Antitrust Basics

Antitrust Basics
Author: Thomas V. Vakerics
Publisher: Law Journal Seminars Press
Total Pages: 1200
Release: 2017-12-28
Genre: Law
ISBN: 9781588520326

This book anticipates virtually every antitrust issue you can expect to face, including: horizontal and vertical restraints; joint ventures; private treble damage actions; price fixing; and more.

The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement

The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement
Author: Daniel A. Crane
Publisher:
Total Pages: 276
Release: 2011
Genre: Law
ISBN:

This text provides a comprehensive and succinct treatment of the history, structure, and behaviour of the various US institutions that enforce antitrust laws. It also draws comparisons with the structure of institutional enforcement outside the US, and it considers the possibility of creating international antitrust institutions.

The Antitrust Enterprise

The Antitrust Enterprise
Author: Herbert HOVENKAMP
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Total Pages: 392
Release: 2009-06-30
Genre: Law
ISBN: 9780674038820

After thirty years, the debate over antitrust's ideology has quieted. Most now agree that the protection of consumer welfare should be the only goal of antitrust laws. Execution, however, is another matter. The rules of antitrust remain unfocused, insufficiently precise, and excessively complex. The problem of poorly designed rules is severe, because in the short run rules weigh much more heavily than principles. At bottom, antitrust is a defensible enterprise only if it can make the microeconomy work better, after accounting for the considerable costs of operating the system. The Antitrust Enterprise is the first authoritative and compact exposition of antitrust law since Robert Bork's classic The Antitrust Paradox was published more than thirty years ago. It confronts not only the problems of poorly designed, overly complex, and inconsistent antitrust rules but also the current disarray of antitrust's rule of reason, offering a coherent and workable set of solutions. The result is an antitrust policy that is faithful to the consumer welfare principle but that is also more readily manageable by the federal courts and other antitrust tribunals.

Reconciling Efficiency and Equity

Reconciling Efficiency and Equity
Author: Damien Gerard
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Total Pages: 475
Release: 2019-05-09
Genre: Law
ISBN: 1108498086

Provides a new conceptualization of competition law as economic inequality and its interaction with efficiency become of central concern to policy and decision-makers.

Punitive Damages

Punitive Damages
Author: Cass R. Sunstein
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Total Pages: 299
Release: 2008-12-19
Genre: Law
ISBN: 0226780163

Over the past two decades, the United States has seen a dramatic increase in the number and magnitude of punitive damages verdicts rendered by juries in civil trials. Probably the most extraordinary example is the July 2000 award of $144.8 billion in the Florida class action lawsuit brought against cigarette manufacturers. Or consider two recent verdicts against the auto manufacturer BMW in Alabama. In identical cases, argued in the same court before the same judge, one jury awarded $4 million in punitive damages, while the other awarded no punitive damages at all. In cases involving accidents, civil rights, and the environment, multimillion-dollar punitive awards have been a subject of intense controversy. But how do juries actually make decisions about punitive damages? To find out, the authors-experts in psychology, economics, and the law-present the results of controlled experiments with more than 600 mock juries involving the responses of more than 8,000 jury-eligible citizens. Although juries tended to agree in their moral judgments about the defendant's conduct, they rendered erratic and unpredictable dollar awards. The experiments also showed that instead of moderating juror verdicts, the process of jury deliberation produced a striking "severity shift" toward ever-higher awards. Jurors also tended to ignore instructions from the judges; were influenced by whatever amount the plaintiff happened to request; showed "hindsight bias," believing that what happened should have been foreseen; and penalized corporations that had based their decisions on careful cost-benefit analyses. While judges made many of the same errors, they performed better in some areas, suggesting that judges (or other specialists) may be better equipped than juries to decide punitive damages. Using a wealth of new experimental data, and offering a host of provocative findings, this book documents a wide range of systematic biases in jury behavior. It will be indispensable for anyone interested not only in punitive damages, but also jury behavior, psychology, and how people think about punishment.