This paper focuses on two distinct, but related, issues with respect to managers' incentives to report earnings that meet or exceed analysts' expectations. First, we assess the differential stock price sensitivity to earnings that meet or exceed analysts' expectations compared to those that do not. Second, we examine whether the market implicitly revises analysts' earnings forecasts for firms that systematically report earnings that exceed forecasts. We find that the earnings response coefficient (ERC) is significantly higher for firms that meet analysts' forecasts. Additionally, we find that the market recognizes and adjusts the forecast error of firms that exhibit a systematic pattern of reporting positive or negative unexpected earnings. The market fully adjusts for the systematic component of the forecast error when it is negative; however, only a partial adjustment is made when the systematic component is positive. Overall, our evidence suggests that managers who try to report earnings that meet analysts' forecasts are responding to two market incentives. First, the market provides a premium to positive forecast errors and assigns a higher multiple to the level of positive unexpected earnings. Second, though the market recognizes systematic bias in analysts' forecasts, it does not fully adjust for systematically positive forecast errors. Our evidence provides, at a minimum, a partial explanation for managers' fixation on reporting positive unexpected earnings.