The Effect of Accounting Discretion on Executive Compensation Contracts
| Author | : Susan Gribble Pourciau |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 144 |
| Release | : 1988 |
| Genre | : Compensation management |
| ISBN | : |
The Effect Of Accounting Discretion On Executive Compensation Contracts
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Executive Compensation and Earnings Management Under Moral Hazard
| Author | : Bo Sun |
| Publisher | : DIANE Publishing |
| Total Pages | : 33 |
| Release | : 2010-08 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1437930980 |
Analyzes executive compensation in a setting where managers may take a costly action to manipulate corporate performance, and whether managers do so is stochastic. Examines how the opportunity to manipulate affects the optimal pay contract, and establishes necessary and sufficient conditions under which earnings management occurs. The author¿s model provides a set of implications on the role earnings management plays in driving the time-series and cross-sectional variation of executive compensation. In addition, the model's predictions regarding the changes of earnings management and executive pay in response to corporate governance legislation are consistent with empirical observations. Charts and tables.
Research Handbook on Executive Pay
| Author | : John S. Beasley |
| Publisher | : Edward Elgar Publishing |
| Total Pages | : 553 |
| Release | : 2012-01-01 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1781005109 |
Research on executive compensation has exploded in recent years, and this volume of specially commissioned essays brings the reader up-to-date on all of the latest developments in the field. Leading corporate governance scholars from a range of countries set out their views on four main areas of executive compensation: the history and theory of executive compensation, the structure of executive pay, corporate governance and executive compensation, and international perspectives on executive pay. The authors analyze the two dominant theoretical approaches – managerial power theory and optimal contracting theory – and examine their impact on executive pay levels and the practices of concentrated and dispersed share ownership in corporations. The effectiveness of government regulation of executive pay and international executive pay practices in Australia, the US, Europe, China, India and Japan are also discussed. A timely study of a controversial topic, the Handbook will be an essential resource for students, scholars and practitioners of law, finance, business and accounting.
Executive Compensation and Financial Accounting
| Author | : David Aboody |
| Publisher | : Now Publishers Inc |
| Total Pages | : 98 |
| Release | : 2010 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1601983425 |
Executive Compensation and Financial Accounting provides research perspectives on the interface between financial reporting and disclosure policies and executive compensation. In particular, it focuses on two important dimensions: - the effects of compensation-based incentives on executives' financial accounting and disclosure choices, and - the role of financial reporting and income tax regulations in shaping executive compensation practices. Executive Compensation and Financial Accounting examines the key dimensions of the relation between financial accounting and executive compensation. Specifically, the authors examine the extent to which compensation plans create incentives for executives to make particular financial reporting and disclosure choices. They also examine the extent to which accounting regulation creates incentives for firms to design particular compensation plans for their executives.
Pay Without Performance
| Author | : Lucian A. Bebchuk |
| Publisher | : Harvard University Press |
| Total Pages | : 308 |
| Release | : 2004 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 9780674020634 |
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
The Effect of Executive Compensation Discretion on Investor Judgments
| Author | : |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 126 |
| Release | : 2015 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
This dissertation develops two chapters related to experimental examinations of investor perceptions. This is motivated by the need to understand the underlying causes of investment decisions, as investment decisions have large implications for firms and management decision-making. Chapter two synthesizes existing experimental research in the area of investor perceptions. Within it, I develop three main categories to group the research: investor perceptions of information formats, investor characteristics, and investor perceptions of disclosure credibility. The chapter concludes with suggestions for further research on investor expectations, perceptions of governance, and how investment position changes investor perceptions. Chapter three examines investor perceptions related to how the Board of Directors determines executive compensation. A large body of research documents the effect of firm and manager characteristics on executive compensation design and the effect of compensation on manager actions. This chapter focuses specifically on how investors view the compensation choices firms have made. I find that investors view investing in firms more negatively after reading the compensation disclosure, especially if the Board uses discretion, rather than a target-based formula, to determine executive pay. Investors have specific concerns regarding management behavior due to the information asymmetry inherent in the separation of ownership and management. Their concerns lead them to judge the financial statements as less reliable and less relevant, which lowers their likelihood to invest in the firm and their ratings of investment attraction. Hiring a compensation consultant or following the industry norm lessens investors' negative reactions to the compensation design.
Executive Compensation
| Author | : Gary Girous |
| Publisher | : Business Expert Press |
| Total Pages | : 145 |
| Release | : 2014-12-08 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1606498797 |
The chief executive officer (CEO) of a corporation and his or her executive team are responsible for the management of the business and its continued operating and financial success. The CEO and executive team are almost always highly compensated and the relative total compensation has mushroomed over time. Most of the compensation now is designed to be performance-based, but leading to charges that executives have incentives to manipulate corporate earnings and stock price in the short-term for their own self interests. The compensation at some companies became so egregious that compensation again became a major public policy issue subject to federal regulation. Executive Compensation focuses on the major topics related to executive compensation—present, past, and future. First, is understanding what executive compensation is, including composition and objectives of pay contracts. Second, how do specific compensation agreements affect corporate behavior and performance? Third, what are the major components, including how and what are accounted for and disclosed? How is compensation, especially executive compensation, accounted for—that is, what are the calculations and journal entries required? Fourth, what does historical analysis tell us about the topic, especially how contractual decisions have been made and what has worked. Finally, what is in store for the future—both expected compensation agreements and what the compensation incentives suggest for future corporate decisions on operations and accounting manipulation.
Executive Compensation and Earnings Management Under Moral Hazard
| Author | : Bo Sun |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 42 |
| Release | : 2009 |
| Genre | : Corporate governance |
| ISBN | : |
This paper analyzes executive compensation in a setting where managers may take a costly action to manipulate corporate performance, and whether managers do so is stochastic. We examine how the opportunity to manipulate affects the optimal pay contract, and establish necessary and sufficient conditions under which earnings management occurs. Our model provides a set of implications on the role earnings management plays in driving the time-series and cross-sectional variation of executive compensation. In addition, the model's predictions regarding the changes of earnings management and executive pay in response to corporate governance legislation are consistent with empirical observations.
The Effect of Accounting Procedure Changes on Executive Remuneration
| Author | : Paul M Healy |
| Publisher | : Legare Street Press |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2023-07-18 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : 9781019946046 |
Drawing on a unique dataset of executive compensation in Fortune 500 companies, this groundbreaking study examines the effect of accounting procedure changes on the remuneration of top-level executives. With rigorous statistical analysis and insightful commentary, this book sheds new light on the complex relationships between accounting, finance, and corporate governance. This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
