In Chapter 1 of this dissertation, I study the effect of student debt on the post-schooling migration decisions of high-skill workers in the United States. Over the past 40 years, the U.S. has experienced significant skill-based geographic sorting, with high-skill workers increasingly concentrating in large cities. During the same period, the growth of student debt has far exceeded the rate of inflation. In this chapter, I document a link between these two facts. I first estimate the causal effect of student debt on post-schooling location choices by exploiting an expansion of federal student loan limits. Using a difference-in-differences framework, I find that $10,000 of additional debt increases the probability that individuals locate in large metropolitan counties by 6.5 percentage points. By incorporating student debt into a standard spatial equilibrium model, I find that the rise in student debt from 1980 to 2019 can account for 5-19 percent of the increase in skill-based sorting over this period. Counterfactual simulation of three policy proposals - debt forgiveness, tuition-free college, and income-driven repayment - show that only income-driven repayment can eliminate distortions to location choices while improving welfare. The remaining chapters focus on public-sector employee pension systems in the United States and the over $3 trillion in debt associated with them. In Chapter 2, I consider the political economy problem of setting pension benefit levels, where politicians balance the demands of general voters and public-sector unions. More specifically, I empirically show that expanded collective bargaining rights for public-sector employees significantly increased pension plan generosity in the 20th century, and is associated with higher levels of unfunded liabilities in the 21st century. I also provide descriptive evidence that increased plan generosity resulted in higher levels of unfunded liabilities because local governments shirked their expected contributions to pension funds and made overly optimistic assumptions on investment returns, both of which were made possible by systematic information asymmetries around public pension plans. In Chapter 3, I examine the implications of public-sector pension debt for the local economy. I exploit plausibly exogenous shocks to the reported levels of unfunded pension liabilities in a difference-in-differences framework to investigate the speed and extent to which debt shocks are capitalized into house prices. I find that increases in public debt depress local house prices relatively quickly (within 9 months). Additionally, this effect is driven by responses in the price of single-family homes, owners of which may be more likely to rely on public goods that are subject to cuts following spikes in reported pension under-funding.