This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1920 edition. Excerpt: ...Germany in every possibikjeay, and s JI fancy that he wasTalways a little contemptuous about the Indemnity; he had no intention of leaving Germany in a position to practise a vast commercial activity. But he did not trouble his head to understand either the Indemnity or poor M. Klotz's overwhelming financial difficulties. If it amused the financiers to put into the Treaty some very large demands, well there was no harm in that; but the satisfaction of these demands must not be allowed to interfere with the essential requirements of a Carthaginian Peace. The combi-) '," nation of the "real" policy of M. Clemenceau on' unreal issues, with M. Klotz's policy of pretense on what were very real issues indeed, introduced into the Treaty a whole set of incompatible provisions, Jfc over and above the inherent impracticabilities oiyS the Reparation proposals. i In conversation with Frenchmen who were private persons and quite unaffected by political considerations, this aspect became very clear. You might persuade them that some current estimates as to the amount to be got out of Germany were quite fantastic. Yet at the end they would always come back to where they had started: "But Germany must pay; for, otherwise, what is to happen to France?" I cannot here describe the endless controversy and intrigue between the Allies themselves, which at last after some months culminated in the presentation tcL Germany of the Eeparation Chapter in its final form. There can have been few nego--'," tiations in history so contorted, so miserable, so, fc Utterly unsatisfactory to all parties, ' I doubt il any one who took much part in that debate can look back on it without shame. I must be content with an analysis of the elements of the final compromise which is known to...