Screening Risk Averse Agents Under Moral Hazard
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| Author | : Amy Finkelstein |
| Publisher | : Columbia University Press |
| Total Pages | : 161 |
| Release | : 2014-12-02 |
| Genre | : Medical |
| ISBN | : 0231538685 |
Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice
| Author | : John Eatwell |
| Publisher | : Springer |
| Total Pages | : 321 |
| Release | : 1989-09-21 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1349202150 |
This is an extract from the 4-volume dictionary of economics, a reference book which aims to define the subject of economics today. 1300 subject entries in the complete work cover the broad themes of economic theory. This volume concentrates on the topic of allocation information and markets.
| Author | : Mingyan Liu |
| Publisher | : Springer Nature |
| Total Pages | : 127 |
| Release | : 2022-06-01 |
| Genre | : Computers |
| ISBN | : 3031023811 |
This book provides an introduction to the theory and practice of cyber insurance. Insurance as an economic instrument designed for risk management through risk spreading has existed for centuries. Cyber insurance is one of the newest sub-categories of this old instrument. It emerged in the 1990s in response to an increasing impact that information security started to have on business operations. For much of its existence, the practice of cyber insurance has been on how to obtain accurate actuarial information to inform specifics of a cyber insurance contract. As the cybersecurity threat landscape continues to bring about novel forms of attacks and losses, ransomware insurance being the latest example, the insurance practice is also evolving in terms of what types of losses are covered, what are excluded, and how cyber insurance intersects with traditional casualty and property insurance. The central focus, however, has continued to be risk management through risk transfer, the key functionality of insurance. The goal of this book is to shift the focus from this conventional view of using insurance as primarily a risk management mechanism to one of risk control and reduction by looking for ways to re-align the incentives. On this front we have encouraging results that suggest the validity of using insurance as an effective economic and incentive tool to control cyber risk. This book is intended for someone interested in obtaining a quantitative understanding of cyber insurance and how innovation is possible around this centuries-old financial instrument.
| Author | : Georges Dionne |
| Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
| Total Pages | : 1133 |
| Release | : 2013-12-02 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1461401550 |
This new edition of the Handbook of Insurance reviews the last forty years of research developments in insurance and its related fields. A single reference source for professors, researchers, graduate students, regulators, consultants and practitioners, the book starts with the history and foundations of risk and insurance theory, followed by a review of prevention and precaution, asymmetric information, risk management, insurance pricing, new financial innovations, reinsurance, corporate governance, capital allocation, securitization, systemic risk, insurance regulation, the industrial organization of insurance markets and other insurance market applications. It ends with health insurance, longevity risk, long-term care insurance, life insurance financial products and social insurance. This second version of the Handbook contains 15 new chapters. Each of the 37 chapters has been written by leading authorities in risk and insurance research, all contributions have been peer reviewed, and each chapter can be read independently of the others.
| Author | : |
| Publisher | : Newnes |
| Total Pages | : 1663 |
| Release | : 2014-02-21 |
| Genre | : Medical |
| ISBN | : 0123756790 |
The Encyclopedia of Health Economics offers students, researchers and policymakers objective and detailed empirical analysis and clear reviews of current theories and polices. It helps practitioners such as health care managers and planners by providing accessible overviews into the broad field of health economics, including the economics of designing health service finance and delivery and the economics of public and population health. This encyclopedia provides an organized overview of this diverse field, providing one trusted source for up-to-date research and analysis of this highly charged and fast-moving subject area. Features research-driven articles that are objective, better-crafted, and more detailed than is currently available in journals and handbooks Combines insights and scholarship across the breadth of health economics, where theory and empirical work increasingly come from non-economists Provides overviews of key policies, theories and programs in easy-to-understand language
| Author | : Georges Dionne |
| Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
| Total Pages | : 748 |
| Release | : 1992 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 0792392043 |
Economic and financial research on insurance markets has undergone dramatic growth since its infancy in the early 1960s. Our main objective in compiling this volume was to achieve a wider dissemination of key papers in this literature. Their significance is highlighted in the introduction, which surveys major areas in insurance economics. While it was not possible to provide comprehensive coverage of insurance economics in this book, these readings provide an essential foundation to those who desire to conduct research and teach in the field. In particular, we hope that this compilation and our introduction will be useful to graduate students and to researchers in economics, finance, and insurance. Our criteria for selecting articles included significance, representativeness, pedagogical value, and our desire to include theoretical and empirical work. While the focus of the applied papers is on property-liability insurance, they illustrate issues, concepts, and methods that are applicable in many areas of insurance. The S. S. Huebner Foundation for Insurance Education at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School made this book possible by financing publication costs. We are grateful for this assistance and to J. David Cummins, Executive Director of the Foundation, for his efforts and helpful advice on the contents. We also wish to thank all of the authors and editors who provided permission to reprint articles and our respective institutions for technical and financial support.
| Author | : Günter Bamberg |
| Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
| Total Pages | : 538 |
| Release | : 2012-12-06 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 3642750605 |
Agency Theory is a new branch of economics which focusses on the roles of information and of incentives when individuals cooperate with respect to the utilisation of resources. Basic approaches are coming from microeco nomic theory as well as from risk analysis. Among the broad variety of ap plications are: the many designs of contractual arrangements, organiza tions, and institutions as well as the manifold aspects of the separation of ownership and control so fundamental for business finance. After some twenty years of intensive research in the field of information economics it might be timely to present the most basic issues, questions, models, and applications. This volume Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives offers introductory surveys as well as results of individual rese arch that seem to shape that field of information economics appropriately. Some 30 authors were invited to present their subjects in such a way that students could easily become acquainted with the main ideas of informa tion economics. So the aim of Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives is to introduce students at an intermediate level and to accompany their work in classes on microeconomics, information economics, organization, management theory, and business finance. The topics selected form the eight sections of the book: 1. Agency Theory and Risk Sharing 2. Information and Incentives 3. Capital Markets and Moral Hazard 4. Financial Contracting and Dividends 5. External Accounting and Auditing 6. Coordination in Groups 7. Property Rights and Fairness 8. Agency Costs.
| Author | : Lingjie Duan |
| Publisher | : Springer |
| Total Pages | : 178 |
| Release | : 2017-09-15 |
| Genre | : Computers |
| ISBN | : 3319675400 |
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 7th EAI International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets 2017, held in Knoxville, Tennessee, USA, in May 2017. The 10 conference papers and 5 invited papers presented cover topics such as smart electric grid, Internet of Things (IoT), social networks, networks security, mobile service markets, and epidemic control.
| Author | : Bernard Salanie |
| Publisher | : MIT Press |
| Total Pages | : 257 |
| Release | : 2005-03-11 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 0262257874 |
A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition. The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries. This popular text, revised and updated throughout for the second edition, serves as a concise and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists. The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard. It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics. The goal is to give readers the tools to understand the basic models and create their own. For the second edition, major changes have been made to chapter 3, on examples and extensions for the adverse selection model, which now includes more thorough discussions of multiprincipals, collusion, and multidimensional adverse selection, and to chapter 5, on moral hazard, with the limited liability model, career concerns, and common agency added to its topics. Two chapters have been completely rewritten: chapter 7, on the theory of incomplete contracts, and chapter 8, on the empirical literature in the theory of contracts. An appendix presents concepts of noncooperative game theory to supplement chapters 4 and 6. Exercises follow chapters 2 through 5. Praise for the previous edition: “The Economics of Contracts offers an excellent introduction to agency models. Written by one of the leading young researchers in contact theory, it is rigorous, clear, concise, and up-to-date. Researchers and students who want to learn about the economics of incentives will want to read this primer.”—Jean Tirole, Institut D'Économie Industrielle, Universite des Sciences Sociales, France “Students will find this a very useful introduction to the ideas of contract theory. Salanié has managed to summarize a large amount of material in a relatively short number of pages in a highly accessible and readable manner.”—Oliver Hart, Professor of Economics, Harvard University
| Author | : Patrick Bolton |
| Publisher | : MIT Press |
| Total Pages | : 746 |
| Release | : 2004-12-10 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 9780262025768 |
A comprehensive introduction to contract theory, emphasizing common themes and methodologies as well as applications in key areas. Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.
