Prior research suggests that private loan contracts are designed with future renegotiations in mind. I examine whether and how foreign bank branch participation in loan syndicates influences loan contract design in the U.S. syndicated loan market. Dollar funding liquidity risk and institutional and cultural differences associated with foreign bank branch participation potentially affect contract design through increased renegotiation costs. Consistent with my prediction, I find that loan contracts with greater foreign bank branch participation include fewer flexibility-reducing covenants such as capital expenditure and balance sheet covenants that restrict borrowers from making positive net present value investments. I document similar results using matched samples and plausibly exogenous variations in foreign bank branch participation. Additionally, I find that loan contracts with greater foreign bank branch participation are more likely to be structured with split control rights where control rights are delegated to banks in revolving lines of credit and foreign bank branches fund term loans lacking control rights. Overall, I provide evidence that foreign bank branch participation in loan syndicates affects loan contract design through renegotiation considerations.