The Use of Air Power in The Second Chechen War. Operational Analysis

The Use of Air Power in The Second Chechen War. Operational Analysis
Author: william kealey
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
Total Pages: 17
Release: 2014-02-05
Genre: Political Science
ISBN: 3656588236

Document from the year 2013 in the subject Politics - Topic: Peace and Conflict, Security, grade: 89.00, University of Nottingham, language: English, abstract: Since this document primarily focuses on the role of air power within the confines of the latter of the two conflicts, the analysis will be strictly related to just that as opposed to broader military operational analysis, only with occasional reference to the former conflict of 1994-1996. The role of Russian air power throughout the first conflict varies significantly when contrasted with that of the second. This, as will be discussed later, is primarily a result of the lessons learnt from the first conflict- which is generally conceded as a Russian operational failure since Chechnya still remained a de facto independent state following the declaration of the 'Khasavyurt Accords' resulting in a ceasefire in 1996. The second conflict on the other hand, can be considered, at least in operational terms, successful since Russia restored federal control of the territory. Defence cuts and structural problems within the Russian air force attributed to a defeat in the first conflict and a 'humiliating victory' (Haas, D.M: 2004; 1-18) in the second. Although the air force was not the only branch of the Russian military that faced defence cuts, it was perhaps arguably the most strategically indispensible in a conflict which had been suggested by the then Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev, as an opportunity to exhibit Russia's rapid deployment capabilities. The conclusions of both conflicts are a result of the Russian air force not being utilised effectively- or rather unable to be utilised to the extent required within a theatre of war constituted by counter insurgency combat. Nevertheless, Russian air power was used extensively and considered to be paramount in strategic discourse throughout both conflicts (Malek. M: 2009; 8-12)

Russian Airpower in the Second Chechen War

Russian Airpower in the Second Chechen War
Author: Robert D. Evans
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2001
Genre:
ISBN:

The Second Chechen War, which began on 23 September 1999 with massive Russian air strikes, bore little resemblance to the inconclusive campaign that had ended just three years earlier. In the earlier conflict, Russian Air Force operations concentrated on achieving control of the air, directly supporting Russian ground forces, and attacking rebels in the foothills and mountains of southern Chechnya. Aside from the very brief initial campaign against the Chechen Air Force, Russian airpower played a minor supporting role to ground forces during the First Chechen War, achieving only limited tactical successes. During the Second Chechen War, Russian commanders used airpower extensively, with mixed results. By examining the use of Russian airpower in the Second Chechen War, the author identified implications for the United States Air Force conducting small-scale, high-intensity operations. The monograph examines the background to the Chechen wars and the use of airpower in the First Chechen War to set the stage for the analysis of the Russian use of airpower during the Second Chechen War. The author considered if Russian Air Force employment concepts and equipment, used during the Second Chechen War were adequate, feasible, and acceptable, by western standards. When measured against the criterions, the employment of Russian airpower in the Second Chechen War yielded mixed results. Russian Air Force employment concepts were adequate, successfully accomplishing all military objectives. However, airpower failed in its most important objective, reducing Russian ground force casualties. Russian Air Force employment concepts and equipment were unable to accomplish the mission, within allowable constraints, making them infeasible. Finally, the failure to comply with international laws of war, and consider the effect of the air campaign on the political end stat.

Counterinsurgency Warfare and Brutalisation

Counterinsurgency Warfare and Brutalisation
Author: Roberto Colombo
Publisher: Routledge
Total Pages: 100
Release: 2021-07-21
Genre: History
ISBN: 1000456072

This book offers the first analysis of the brutalisation paradigm in counter-insurgency warfare. Minimising the use of force and winning over the population’s opinion is said to be the cornerstone of success in modern counterinsurgency (COIN). Yet, this tells only one side of the story. Drawing upon primary data collected during interviews with eyewitnesses of the Second Russian-Chechen War, as well as from secondary sources, this book is the first to offer a detailed analysis of the long-neglected logic underpinning brutalisation-centred COIN campaigns. It offers a comprehensive systematisation of the brutalisation paradigm and challenges the widespread assumption of brutalisation as an underperforming paradigm of COIN warfare. It shows that, although appalling, brutalisation-centred measures can deliver success. The book also outlines a stigmatised yet widely deployed set of COIN measures and provides critical insights into how Western military blueprints can be improved without compromising important moral and ethical requirements. This book will be of much interest to students of counterinsurgency, military and strategic studies, Russian politics, and International Relations.

Russia's Chechen Wars 1994-2000

Russia's Chechen Wars 1994-2000
Author: Olga Oliker
Publisher: Rand Corporation
Total Pages: 129
Release: 2001-09-28
Genre: History
ISBN: 0833032488

An examination of the difficulties faced by the Russian military in planningand carrying out urban operations in Chechnya.Russian and rebel military forces fought to control the Chechen city ofGrozny in the winters of 1994-1995 and 1999-2000, as well as clashing insmaller towns and villages. The author examines both Russian and rebeltactics and operations in those battles, focusing on how and why thecombatants' approaches changed over time. The study concludes that whilethe Russian military was able to significantly improve its ability to carryout a number of key tasks in the five-year interval between the wars, otherimportant missions--particularly in the urban realm--were ignored, largelyin the belief that the urban mission could be avoided. This consciousdecision not to prepare for a most stressful battlefield met withdevastating results, a lesson the United States would be well served tostudy.

The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine

The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine
Author: Alekseĭ Georgievich Arbatov
Publisher:
Total Pages: 68
Release: 2000
Genre: Chechni︠a︡ (Russia)
ISBN:

" ... Paper provides an authoritative analysis of national security thinking in Moscow, as well as some pointed suggestions on how to improve relations between Russia and the West. To assist readers who may want more details from official documents, as opposed to the opinions of an individual scholar and parliamentarian, we have also included extracts from the current Russian Military Doctrine and National Security Concept."--Forward.

The Russian Way of War

The Russian Way of War
Author: Lester W. Grau
Publisher: Mentor Military
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2018
Genre: History
ISBN: 9781940370194

Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces The mighty Soviet Army is no more. The feckless Russian Army that stumbled into Chechnya is no more. Today's Russian Army is modern, better manned, better equipped and designed for maneuver combat under nuclear-threatened conditions. This is your source for the tactics, equipment, force structure and theoretical underpinnings of a major Eurasian power. Here's what the experts are saying: "A superb baseline study for understanding how and why the modern Russian Army functions as it does. Essential for specialist and generalist alike." -Colonel (Ret) David M. Glantz, foremost Western author on the Soviet Union in World War II and Editor of The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. "Congratulations to Les Grau and Chuck Bartles on filling a gap which has yawned steadily wider since the end of the USSR. Their book addresses evolving Russian views on war, including the blurring of its nature and levels, and the consequent Russian approaches to the Ground Forces' force structuring, manning, equipping, and tactics. Confidence is conferred on the validity of their arguments and conclusions by copious footnoting, mostly from an impressive array of primary sources. It is this firm grounding in Russian military writings, coupled with the authors' understanding of war and the Russian way of thinking about it, that imparts such an authoritative tone to this impressive work." -Charles Dick, former Director of the Combat Studies Research Centre, Senior Fellow at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, author of the 1991 British Army Field Manual, Volume 2, A Treatise on Soviet Operational Art and author of From Victory to Stalemate The Western Front, Summer 1944 and From Defeat to Victory, The Eastern Front, Summer 1944. "Dr. Lester Grau's and Chuck Bartles' professional research on the Russian Armed Forces is widely read throughout the world and especially in Russia. Russia's Armed Forces have changed much since the large-scale reforms of 2008, which brought the Russian Army to the level of the world's other leading armies. The speed of reform combined with limited information about their core mechanisms represented a difficult challenge to the authors. They have done a great job and created a book which could be called an encyclopedia of the modern armed forces of Russia. They used their wisdom and talents to explore vital elements of the Russian military machine: the system of recruitment and training, structure of units of different levels, methods and tactics in defense and offence and even such little-known fields as the Arctic forces and the latest Russian combat robotics." -Dr. Vadim Kozyulin, Professor of Military Science and Project Director, Project on Asian Security, Emerging Technologies and Global Security Project PIR Center, Moscow. "Probably the best book on the Russian Armed Forces published in North America during the past ten years. A must read for all analysts and professionals following Russian affairs. A reliable account of the strong and weak aspects of the Russian Army. Provides the first look on what the Russian Ministry of Defense learned from best Western practices and then applied them on Russian soil." -Ruslan Pukhov, Director of the Moscow-based Centre for the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST) and member of the Public Council of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense. Author of Brothers Armed: Military Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine, Russia's New Army, and The Tanks of August.

A Strategic Analysis of the Chechen Wars

A Strategic Analysis of the Chechen Wars
Author: Jennifer Cayias
Publisher:
Total Pages: 86
Release: 2012
Genre:
ISBN:

Abstract: At the start of the First Chechen war, the Russian Federation had recently inherited a fractured polity. New leaders tried to piece together a new identity and grand strategy for a state that was still coming to terms with the fact that it was no longer the center of a union. Its new borders were unstable and unsecure, and secession of any one republic threatened a potential chain reaction throughout the region. What Russia needed was a strong, experienced leader, with a clear sense of direction and purpose for the Russian Federation. While many factors contributed to Russia's domestic troubles, Boris Yeltsin proved unequal to the task of effectively consolidating and directing what remained of the Russian Republic. In the case of Chechnya, after the collapse of the Soviet Union the Russian military still retained a vast arsenal and reserves of manpower, which could have overwhelmed Chechnya from the outset - had they been well coordinated and directed. Dzhokhar Dudaev was exactly what Chechnya needed. He had decades of experience in the ranks of the Russian military and thoroughly understood their tactics, and he also had experience in irregular warfare from his service in the Soviet war in Afghanistan. And, of course, he was very familiar with the irregular and unconventional style of warfare that traversed Chechen history. In 1994 and 1995 Dudaev proved his ability to out-strategize the dysfunctional Russian forces, both politically and militarily. In 1996, two factors brought him down: the sheer mass of the Russian forces sent to Chechnya and their tactical adjustments, as well as undermining from competing Chechen factions. His death to a Russian air strike in that same year hamstrung the Chechen government with weak leadership that resulted in disaster for the nascent Chechen state. Neither the 1994 war nor that of 1999 was won or lost solely by the actions of one side or one leader. A mosaic of complex factors, acting on both sides, contributed to the origins, developments, and outcomes of each war. Technological, training, and coordinative flaws in the Russian strategy during the first war were largely rectified in the second. Additionally, the image of potentially legitimate statehood and victimization that the Chechens enjoyed at the start of the first war vanished by the second, causing the republic to lose its badly needed public support in both Russia and abroad in the international community. While noting the complexity of factors involved in the outcome if each war, key individuals at the helm of each polity created successes and failures out of the assets and liabilities at hand. Similarities between the origins of each war, contrasted with the stark differences in how forces executed their operations and the results they achieved, exemplify the significance that leadership has on an army's success or failure.