers under the heading of "econometric theory" will be extremely useful for most applied researchers. I hope that the reader will also share my feeling of gratitude toward Ralf Becker and Stan Hurn for putting together this outstanding permanent record of some of the conference's most important contributions.' - From the foreword by James D. Hamilton, University of California, San Diego, US This authoritative collection of papers covers a broad spectrum of topics in theoretical and applied economics and econometrics. The tone of the book is set by Paul Klemperer's contribution on using and abusing economic theory, in which academics are encouraged to widen the scope of their analyses beyond the confines of elegant models which sometimes lack 'real-world' detail. As a result, many of the chapters in this volume share a high degree of practical relevance.
Assets, Beliefs, and Equilibria in Economic Dynamics
| Author | : Charalambos D. Aliprantis |
| Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
| Total Pages | : 733 |
| Release | : 2013-11-11 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 3662058588 |
A collection of papers dealing with a broad range of topics in mathematical economics, game theory and economic dynamics. The contributions present both theoretical and applied research. The volume is dedicated to Mordecai Kurz. The papers were presented in a special symposium co-hosted by the Stanford University Department of Economics and by the Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research in August 2002.
The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information
| Author | : Sushil Bikhchandani |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 509 |
| Release | : 2013-08-12 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1107433762 |
There has been explosive progress in the economic theory of uncertainty and information in the past few decades. This subject is now taught not only in departments of economics but also in professional schools and programs oriented toward business, government and administration, and public policy. This book attempts to unify the subject matter in a simple, accessible manner. Part I of the book focuses on the economics of uncertainty; Part II examines the economics of information. This revised and updated second edition places a greater focus on game theory. New topics include posted-price markets, mechanism design, common-value auctions, and the one-shot deviation principle for repeated games.
Strategic Bidding in a Multi-unit Auction
| Author | : Catherine D. Wolfram |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 72 |
| Release | : 1997 |
| Genre | : Auctions |
| ISBN | : |
This paper considers the bidding behavior of participants in the daily auction to supply electricity in England and Wales. Every day, owners of generating capacity submit bids reflecting a price for power from their plants. The price bid by the last plant used to meet electricity needs in a given time period is the price paid for capacity from all plants. Theoretical work on uniform-price multi-unit auctions suggests that bidders selling more than one unit of a good have an incentive to increase the prices they bid at high quantities. If a bid sets the equilibrium price, the bidder receives a higher price for that unit as well as for all inframarginal units. I find evidence of strategic bid increases. First, plants that are likely to be used after a number of other plants are already operating bid more. Second, the larger supplier submits higher bids, all else equal. Lastly, there is some evidence that bids for given plants are higher when the suppliers have more available capacity.
