Social Choice And Strategic Decisions
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| Author | : David Austen-Smith |
| Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
| Total Pages | : 332 |
| Release | : 2006-03-30 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 354027295X |
Social choices, about expenditures on government programs, or about public policy more broadly, or indeed from any conceivable set of alternatives, are determined by politics. This book is a collection of essays that tie together the fields spanned by Jeffrey S. Banks' research on this subject. It examines the strategic aspects of political decision-making, including the choices of voters in committees, the positioning of candidates in electoral campaigns, and the behavior of parties in legislatures. The chapters of this book contribute to the theory of voting with incomplete information, to the literature on Downsian and probabilistic voting models of elections, to the theory of social choice in distributive environments, and to the theory of optimal dynamic decision-making. The essays employ a spectrum of research methods, from game-theoretic analysis, to empirical investigation, to experimental testing.
| Author | : David Austen-Smith |
| Publisher | : Springer |
| Total Pages | : 320 |
| Release | : 2009-09-02 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 9783540801900 |
Social choices, about expenditures on government programs, or about public policy more broadly, or indeed from any conceivable set of alternatives, are determined by politics. This book is a collection of essays that tie together the fields spanned by Jeffrey S. Banks' research on this subject. It examines the strategic aspects of political decision-making, including the choices of voters in committees, the positioning of candidates in electoral campaigns, and the behavior of parties in legislatures. The chapters of this book contribute to the theory of voting with incomplete information, to the literature on Downsian and probabilistic voting models of elections, to the theory of social choice in distributive environments, and to the theory of optimal dynamic decision-making. The essays employ a spectrum of research methods, from game-theoretic analysis, to empirical investigation, to experimental testing.
| Author | : Adrian Van Deemen |
| Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
| Total Pages | : 273 |
| Release | : 2010-06-03 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 3642028659 |
Harrie de Swart is a Dutch logician and mathematician with a great and open int- est in applications of logic. After being confronted with Arrow’s Theorem, Harrie became very interested in social choice theory. In 1986 he took the initiative to start up a group of Dutch scientists for the study of social choice theory. This initiative grew out to a research group and a series of colloquia, which were held approximately every month at the University of Tilburg in The Netherlands. The organization of the colloquia was in the hands of Harrie and under his guidance they became more and more internationally known. Many international scholars liked visiting the social choice colloquia in Tilburg and enjoyed giving one or more presentations about their work. They liked Harrie’s kindness and hospitality, and the openness of the group for anything and everything in the eld of social choice. The Social Choice Theory Group started up by Harrie consisted, and still c- sists, of scholars from several disciplines; mostly economics, mathematics, and (mathematical) psychology. It was set up for the study of and discussion about anything that had to do with social choice theory including, and not in the least, the supervision of PhD students in the theory. Members of the group were, among o- ers, Thom Bezembinder (psychologist), Hans Peters (mathematician), Pieter Ruys (economist), Stef Tijs (mathematician and game theorist) and, of course, Harrie de Swart (logician and mathematician).
| Author | : H. Moulin |
| Publisher | : Elsevier |
| Total Pages | : 227 |
| Release | : 2014-07-14 |
| Genre | : Psychology |
| ISBN | : 148325688X |
Advanced Textbooks in Economics, Volume 18: The Strategy of Social Choice focuses on the social, economics, and political implications of social choice. The publication first surveys introduction, social choice functions and correspondences, and monotonicity and the arrow theorem. Discussions focus on efficiency, anonymity and neutrality, classifying voting methods, normative versus positive approach to voting, voting and the non-strategic theory of social choice, and development of the strategic theory of voting. The text then ponders on strategy-proofness and monotonicity and sophisticated voting. Topics include sophisticated implementation, voting by binary choices, strategy-proof social choice functions and game forms, Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, and restricted domains. The manuscript examines cooperative voting and voting by veto, including the minority principle, proportional veto core, voting by integer veto, effectivity functions, maximal and stable effectivity functions, and implementation by Nash equilibrium. The text is a dependable source of data for researchers interested in the process of social choice.
| Author | : Norman Schofield |
| Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
| Total Pages | : 430 |
| Release | : 2013-03-09 |
| Genre | : Political Science |
| ISBN | : 9401587671 |
In the last decade the techniques of social choice theory, game theory and positive political theory have been combined in interesting ways so as to pro vide a common framework for analyzing the behavior of a developed political economy. Social choice theory itself grew out of the innovative attempts by Ken neth Arrow (1951) and Duncan Black (1948, 1958) to extend the range of economic theory in order to deal with collective decision-making over public goods. Later work, by William Baumol (1952), and James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962), focussed on providing an "economic" interpretation of democratic institutions. In the same period Anthony Downs (1957) sought to model representative democracy and elections while William Riker (1962) made use of work in cooperative game theory (by John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern, 1944) to study coalition behavior. In my view, these "rational choice" analyses of collective decision-making have their antecedents in the arguments of Adam Smith (1759, 1776), James Madison (1787) and the Marquis de Condorcet (1785) about the "design" of political institutions. In the introductory chapter to this volume I briefly describe how some of the current normative and positive aspects of social choice date back to these earlier writers.
| Author | : Fouad Sabry |
| Publisher | : One Billion Knowledgeable |
| Total Pages | : 295 |
| Release | : 2024-08-07 |
| Genre | : Political Science |
| ISBN | : |
Explore the complexities of decision-making with "Social Choice Theory," a key volume in the "Political Science" series. This book delves into how societies make collective choices and the underlying mathematical and philosophical foundations. Essential for those interested in governance, policy, and democratic processes, it provides a thorough examination of key concepts and theories in social choice. Each chapter builds on the last, covering topics such as: 1. Social Choice Theory: Core concepts and significance in collective decision-making. 2. Condorcet Paradox: The issue of intransitive collective preferences. 3. Pareto Efficiency: Evaluating outcomes where no one can be better off without harming others. 4. Kenneth Arrow: Contributions to social choice theory. 5. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: Challenges in creating a fair voting system. 6. Social Welfare Function: Aggregating individual preferences into collective decisions. 7. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: Ensuring choices are unaffected by irrelevant alternatives. 8. Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem: Limitations of strategic voting. 9. Welfare Economics: Improving social welfare through resource allocation. 10. Expected Utility Hypothesis: Decision-making to maximize expected utility. 11. Liberal Paradox: Tension between individual rights and collective decision-making. 12. Lexicographic Preferences: Ranking and decision-making processes. 13. Social Choice and Individual Values: Aligning personal preferences with collective decisions. 14. Quasitransitive Relation: Implications for preference aggregation. 15. Extended Sympathy: Understanding preferences and social choice. 16. Economic Justice: Relevance to equitable decision-making. 17. Preference (Economics): Modeling preferences and their impact. 18. Kevin W. S. Roberts: Contributions to social choice theory. 19. Prasanta Pattanaik: Influence on the field. 20. Jury Theorem: Conditions for accurate collective decisions. 21. Fractional Social Choice: Incorporating partial preferences into decision-making. An invaluable resource for professionals, students, and enthusiasts, this book offers deep insights into social choice theory and its applications, making it a must-have for any political science library.
| Author | : Bernhardt Liebermann |
| Publisher | : Routledge |
| Total Pages | : 442 |
| Release | : 2012-07-26 |
| Genre | : Social Science |
| ISBN | : 1136816062 |
First published in 1971, Social Choice is both a text and reference containing the proceedings of a conference dealing with contemporary work on the normative and descriptive aspects of the social choice problem. This reissue will be of interest to advanced undergraduate and graduate courses on group decision making and social choice. Economists, social psychologists, political scientists and sociologists will welcome this valuable work.
| Author | : Jerry S. Kelly |
| Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
| Total Pages | : 174 |
| Release | : 2013-03-09 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 366209925X |
This is a textbook introducing selected topics in formal social choice theory. Social choice theory studies group choices that are based on information about preferences of members of the group (voting rules being one important special case). This involves economics, which provides the method of modelling individual decision making; political philosophy, which provides criteria about the allocation of decision-influencing power; and game theory, which provides a framework for thinking about the strategies individuals employ in trying to influence the group choice. The goal of this book is to take basic ideas like impossibility theorems, rights exercising and strategy proofness and give the student just enough technical background to be able to understand these ideas in a logically rigorous way. This is done through a set of 250 exercises that constitute the heart of the book and which differentiate this book from all other texts in social choice theory.
| Author | : Eerik Lagerspetz |
| Publisher | : Springer |
| Total Pages | : 448 |
| Release | : 2015-11-26 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 3319232614 |
This book offers a comprehensive overview and critique of the most important political and philosophical interpretations of the basic results of social choice, assessing their plausibility and seeking to identify the links between the theory of social choice and the more traditional issues of political theory and philosophy. In this regard, the author eschews a strong methodological commitment or technical formalism; the approach is instead based on the presentation of political facts and illustrated via numerous real-life examples. This allows the reader to get acquainted with the philosophical and political dispute surrounding voting and collective decision-making and its links to social choice theory.
| Author | : Kenneth J. Arrow |
| Publisher | : Elsevier |
| Total Pages | : 985 |
| Release | : 2010-10-13 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 0080929826 |
This second part of a two-volume set continues to describe economists' efforts to quantify the social decisions people necessarily make and the philosophies that those choices define. Contributors draw on lessons from philosophy, history, and other disciplines, but they ultimately use editor Kenneth Arrow's seminal work on social choice as a jumping-off point for discussing ways to incentivize, punish, and distribute goods. Develops many subjects from Volume 1 (2002) while introducing new themes in welfare economics and social choice theory Features four sections: Foundations, Developments of the Basic Arrovian Schemes, Fairness and Rights, and Voting and Manipulation Appeals to readers who seek introductions to writings on human well-being and collective decision-making Presents a spectrum of material, from initial insights and basic functions to important variations on basic schemes
