This book provides an insightful view of major issues in the economics of corporate governance (CG) and mergers. It presents a systematic update on the developments in the two fields during the last decade, as well as highlighting the neglected topics in CG research, such as the role of boards, CG and public interest and the relation of CG to mergers. Two important conclusions can be drawn from this book: the first is that corporate governance systems that better align shareholders and managers interests lead to better corporate performance; second, there is an important relationship between CG structures and the quality of firm decision-making, one of the most important being the decision to merge or take over another firm. Focusing on some of the often-neglected aspects of corporate governance such as non-profit organizations and public interest, as well as mergers and acquisitions from a CG perspective, this book will be a valuable resource for both academics and postgraduate students of finance, business and economics.