The Financial Impact Of Political Connections
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| Author | : Marika Carboni |
| Publisher | : Springer |
| Total Pages | : 78 |
| Release | : 2017-06-22 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 3319527762 |
This book focuses on political connections in the United States. It contributes to the literature on the link between politics and business, and on the impact of political connections on firm value, by considering industry-level regulation as a discriminating factor in the investigation of firm value creation. Overall, the findings are consistent with the view that industry-level regulation matters.
| Author | : Russell Sobel |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 53 |
| Release | : 2018 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
The US federal government's response to the financial crisis was an unprecedented increase in government subsidies, grants, and contracts given directly to specific private businesses. The terms "crony capitalism" and "cronyism" are now widely used to describe the modern relationship between government and private business. Cronyism is a system in which success in business is determined by political connections rather than market forces. In this paper we estimate the extent to which industry-level and firm-level performance is determined by political connections rather than normal market forces. Our results suggest that corporate political activity is positively correlated with executive compensation measures, but not robustly with firm performance and profitability measures. This suggests that political connections have no significant effect on the performance of firms or particular industries in most cases, but that company executives do indeed benefit from having closer ties with the political process.
| Author | : Krzysztof Jackowicz |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 49 |
| Release | : 2013 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
This study analyses the impact of political connections on the operational performance of non-financial firms in a context of a post-transition European economy. Using a new and detailed data set covering the 2001-2011 period, we found that politically connected firms are much more numerous in Poland than previously reported in the literature. We established that political connections usually lower profitability measured on the level of income from sales. However, the relationship between political connections and operational performance was affected by the characteristics of the former. Namely, the negative impact was the strongest when a firm possessed multiple connections, had politically connected members of the supervisory board and employed ex-politicians with central government experience. Therefore, our findings did not support claims based on the resource dependence theory that political connections improve the operational performance of firms.
| Author | : Nicolas James Myers |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : |
| Release | : 2021 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
In this paper, I extend the existing research on corporate political connections to the post-Citizens United era, focusing on the relationship between a Corporate PAC's political contributions and its related firm's financial outcomes. I find that the value created by a firm's net gain in political connections has been effectively reduced to zero in the decade after the Supreme Court's ruling in Citizens United v. FEC. I measure the financial value of political connections in various ways, including daily stock returns, market-to-book ratios, investment spending, sales, total assets, debt, and SG&A expense. My results raise notable questions about how firms derive value from political connections in the post-Citizens United era.
| Author | : Stijn Claessens |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 61 |
| Release | : 2017 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
Using novel indicators of political connections constructed from campaign contribution data, we show that Brazilian firms that provided contributions to (elected) federal deputies experienced higher stock returns around the 1998 and 2002 elections. This suggests contributions help shape policy on a firm-specific rather than ideological basis. Using a firm fixed effects framework to mitigate the risk that unobserved firm characteristics distort the results, we find that contributing firms substantially increased their bank leverage relative to a control group after each election, indicating that access to bank finance is an important channel through which political connections operate. We estimate the economic costs of these political connections over the two election cycles to be at least 0.2% of GDP per annum.
| Author | : Yacine Belghitar |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 44 |
| Release | : 2016 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
This paper investigates whether and how political connections influence managerial financial decisions. Our study reveals that those firms that have a politician on its board of directors are highly leveraged, use more long-term debt, hold large excess cash and are associated with low quality financial reporting compared to their non-connected counterparts. These effects escalate with the strength of the connected politician and whether he or his party is in power. The winning party effect is observed to be stronger than victory by the politician himself. Overall, our paper provides strong evidence that political connection is a two-edged sword. It is indeed a valuable resource for connected firms, but it comes at a cost of higher agency problems.
| Author | : Dmitry Golubkov |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2016 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
This dissertation consists of three chapters representing three self-contained essays on the effects of corporate political connections on firm operational, financial, and investment activities. The research is based on a sample of Russian non-state-owned companies operating within the period of 2000-2013. Chapter 1 investigates the effect of corporate political connections on firm performance and profitability. I find that political connections to the executive branch of the central (federal) government positively affect connected firm's return on sales, return on assets, return on equity and market-to-book ratio. These improvements are conditioned by better operating performance of the connected firm. At the same time financial and taxation costs are not seriously affected by political connections. Contrary to the effect of federal ties, connections to regional authorities bring more costs than benefits to the connected firms with both operating performance and overall performance indicators showing decline in presence of regional political ties. The latter effect can be explained by greater costs which regionally connected firms have to bear in order to contribute to the economic development of regions and provinces to which they are connected. Overall, Chapter 1 provides direct evidence on the effects of corporate political connections on firm profitability, performance, and their basic determinants, also showing that different types of connections differently affect performance. Chapter 2 examines the effect of corporate political and bank connections on firm-level cost of debt. I find that corporate connections to banks decrease cost of debt of a firm. However this effect works only if a firm has connections to a state-owned bank, not a private bank, and connections to a state-owned bank are to be maintained through a significant shareholder of the firm, not CEO, or board member. I also find that corporate connections to the executive branch of the central (federal) government decrease cost of debt. The latter effect works only if political connections are strong and cohesive enough, i.e. they were formed under circumstances that required high level of mutual trust and reliability between parties. Overall, the second chapter provides evidence that political and bank connections do really affect cost of debt and reveals important conditions under which connections can have an impact on this variable. Chapter 3 investigates the effect of corporate political connections on firm-level acquisitions activity. I find that political connections to central (federal) government positively affect firm's propensity to purchase stakes in other firms. This effect works well in the domestic market, but not in the foreign markets. It does also work well with regard to acquisitions of stakes in the open market, but, ironically, not in the process of privatization. At the same time I find that political connections to regional governments are negatively associated with the probability of purchasing a stake by the acquirer. The latter effect may have an explanation that in a “small world” of regional political and business elites it is risky for participants to violate the regional equilibrium of wealth and power, thus firms demonstrate acquisitions activity levels lower than that of the reference group of unconnected firms. Overall, the third chapter provides evidence on the effects of corporate political connections on bidder's acquisitions activity, showing, however, that different types of connections may differently impact bidder's propensity to acquire stakes in other firms.
| Author | : Daniel Aobdia |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 80 |
| Release | : 2019 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
We examine the role of political connections in US state government-awarded corporate economic incentives, and whether a role (if present) is cause for constituent concern. We find that companies are more likely to receive an incentive award in a politically connected state and this association is stronger when politicians' motives appear to be self-serving. Although equity investors react more positively to announcements of incentives awarded to politically connected companies, politically connected awards are associated with lower local future economic growth. Our analyses suggest that government incentives awarded to politically connected firms are a less effective allocation of taxpayer funds.
| Author | : Stijn Claessens |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 56 |
| Release | : 2007 |
| Genre | : Business and politics |
| ISBN | : |
| Author | : Pau Castells |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 169 |
| Release | : 2012 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : 9788449032660 |
Aquesta tesi esta composada per tres assaigs. Cadascún dels assaigs presenta investigació empírica original i independent analitzant els impactes de les connexions politiques sobre l'economia. Els articles fan una contribució significativa a aquesta literatura empírica, al mateix temps que subratllen les limitacions i desafiaments amb els que actualment s'enfronten els investigadors d'aquest camp. La recerca que aquí es presenta aplica desenvolupaments als metodes de recerca empirica que milloren la fiabilitat dels resultats. En el segon capitol s'estima l'impacte d'un aconteixement sorpresa a nivell polític sobre els retorns financers del mercat espanyol. Això inclou els impactes específics en determinats sectors i empreses que estan connectades políticament. En els últims dies de la campanya electoral per les eleccions generals espanyoles de l'any 2004, atacs terroristes van causar la mort de 191 persones que viatjaven en tren a la capital del país, Madrid. Quatre dies mes tard, el partit a l'oposició va guanyar les eleccions generals, en contra de totes les prediccions i enquestes que s'havien fet anteriorment a l'acció terrorista. Aquest canvi d'expectatives presenta una oportunitat única per aplicar tècniques d'event study per contrastar hipòtesis de política econòmica. L'anàlisi mostra que les hipòtesis de captura de polítics per empreses, junt amb problemes d'agència en empreses privatitzades i amb dispersió accionarial, no són rebutjades per les dades. En el tercer capítol, intento superar algunes de les limitacions de la recerca empírica en aquest camp, i exploro l'impacte de les connexions polítiques a les empreses en el rendiment empresarial. Ho faig fent servint les dos principals tècniques empíriques que es fan servir més comunment a la literatura economica: anàlisi centrat en establir les reaccions dels mercats financers a esdeveniments d'índole política; i anàlisi economètric de l'impacte de les connexions polítiques en el rendiment contable de les empreses. Els resultats de l'anàlisi indiquen que en els primers anys dels segle XXI, les connexions polítiques podrien haver tingut un impact negatiu sobre el rendiment de les empreses espanyoles. Tot i que els resultats basats en les reaccions dels mercats financers no són concloents, l'anàlisi economètric sobre mesures contables mostra una relació negativa i estadísticament significativa entre connexions polítiques i beneficis empresarials. Els resultats son consistents quan s'utilitzen diferents variables per mesurar el nivell de connexions polítiques, i també sota diverses especificacions economètriques que incloen regressions amb mètodes de variables instrumentals. Finalment, el capítol 4 considera l'influencia del sector privat en les decisions preses des de l'administració pública. Això contrasta amb l'anàlisi presentat en els dos capítols anteriors i a la majoria de recerca empírica en aquest camp, on el que es considera es generalment l'impacte de les connexions polítiques sobre els resultats econòmics empresarials. L'anàlisi està basat en dades del Regne Unit sobre la concessió de subsidis a empreses per dur a terme recerca i desenvolupament. L'agència responsable de la concessió de subsidis al Regne Unit, la Technology Strategy Board, s'encarrega en primer lloc d'identificar àrees de prioritat tecnològica. Un cop aquestes arees són aprovades i dotades de recursos pel Govern, l'agència s'encarrega de convocar concursos i seleccionar les propostes guanyadores. Els resultats de l'anàlisi suggereixen que el programa de subsidis, tot i ser efectiu en corretgir alguns errors de mercat, està esbiaixat en la distribució dels subsidis cap a aquelles empreses que estan directament connectades amb l'agència.
