The Shapley-value Compared to Solutions of Cooperative N-person Games in Extensive Form and to Aspirations
| Author | : Ulrike Radosch |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 138 |
| Release | : 1983 |
| Genre | : Economics, Mathematical |
| ISBN | : |
The Shapley Value Compared To Solutions Of Cooperative N Person Games In Extensive Form And To Aspirations
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Handbook of the Shapley Value
| Author | : Encarnación Algaba |
| Publisher | : CRC Press |
| Total Pages | : 607 |
| Release | : 2019-12-06 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1351241400 |
Handbook of the Shapley Value contains 24 chapters and a foreword written by Alvin E. Roth, who was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences jointly with Lloyd Shapley in 2012. The purpose of the book is to highlight a range of relevant insights into the Shapley value. Every chapter has been written to honor Lloyd Shapley, who introduced this fascinating value in 1953. The first chapter, by William Thomson, places the Shapley value in the broader context of the theory of cooperative games, and briefly introduces each of the individual contributions to the volume. This is followed by a further contribution from the editors of the volume, which serves to introduce the more significant features of the Shapley value. The rest of the chapters in the book deal with different theoretical or applied aspects inspired by this interesting value and have been contributed specifically for this volume by leading experts in the area of Game Theory. Chapters 3 through to 10 are more focused on theoretical aspects of the Shapley value, Chapters 11 to 15 are related to both theoretical and applied areas. Finally, from Chapter 16 to Chapter 24, more attention is paid to applications of the Shapley value to different problems encountered across a diverse range of fields. As expressed by William Thomson in the Introduction to the book, "The chapters contribute to the subject in several dimensions: Mathematical foundations; axiomatic foundations; computations; applications to special classes of games; power indices; applications to enriched classes of games; applications to concretely specified allocation problems: an ever-widening range, mapping allocation problems into games or implementation." Nowadays, the Shapley value continues to be as appealing as when it was first introduced in 1953, or perhaps even more so now that its potential is supported by the quantity and quality of the available results. This volume collects a large amount of work that definitively demonstrates that the Shapley value provides answers and solutions to a wide variety of problems.
The Shapley Value
| Author | : Alvin E. Roth |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 342 |
| Release | : 1988-10-28 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1107717213 |
Composed in honour of the sixty-fifth birthday of Lloyd Shapley, this volume makes accessible the large body of work that has grown out of Shapley's seminal 1953 paper. Each of the twenty essays concerns some aspect of the Shapley value. Three of the chapters are reprints of the 'ancestral' papers: Chapter 2 is Shapley's original 1953 paper defining the value; Chapter 3 is the 1954 paper by Shapley and Shubik applying the value to voting models; and chapter 19 is Shapley's 1969 paper defining a value for games without transferable utility. The other seventeen chapters were contributed especially for this volume. The first chapter introduces the subject and the other essays in the volume, and contains a brief account of a few of Shapley's other major contributions to game theory. The other chapters cover the reformulations, interpretations and generalizations that have been inspired by the Shapley value, and its applications to the study of coalition formulation, to the organization of large markets, to problems of cost allocation, and to the study of games in which utility is not transferable.
Interpretable Machine Learning
| Author | : Christoph Molnar |
| Publisher | : Lulu.com |
| Total Pages | : 320 |
| Release | : 2020 |
| Genre | : Artificial intelligence |
| ISBN | : 0244768528 |
This book is about making machine learning models and their decisions interpretable. After exploring the concepts of interpretability, you will learn about simple, interpretable models such as decision trees, decision rules and linear regression. Later chapters focus on general model-agnostic methods for interpreting black box models like feature importance and accumulated local effects and explaining individual predictions with Shapley values and LIME. All interpretation methods are explained in depth and discussed critically. How do they work under the hood? What are their strengths and weaknesses? How can their outputs be interpreted? This book will enable you to select and correctly apply the interpretation method that is most suitable for your machine learning project.
Value Solutions In Cooperative Games
| Author | : Roger A Mccain |
| Publisher | : World Scientific |
| Total Pages | : 236 |
| Release | : 2013-03-07 |
| Genre | : Mathematics |
| ISBN | : 9814417416 |
This book introduces new concepts for cooperative game theory, and particularly solutions that determine the distribution of a coalitional surplus among the members of the coalition. It also addresses several generalizations of cooperative game theory. Drawing on methods of welfare economics, new value solutions are derived for Non-Transferable Utility games with and without differences of bargaining power among the members of the coalition. Cooperation in intertemporal games is examined, and conditions that permit the reduction of these games to games in coalition function form are outlined. Biform games and games that combine non-cooperative search and matching of coalition members with cooperative solutions (i.e., efficient contracts) within the coalition are considered.
Time Series Representations of the Austrian Labor Market
| Author | : Klaus Neusser |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 54 |
| Release | : 1984 |
| Genre | : Labor supply |
| ISBN | : |
Research paper, statistical analysis and econometric model of the labour market in Austria - investigates relationships between wages, prices, unemployment and interest rates; gives comparison of USA results; discusses intertemporal substitution model and staggered wage contract model. Bibliography, graphs, statistical tables.
Fuzzy and Multiobjective Games for Conflict Resolution
| Author | : Ichiro Nishizaki |
| Publisher | : Physica |
| Total Pages | : 264 |
| Release | : 2013-06-05 |
| Genre | : Mathematics |
| ISBN | : 3790818305 |
Decision makers in managerial and public organizations often encounter de cision problems under conflict or competition, because they select strategies independently or by mutual agreement and therefore their payoffs are then affected by the strategies of the other decision makers. Their interests do not always coincide and are at times even completely opposed. Competition or partial cooperation among decision makers should be considered as an essen tial part of the problem when we deal with the decision making problems in organizations which consist of decision makers with conflicting interests. Game theory has been dealing with such problems and its techniques have been used as powerful analytical tools in the resolution process of the decision problems. The publication of the great work by J. von Neumann and O. Morgen stern in 1944 attracted attention of many people and laid the foundation of game theory. We can see remarkable advances in the field of game theory for analysis of economic situations and a number of books in the field have been published in recent years. The aim of game theory is to specify the behavior of each player so as to optimize the interests of the player. It then recommends a set of solutions as strategies so that the actions chosen by each decision maker (player) lead to an outcome most profitable for himself or her self.
