The Early Adoption Of Stock Option Compensation Expense
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| Author | : Petro Lisowsky |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 53 |
| Release | : 2008 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
I examine the likelihood of firms adopting the fair value based method of accounting for stock option compensation cost in 2002 and 2003. To examine this issue, I use two matched sample methodologies: (1) a size and book-to-market matching method typically employed in empirical accounting and finance research; and (2) a Propensity Score matching method typically used in the life sciences. I create a profile of firms that elected to expense employee stock option compensation when it was not yet required by Statement on Financial Standards No. 123 (Revised): Share-Based Payment (SFAS 123(R)). I find support for the general hypothesis that increasing switching costs from disclosure to recognition lowers the likelihood for stock option expense adoption in 2002 and 2003. More specifically, the likelihood of expensing stock options decreases when the magnitude of (implied) stock option expense increases and the value of options awarded to the firm's executives increases in relation to their total compensation. I find that the likelihood of expensing stock options increases when the interest coverage ratio increases and when the number of options awarded to the firm's executives increases in relation to the number of stock options awarded to all employees. I also find weak evidence that the likelihood of expensing is highest in the healthcare industry. Although these results hold under both matched sample approaches, the Propensity Score approach helps to prevent misleading statistical inference by reducing the bias inherent in traditional size and book-to-market matched sampling.
| Author | : Scott S. Rodrick |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 230 |
| Release | : 2000 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : |
| Author | : International Accounting Standards Board |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 58 |
| Release | : 2004 |
| Genre | : Accounting |
| ISBN | : |
| Author | : Barbara Wood |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : |
| Release | : 2005 |
| Genre | : Compensation management |
| ISBN | : 9780542466908 |
Until June 2005, firms had a choice in accounting for stock option compensation. The majority of firms elected to disclose option compensation expense in the footnotes of their financial statements. However, after the accounting scandals in the early 2000s, many firms moved from disclosing the expense to recognizing the expense as a charge against earnings. This research examines the reasons that firms would voluntarily elect to adopt option recognition prior to regulatory requirement. The decision to recognize option pay is examined with respect to efficient contracting, earnings management, and information signaling. Firms that elect to expense option pay do so to reduce political costs and potential debt covenant violations. These firms also have greater earnings and lower option costs, reducing the impact of the recognition decision. From an information signaling perspective, firms with greater growth opportunities and greater insider ownership of the firm's stock use their recognition decision to reveal their firm's favorable prospects. Examination of the use of option compensation by firms that voluntarily choose to expense option pay and firms that do not reveals that expensing firms are high quality firms that use option compensation more effectively. The payoff relationship between executive option pay and operating income shows diminishing returns for non-expensing firms and a linear relation for expensing firms, suggesting that non-expensing firms may be over-granting option pay. Additionally, the incentive value of CEO option grants for expensing firms is more closely aligned with shareholder interests than for non-expensing firms. The economic determinants of executive option grants is similar for expensing and non-expensing firms. The residuals from the economic determinants model are used as an explanatory variable in a logistic regression model examining the decision to expense option compensation. Positive residuals indicate the firm grants options in excess of the level predicted by the economics determinants model. Firms over-granting option compensation would be less inclined to increase the transparency of their option program by moving the cost information into the firm's financial statements. The model shows that firms that over-grant executive stock options are less likely to voluntarily recognize option pay.
| Author | : Judith S. Ruud |
| Publisher | : DIANE Publishing |
| Total Pages | : 541 |
| Release | : 2008-05 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1428988599 |
In March 2003, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) began reconsidering the accounting standard for equity-based compensation. The Board released an exposure draft for a revised standard on Mar. 31, 2004. That revised standard would require firms to recognize the fair value of employee stock options (ESO) as an expense, as was first proposed by FASB more than 10 years ago. This paper assesses whether, under the current accounting standard, firms that grant ESO without recognizing an expense overstate their income. Presents the relevant issues, describes the current standard for ESO, compares the intrinsic value & fair value methods of measure., & weighs the potential economic effects of revising the standard. Ill.
| Author | : Kaye A. Thomas |
| Publisher | : Fairmark Press Inc. |
| Total Pages | : 290 |
| Release | : 2005 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 0967498171 |
This is the 2005 edition of the most popular book on employee stock options. It's a major revision from the previous edition, with new design, content and organization to make it even easier for employees to learn what they need to know about their equity compensation.
| Author | : Stephen R. Poland |
| Publisher | : 1x1 Media |
| Total Pages | : 131 |
| Release | : 2018-10-15 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1938162145 |
This highly visual guide offers startup founders and employees a “nuts and bolts” view of how stock options and other forms of equity compensation work in early-stage startups. Throughout this guide numerous mini-infographics illustrate the key concepts founders need to know and show the relationships between stock option grants, vesting timelines, exercise timing, and associated tax implications. In detail, this Founder’s Pocket Guidewalks entrepreneurs though the following elements: Startup Equity Compensation Basics: Sharing Equity with Your Team The first section of this guide is structured to help founders build a base of understanding about the numerous definitions and terminology related to startup equity compensation and stock options. Topics covered include: · A brief refresher on startup equity in preparation for delving into the details of stock options and other forms of equity compensation. · A quick review of how startup equity ownership is shared between the various stakeholder of a startup including the founders, investors, and employees. · The fundamental mechanics of how startup stock options work, including option grants, exercising, vesting, and selling of stock shares. · A detailed review of equity compensation terminology and definitions, such as vesting, strike price, fair market value, and spread. · An explanation of each of the most common types of equity compensation including Restricted Stock, Incentive Stock Options, Non-Qualified Stock Options, and Restricted Stock Units. Equity Compensation Types in Detail The next section of this guide reviews each of the most common types of equity compensation, including detailed components such as tax implications, vesting and exercise parameters, and other IRS rules governing the ownership of each equity type. The following equity compensation types are covered: · Restricted Stock (RS) · Incentive Stock Options (ISOs) · Early Exercise Incentive Stock Options (EE-ISOs) · Nonstatutory Stock Options (NSOs) · Early Exercise Nonstatutory Stock Options (EE-NSOs) · Restricted Stock Units (RSU) Establishing Your Startup’s Equity Plan In the final part of this guide we dig deeper into the key areas founders need to consider when developing an equity plan for their startup, with specific focus on the following issues: · When to implement a formal equity incentive plan · What factors to consider when deciding how large the equity compensation pool should be · How to decide employee equity award amounts at the different stages of a startup’s lifecycle · What general steps to take to establish a equity compensation plan for your startup · What key information that must be communicated to employees about equity compensation awards · Which step-by-step calculations are needed to truly understand equity ownership percentages and value · How IRS and SEC rules impact private company equity compensation
| Author | : Peter R. Wheeler |
| Publisher | : AdvisorPress |
| Total Pages | : 208 |
| Release | : 2004 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 0971489815 |
Stock Options + Grants: The Executive's Guide to Equity Compensation provides a comprehensive, easy reading treatment to the complex area of stock options and grants for the busy executive. From the boardroom to the mailroom, individuals with stock options or grants will benefit from the quick reading question and answer format of this book. If you have a question about your stock options or grants, you are likely to find it answered in Stock Options + Grants: The Executive's Guide to Equity Compensation.
| Author | : Frederick D. Lipman |
| Publisher | : Prima Lifestyles |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2001 |
| Genre | : Employee stock options |
| ISBN | : 9780761533825 |
Numerous private and public companies offer stock option plans every year to motivate, retain, and reward employees. But implementing the right stock option plan can be a complex and daunting undertaking, without the proper guidance.The Complete Guide to Employee Stock Optionsunravels the mystery of creating a meaningful equity compensation plan for employees that is favorable for the business. Author and attorney Frederick D. Lipman describes in complete detail the legal, operational, and motivational aspects of developing a stock option program, whether it's for the new start-up looking to attract top talent or the venerable company looking for ways to reward its best performing employees. Readers will discover how to: * Understand the pros and cons of different option plans* Implement the right plan to meet the company's future plans* Motivate key employees with equity compensation* Minimize the risk of losing equity in a volatile market* And much moreThis book also includes useful information for employees who want to understand what their stock options mean and how to maximize their profitability. Complete wi
| Author | : Lucian A. Bebchuk |
| Publisher | : Harvard University Press |
| Total Pages | : 308 |
| Release | : 2004 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 9780674020634 |
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
