Team Incentive Contracts With Interim Private Information
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| Author | : Priyodorshi Banerjee |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 35 |
| Release | : 2008 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
We study contracting in a principal multi-agent moral hazard problem where agents receive private information on the realisation of a common productivity shock after contracts are signed, but before actions are taken. Joint performance evaluation schemes can be optimal when private information is of sufficiently high quality, while relative performance evaluation schemes are optimal with poor quality private signals. Interdependent incentive schemes create an endogenous externality between agents, the nature of which depends on the structure of the evaluation scheme. Joint performance evaluation schemes generate endogenous complementarities in the presence of correlated private information, and so may be optimal.
| Author | : Christina E. Bannier |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2016 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard and risk-averse agents, who have private information on their productivity. Two vertically differentiated firms compete for agents by offering contracts with fixed and variable payments. The superior firm employs both agent types in equilibrium, but the competitive pressure exerted by the inferior firm has a strong impact on contract design: For high degrees of vertical differentiation, i.e. low competition, low-ability agents are under-incentivized and exert too little effort. For high degrees of competition, high-ability agents are over-incentivized and bear too much risk. For a range of intermediate degrees of competition, however, agents' private information has no impact and both contracts are second-best. Interim efficiency of the least-cost separating allocation in the inferior firm is a sufficient condition for equilibrium existence. If this is violated, there can only be equilibria where the inferior firm "overbids", i.e. where it would not break even when attracting both agent types. Adding horizontal differentiation allows for pure-strategy equilibria even when there would be no equilibrium without overbidding in the pure vertical model, but equilibria with overbidding fail to exist.
| Author | : W. Bentley MacLeod |
| Publisher | : MIT Press |
| Total Pages | : 417 |
| Release | : 2022-04-05 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 0262046873 |
A graduate textbook on microeconomics, covering decision theory, game theory, and the foundations of contract theory, with a unique focus on the empirical. This graduate-level text on microeconomics, covering such topics as decision theory, game theory, bargaining theory, contract theory, trade under asymmetric information, and relational contract theory, is unique in its emphasis on the interplay between theory and evidence. It reviews the microeconomic theory of exchange “from the ground up,” aiming to produce a set of models and hypotheses amenable to empirical exploration, with particular focus on models that are useful for the study of contracts, institutions, and organizations. It explores research that extends price theory to the exchange of commodities when markets are incomplete, discussing recent developments in the field. Topics covered include the relationship between theory and evidence; decision theory as it is used in contract theory and institutional design; game theory; axiomatic and strategic bargaining theory; agency theory and the class of models that are considered to constitute contract theory, with discussions of moral hazard and trade with asymmetric information; and the theory of relational contracts. The final chapter offers a nontechnical review that provides a guide to which model is the most appropriate for a particular application. End-of-chapter exercises help students expand their understanding of the material, and an appendix provides brief introduction to optimization theory and the welfare theorem of general equilibrium theory. Students are assumed to be familiar with general equilibrium theory and basic constrained optimization theory.
| Author | : Patrick Bolton |
| Publisher | : MIT Press |
| Total Pages | : 746 |
| Release | : 2004-12-10 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 0262257963 |
A comprehensive introduction to contract theory, emphasizing common themes and methodologies as well as applications in key areas. Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.
| Author | : Dionysius Glycopantis |
| Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
| Total Pages | : 656 |
| Release | : 2005-12-28 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 3540269797 |
One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative equilibrium concepts which have these properties. This volume contains original contributions on noncooperative and cooperative equilibrium notions in economies with differential information and provides answers to the above questions. Moreover, issues of stability, learning and continuity of alternative equilibria are also examined.
| Author | : G. K. Awari |
| Publisher | : CRC Press |
| Total Pages | : 237 |
| Release | : 2022-05-16 |
| Genre | : Technology & Engineering |
| ISBN | : 1000573206 |
This reference text introduces concepts of computer and Internet crime, ethics in information technology, and privacy techniques. It comprehensively covers important topics including ethical consideration in decision making, security attacks, identification of theft, strategies for consumer profiling, types of intellectual property rights, issues related to intellectual property, process and product quality, software quality assurance techniques, elements of an ethical organization, telemedicine, and electronic health records. This book will serve as a useful text for senior undergraduate and graduate students in interdisciplinary areas including computer science, information technology, electronics and communications engineering, and electrical engineering.
| Author | : United States. Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 1110 |
| Release | : 1990 |
| Genre | : Affirmative action programs |
| ISBN | : |
| Author | : Xiaotie Deng |
| Publisher | : Springer |
| Total Pages | : 1122 |
| Release | : 2005-11-25 |
| Genre | : Computers |
| ISBN | : 3540322930 |
WINE 2005, the First Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE 2005), took place in Hong Kong, China, December 15-17, 2005. The symposium aims to provide a forum for researchers working in Internet and Network Economic algorithms from all over the world. The final count of electronic submissions was 372, of which 108 were accepted. It consists of the main program of 31 papers, of which the submitter email accounts are: 10 from edu (USA) accounts, 3 from hk (Hong Kong), 2 each from il (Isreal), cn (China), ch (Switzerland), de (Germany), jp (Japan), gr (Greece), 1 each from hp. com, sohu. com, pl (Poland), fr (France), ca (Canada), and in (India). In addition, 77 papers from 20 countries or regions and 6 dot. coms were selected for 16 special focus tracks in the areas of Internet and Algorithmic Economics; E-Commerce Protocols; Security; Collaboration, Reputation and Social Networks; Algorithmic Mechanism; Financial Computing; Auction Algorithms; Online Algorithms; Collective Rationality; Pricing Policies; Web Mining Strategies; Network Economics; Coalition Strategies; Internet Protocols; Price Sequence; Equilibrium. We had one best student paper nomination: “Walrasian Equilibrium: Hardness, Approximations and Tracktable Instances” by Ning Chen and Atri Rudra. We would like to thank Andrew Yao for serving the conference as its Chair, with inspiring encouragement and far-sighted leadership. We would like to thank the International Program Committee for spending their valuable time and effort in the review process.
| Author | : Wolters Kluwer |
| Publisher | : CCH |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2016-05-10 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 9781454880714 |
This new, single-volume resource provides the most complete guidance available for analyzing the cost and pricing aspects of federal government contracts--so you can propose and negotiate appropriate prices and win contracts. The practical Contract Pricing Reference Guide reference combines five manuals into a single source, covering: Price Analysis Quantitative Techniques for Contract Pricing Cost Analysis Advanced Issues in Contract Pricing And Federal Contract Negotiation Techniques Determine the Proper Pricing to Win Government Business Throughout these pages, you will find highly detailed explanations of how the government evaluates proposals, arrives at pricing, chooses contractors, and awards contracts. With Contract Pricing Reference Guide, you can more confidently: Conduct market research for price analysis Employ proven techniques of quantitative price analysis Propose a fair and appropriate price Confidently engage in sealed bidding Include only what's allowable in the price Employ the most effective, competitive pricing strategies And engage in effective contract negotiations The One-of-a-Kind, Time-Saving Pricing Resource The all-new Contract Pricing Reference Guide provides a road-map for how to set correct pricing and engage in the competitive bidding process. It is a practical business tool to help you acquire government contract business--and it brings all the most valuable pricing information together in an easy-access, single-volume resource that puts everything you need literally right in front of you. No other resource delivers all of this together in one place, making it the most convenient way to obtain the most vital information on pricing government contracts.
| Author | : Colin F. Camerer |
| Publisher | : Princeton University Press |
| Total Pages | : 569 |
| Release | : 2011-09-05 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1400840880 |
Game theory, the formalized study of strategy, began in the 1940s by asking how emotionless geniuses should play games, but ignored until recently how average people with emotions and limited foresight actually play games. This book marks the first substantial and authoritative effort to close this gap. Colin Camerer, one of the field's leading figures, uses psychological principles and hundreds of experiments to develop mathematical theories of reciprocity, limited strategizing, and learning, which help predict what real people and companies do in strategic situations. Unifying a wealth of information from ongoing studies in strategic behavior, he takes the experimental science of behavioral economics a major step forward. He does so in lucid, friendly prose. Behavioral game theory has three ingredients that come clearly into focus in this book: mathematical theories of how moral obligation and vengeance affect the way people bargain and trust each other; a theory of how limits in the brain constrain the number of steps of "I think he thinks . . ." reasoning people naturally do; and a theory of how people learn from experience to make better strategic decisions. Strategic interactions that can be explained by behavioral game theory include bargaining, games of bluffing as in sports and poker, strikes, how conventions help coordinate a joint activity, price competition and patent races, and building up reputations for trustworthiness or ruthlessness in business or life. While there are many books on standard game theory that address the way ideally rational actors operate, Behavioral Game Theory stands alone in blending experimental evidence and psychology in a mathematical theory of normal strategic behavior. It is must reading for anyone who seeks a more complete understanding of strategic thinking, from professional economists to scholars and students of economics, management studies, psychology, political science, anthropology, and biology.
