The Nature And Normativity Of Defeat
Download The Nature And Normativity Of Defeat full books in PDF, epub, and Kindle. Read online free The Nature And Normativity Of Defeat ebook anywhere anytime directly on your device. Fast Download speed and no annoying ads. We cannot guarantee that every ebooks is available!
| Author | : Christoph Kelp |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 70 |
| Release | : 2023-09-04 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 1009190687 |
Defeat is the loss of justification for believing something in light of new information. This Element mainly aims to work towards developing a novel account of defeat. It distinguishes among three broad views in the epistemology of defeat: scepticism, internalism, and externalism and argues that that sceptical and internalist accounts of defeat are bound to remain unsatisfactory. As a result, any viable account of defeat must be externalist. While there is no shortage of externalist accounts, the Element provides reason to think that extant accounts remain unsatisfactory. The Element also explains the constructive tasks of developing an alternative account of defeat and showing that it improves on the competition.
| Author | : Christoph Kelp |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 129 |
| Release | : 2023-09-07 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 1009190679 |
This Element aims to work towards developing a novel account of defeat. It distinguishes among three broad views in the epistemology of defeat: scepticism, internalism, and externalism. It argues that that sceptical and internalist accounts of defeat are bound to remain unsatisfactory.
| Author | : Jessica Brown |
| Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
| Total Pages | : 288 |
| Release | : 2021-04-16 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0192586491 |
Traditionally, the notion of defeat has been central to epistemology, practical reasoning, and ethics. Within epistemology, it is standardly assumed that a subject who knows that p, or justifiably believes that p, can lose this knowledge or justified belief by acquiring a so-called 'defeater', whether that is evidence that not-p, evidence that the process that produced her belief is unreliable, or evidence that she has likely misevaluated her own evidence. Within ethics and practical reasoning, it is widely accepted that a subject may initially have a reason to do something although this reason is later defeated by her acquisition of further information. However, the traditional conception of defeat has recently come under attack. Some have argued that the notion of defeat is problematically motivated; others that defeat is hard to accommodate within externalist or naturalistic accounts of knowledge or justification; and still others that the intuitions that support defeat can be explained in other ways. This volume presents new work re-examining the very notion of defeat, and its place in epistemology and in normativity theory at large.
| Author | : Ralph Wedgwood |
| Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
| Total Pages | : 307 |
| Release | : 2007-07-19 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0199251312 |
The semantics of normative thought and discourse -- Thinking about what ought to be -- Expressivism -- Causal theories and conceptual analyses -- Conceptual role semantics -- Context and the logic of 'ought' -- The metaphysics of normative facts -- The metaphysical issues -- The normativity of the intentional -- Irreducibility and causal efficacy -- Non-reductive naturalism -- The epistemology of normative belief -- The status of normative intuitions -- Disagreement and the a priori.
| Author | : Sanford Goldberg |
| Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
| Total Pages | : 294 |
| Release | : 2018 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0198793677 |
Sandford C. Goldberg puts forward a theory of epistemic normativity that is grounded in the things we properly expect of one another as epistemic subjects. This theory has far-reaching implications not only for the theory of epistemic normativity, but also for the nature of epistemic assessment itself.
| Author | : Sanford C. Goldberg |
| Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
| Total Pages | : 294 |
| Release | : 2018-03-09 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 019251234X |
Sanford C. Goldberg argues in this volume that epistemic normativity - the sort of normativity implicated in assessments of whether a belief amounts to knowledge - is grounded in the things we properly expect of one another as epistemic subjects. In developing this claim Goldberg argues that epistemic norms and standards themselves are generated by the expectations that arise out of our profound and ineliminable dependence on one another for what we know of the world. The expectations in question are those through which we hold each other accountable to standards of both (epistemic) reliability and (epistemic) responsibility. In arguing for this Goldberg aims to honor the insights of both internalist and externalist approaches to epistemic justification. The resulting theory has far-reaching implications not only for the theory of epistemic normativity, but also for the nature of epistemic assessment itself, as well as for our understanding of epistemic defeat, epistemic justification, epistemic responsibility, and the various social dimensions of knowledge.
| Author | : Christoph Kelp |
| Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
| Total Pages | : 223 |
| Release | : 2021-04-01 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0192649426 |
Inquiry, Knowledge, and Understanding takes inquiry as the starting point for epistemological theorising. It uses this idea to develop new and systematic answers to some of the most fundamental questions in epistemology, including about the nature of core epistemic phenomena (most importantly: knowledge and understanding) as well as their value and the extent to which we possess them. Christoph Kelp argues that knowledge is the constitutive aim of inquiry into specific questions and that understanding is the constitutive aim of inquiry into general phenomena. He shows that these claims shed light on the nature of knowledge and understanding. He develops non-reductive 'network' analyses for both knowledge and understanding which elucidate the nature of knowledge and understanding in terms of their place in inquiry. Activities with constitutive aims, including inquiry, constitute critical domains of value in which the constitutive aim corresponds to a for-its-own-sake value relative to this domain. This study uses this idea to explain which epistemic phenomena are epistemically valuable for their own sake and to develop new solutions to a range of important value problems in epistemology, including the time-honoured Meno problem: knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief because it is the constitutive aim of inquiry, and thus epistemically valuable for its own sake.
| Author | : Michael P. Wolf |
| Publisher | : Springer |
| Total Pages | : 357 |
| Release | : 2016-08-31 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 3319336878 |
Drawing on a rich pragmatist tradition, this book offers an account of the different kinds of ‘oughts’, or varieties of normativity, that we are subject to contends that there is no conflict between normativity and the world as science describes it. The authors argue that normative claims aim to evaluate, to urge us to do or not do something, and to tell us how a state of affairs ought to be. These claims articulate forms of action-guidance that are different in kind from descriptive claims, with a wholly distinct practical and expressive character. This account suggests that there are no normative facts, and so nothing that needs any troublesome shoehorning into a scientific account of the world. This work explains that nevertheless, normative claims are constrained by the world, and answerable to reason and argumentation, in a way that makes them truth-apt and objective.
| Author | : Mona Simion |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 231 |
| Release | : 2024-02-15 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 1009298526 |
Explores the phenomenon of distrusting evidence coming from reliable sources with current examples including climate change and vaccine scepticism. The book argues that evidence resistance relates to a type of cognitive malfunction and distinguishes it from justified evidence rejection occurring in environments polluted with disinformation.
| Author | : John Greco |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 217 |
| Release | : 2010-04-22 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0521193915 |
Argues that knowledge is a kind of achievement, exploring questions of what it is and what kind of value it has.
