Market Analysis for Real Estate

Market Analysis for Real Estate
Author: Rena Mourouzi-Sivitanidou
Publisher: Routledge
Total Pages: 555
Release: 2020-08-06
Genre: Architecture
ISBN: 100006316X

Market Analysis for Real Estate is a comprehensive introduction to how real estate markets work and the analytical tools and techniques that can be used to identify and interpret market signals. The markets for space and varied property assets, including residential, office, retail, and industrial, are presented, analyzed, and integrated into a complete understanding of the role of real estate markets within the workings of contemporary urban economies. Unlike other books on market analysis, the economic and financial theory in this book is rigorous and well integrated with the specifics of the real estate market. Furthermore, it is thoroughly explained as it assumes no previous coursework in economics or finance on the part of the reader. The theoretical discussion is backed up with numerous real estate case study examples and problems, which are presented throughout the text to assist both student and teacher. Including discussion questions, exercises, several web links, and online slides, this textbook is suitable for use on a variety of degree programs in real estate, finance, business, planning, and economics at undergraduate and MSc/MBA level. It is also a useful primer for professionals in these disciplines.

Compendium of Research Reports

Compendium of Research Reports
Author: United States. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development. Office of Policy Development and Research
Publisher:
Total Pages: 224
Release: 1980
Genre: Housing
ISBN:

Report

Report
Author: Cook County (Ill.). Joint Commission on Real Estate Valuation
Publisher:
Total Pages: 196
Release: 1927
Genre: Land value taxation
ISBN:

Market Distortions when Agents are Better Informed

Market Distortions when Agents are Better Informed
Author: Steven D. Levitt
Publisher:
Total Pages: 56
Release: 2005
Genre: Real property
ISBN:

"Agents are often better informed than the clients who hire them and may exploit this informational advantage. Real-estate agents, who know much more about the housing market than the typical homeowner, are one example. Because real estate agents receive only a small share of the incremental profit when a house sells for a higher value, there is an incentive for them to convince their clients to sell their houses too cheaply and too quickly. We test these predictions by comparing home sales in which real estate agents are hired by others to sell a home to instances in which a real estate agent sells his or her own home. In the former case, the agent has distorted incentives; in the latter case, the agent wants to pursue the first-best. Consistent with the theory, we find homes owned by real estate agents sell for about 3.7 percent more than other houses and stay on the market about 9.5 days longer, even after controlling for a wide range of housing characteristics. Situations in which the agent's informational advantage is larger lead to even greater distortions"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.