The Effects Of Tiered Goals When Performers Receive Fixed And Incentive Pay
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| Author | : Alejandro Ramos (Psychologist) |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2020 |
| Genre | : Incentive awards |
| ISBN | : |
The purpose of this study was to compare the performance of participants when they were given tiered goals and received fixed or incentive pay. An ordered treatment design was used with 104 undergraduate students randomly assigned to one of the following conditions: (a) fixed pay without tiered goals; (b) fixed pay with tiered goals; (c) piece-rate pay without tiered goals; and (d) piece-rate pay with tiered goals. Participants performed a computerized simulated medical data-entry task and the primary dependent variable was the average number of correctly completed medical records per session. Participants attended one 45-minute covariate session and five 45-minute experimental sessions. A rank-based ANCOVA monotone method was used to evaluate the hypothesis that performance would be (1) highest for piece-rate pay with tiered goals, (2) intermediate for both fixed pay with tiered goals and piece-rate pay without tiered goals, and (3) lowest for fixed pay without tiered goals. The results of the main monotonic analysis were consistent with this hypothesis. A secondary analysis demonstrated that performance did not differ significantly between the two conditions expected to produce intermediate level performance. The results of the main analysis indicate that the combination of goals and incentives is likely to maximize performance in organizations, and the results of the secondary analysis are important due to the relative ease of implementing tiered goals as opposed to piece-rate pay.
| Author | : Jessica L. Urschel |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 109 |
| Release | : 2015 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
This study examined the relative effects of tiered goals, difficult goals, and moderate goals on performance when individuals earned bonus pay for goal achievement. The experimental design was a 3 x 2 mixed factorial design. Participants were 44 undergraduate students performing a computerized data entry task that simulated the job of a medical data entry clerk. For each session, participants were paid a $4 base salary plus bonus pay contingent on goal achievement. Participants were randomly assigned to 1 of 3 groups: a) a multiple, tiered goal level condition, in which participants earned $1 in bonus pay for achieving an easy goal, $2 for achieving a moderate goal, or $3 for achieving a difficult goal, b) a difficult goal condition, in which participants only had the opportunity to earn $3 for achieving the difficult goal, or c) a moderate goal condition, in which participants only had the opportunity to earn $2 for achieving the moderate goal. Results of a homogeneity of regression slopes test showed that the effects of the goal depended on participants performance levels in a do your best covariate session before the goals were introduced. After the data for the difficult and tiered goal conditions were pooled, a picked points analysis revealed that for both the lowest and average performers, tiered and difficult goals produced significantly higher performance than moderate goals, X=21, F(1, 40) = 6.57, p = .014 and X=208, F(1, 40) = 9.26, p = .004, respectively, in the first of five experimental sessions. Tiered and difficult goals did not produce significantly higher performance than moderate goals for the highest performers in the first session. No significant differences were found for the last session. These results suggest the importance of within-subjects factors to determine the effects of goals over time. The goals in this study were much easier to achieve than planned. Future research should compare the effects of moderate and difficult goals to tiered goals with goals that are more indicative of goals defined as such in the literature.
| Author | : Alejandro Ramos (Psychologist) |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2022 |
| Genre | : Incentive awards |
| ISBN | : |
The purpose of this study was to compare the performance of participants under three pay systems when all were given five tiered goals. Seventy-one undergraduate students were randomly assigned to receive either fixed pay, base pay with bonuses, or piece-rate pay. Over the course of six 45-minute sessions, one of which served as a covariate, participants engaged in a computerized simulated medical record data entry task. The primary dependent variable was the average number of correctly completed medical records per session. An increasing relationship was expected to be found between the three groups with respect to the number of correctly completed records, with the fixed pay group performing the worst and the piece-rate pay group performing the best. The results of a rank-based ANCOVA monotone analysis were inconsistent with this hypothesis. A one-factor ANCOVA showed that, while the fixed pay group performed significantly worse than both the base pay with bonuses group and the piece-rate pay group, the latter two groups were not significantly different from one another. These results partially replicated those of Ramos (2020), in which piece-rate pay with tiered goals outperformed fixed pay with tiered goals. The results also indicated that base pay with bonuses, when paired with tiered goals, may result in performance on par (or perhaps even better) than those of piece-rate pay with tiered goals. Finally, a comparison was made between task performance in a laboratory setting (Ramos, 2020) and in a remote setting (this study), finding that the latter resulted in significantly lower performance for both fixed pay with tiered goals and piece-rate pay with tiered goals. However, there were some methodological differences between the two studies which present some confounds that will require further research to truly make the comparison.
| Author | : Daniel B. Sundberg |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 147 |
| Release | : 2015 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
This study examined the relative effects of three incentive pay systems, piece-rate pay, threshold piece-rate pay, and bonus pay, on performance when individuals were given the same five-tiered performance goals. A fourth system, wage pay, served as a control. The task was a computerized simulation of a medical data entry job and the primary dependent variable was the number of correctly completed patient records. Sixty-six college students were randomly assigned to one of the four pay conditions, and attended one 60-minute covariate session and five 60-minute experimental sessions. Participants in the wage pay condition earned $6.50 per session; those in the three incentive pay conditions earned a base rate of $4.50 per session, and were able to earn up to $3.00 in incentive pay. An analysis of covariance showed no significant differences in performance among any of the four pay groups, or across time. Such findings indicate that organizations may be able to produce gains in performance similar to those found with incentive pay, through the use of tiered goals and feedback. These findings contradict past data that show that performance contingent monetary incentives produce gains in performance above what is seen with wage pay alone. The findings also support a limited body of research that suggests the effects of incentive pay systems may be strongly influenced by performance goals. Analysis of additional variables, further implications, and future directions for research are discussed in detail.
| Author | : Yngvi Freyr Einarsson |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 121 |
| Release | : 2018 |
| Genre | : Feedback (Psychology) |
| ISBN | : |
The purpose of the study was to compare the effects of graphic social comparison feedback (SCF) with tiered goals under both fixed pay and incentive pay. Graphic SCF that displays the individual performance of each group member was found to be the most effective type of graphic feedback in two relatively recent studies (Einarsson, 2016; VanStelle, 2012). The effectiveness of SCF may be due to the fact that the performances of peers serve as sub-goals for each individual, essentially setting up individualized ability-based goals. Currently, it is unclear whether the normative component of SCF contributes to its effectiveness. Rather, similar effects might occur when individuals are given non-normative tiered goals and provided with private, individualized feedback. A 2 x 2 factorial design was used with the following four experimental conditions: (a) goal-setting with fixed pay, (b) goal-setting with incentive pay, (c) SCF with fixed pay, and (d) SCF with incentive pay. Results were based on 64 undergraduate student participants who were randomly assigned to each experimental condition. Each attended a covariate session and three experimental sessions. Sessions were 45 minutes. Participants performed a computerized task that simulates the job of a data entry clerk. The main dependent variable was the number of correctly completed records. A two-factor ANCOVA was used to analyze the differences among the groups. Statistically significant differences were found on factor A and B. The incentive pay conditions performed significantly better than the fixed pay conditions and the SCF conditions performed significantly better than the goal-setting conditions. No significant interaction effect was detected. This study contributed to the feedback literature by comparing the effects of two types of graphic feedback: graphic feedback based on normative standards and graphic feedback based on goals. The component analysis showed that these two types of feedback, although structurally similar, can affect performance differently. In turn, this suggests that the underlying behavioral mechanisms of the two types of feedback are different.
| Author | : Rafael Urriola |
| Publisher | : World Health Organization |
| Total Pages | : 48 |
| Release | : 2023-10-10 |
| Genre | : Medical |
| ISBN | : 924007855X |
| Author | : Peter T. Chingos |
| Publisher | : John Wiley & Sons |
| Total Pages | : 417 |
| Release | : 2002-10-15 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 0471273740 |
An up-to-date, revised edition of the complete, practical guide to designing and implementing effective compensation plans A compensation package should be more than just the means to attract and retain talented executives. The right kind of plan can give your company a powerful strategic advantage. In Paying for Performance, Second Edition, consultants at Mercer Human Resource Consulting, Inc., one of the world's leading human resources consulting firms, give you the tools and techniques you need to design and implement a highly effective compensation program that will sharpen your company's competitive edge for years to come. The book also shows you how to understand shareholder expectations, government regulation, and a host of business and human resources issues. Paying for Performance, Second Edition: * Describes best practices used at America's top-performing companies * Offers proven pay-for-performance tools for addressing current and future pay issues * Uses case studies drawn from extensive Mercer Human Resource Consulting, Inc. research * Addresses the special issues affecting pay-for-performance in not-for-profits * Presents expert advice on managing talent and competencies to maximize performance * Addresses the regulatory issues that affect executive compensation * Covers everything from base pay to annual and long-term compensation
| Author | : Edge |
| Publisher | : Windsor Professional Information |
| Total Pages | : 564 |
| Release | : 2004 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 9781893190252 |
Drawing from nine of the leading compensation advisory firms in the country, Executive Compensation: The Professional's Guide to Current Issues and Practices is the first publication to bring together a number of the top practitioners and experts in the field to provide the information and insights needed to navigate within the new era of accountability and performance standards.
| Author | : Edwin A. Locke |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 440 |
| Release | : 1990 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : |
| Author | : Cynthia H. Ferentinos |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 51 |
| Release | : 2006-07 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : 9781422305881 |
Federal Government agencies are moving to better align pay with performance & create organizational cultures that emphasize performance rather than tenure. However, agencies must invest time, money, & effort in the design of their pay for performance compensation systems in order to succeed. To help agencies understand the critical prerequisites to success & key decision points, a review was conducted of professional & academic writings on the topic of pay for performance. This user-friendly guide summarizes the research findings. Contents: a summary of pay for performance; benefits & risks associated with pay for performance; pay for performance decision points; conclusions & recommendations; & bibliography. Illustrations.
