Robust Versus Optimal Rules in Monetary Policy

Robust Versus Optimal Rules in Monetary Policy
Author: International Monetary Fund
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
Total Pages: 12
Release: 2004-06-01
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 1451851944

We provide a framework for analyzing the choice between optimal and robust monetary policy rules in the presence of paradigm uncertainty. We first discuss the conditions on uncertainty that render a robust rule preferable to an optimal rule. Second, we show how the degree of risk aversion of the policymaker increases the region in which the robust rule is preferred.

Monetary Policy Rules

Monetary Policy Rules
Author: John B. Taylor
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Total Pages: 460
Release: 2007-12-01
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 0226791262

This timely volume presents the latest thinking on the monetary policy rules and seeks to determine just what types of rules and policy guidelines function best. A unique cooperative research effort that allowed contributors to evaluate different policy rules using their own specific approaches, this collection presents their striking findings on the potential response of interest rates to an array of variables, including alterations in the rates of inflation, unemployment, and exchange. Monetary Policy Rules illustrates that simple policy rules are more robust and more efficient than complex rules with multiple variables. A state-of-the-art appraisal of the fundamental issues facing the Federal Reserve Board and other central banks, Monetary Policy Rules is essential reading for economic analysts and policymakers alike.

Robustness

Robustness
Author: Lars Peter Hansen
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Total Pages: 453
Release: 2016-06-28
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 0691170975

The standard theory of decision making under uncertainty advises the decision maker to form a statistical model linking outcomes to decisions and then to choose the optimal distribution of outcomes. This assumes that the decision maker trusts the model completely. But what should a decision maker do if the model cannot be trusted? Lars Hansen and Thomas Sargent, two leading macroeconomists, push the field forward as they set about answering this question. They adapt robust control techniques and apply them to economics. By using this theory to let decision makers acknowledge misspecification in economic modeling, the authors develop applications to a variety of problems in dynamic macroeconomics. Technical, rigorous, and self-contained, this book will be useful for macroeconomists who seek to improve the robustness of decision-making processes.

The Inflation-Targeting Debate

The Inflation-Targeting Debate
Author: Ben S. Bernanke
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Total Pages: 469
Release: 2007-11-01
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 0226044734

Over the past fifteen years, a significant number of industrialized and middle-income countries have adopted inflation targeting as a framework for monetary policymaking. As the name suggests, in such inflation-targeting regimes, the central bank is responsible for achieving a publicly announced target for the inflation rate. While the objective of controlling inflation enjoys wide support among both academic experts and policymakers, and while the countries that have followed this model have generally experienced good macroeconomic outcomes, many important questions about inflation targeting remain. In Inflation Targeting, a distinguished group of contributors explores the many underexamined dimensions of inflation targeting—its potential, its successes, and its limitations—from both a theoretical and an empirical standpoint, and for both developed and emerging economies. The volume opens with a discussion of the optimal formulation of inflation-targeting policy and continues with a debate about the desirability of such a model for the United States. The concluding chapters discuss the special problems of inflation targeting in emerging markets, including the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary.

Budget Deficits and Debt

Budget Deficits and Debt
Author: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
Publisher: Books for Business
Total Pages: 484
Release: 2004-07
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 9781410215567

Few economic issues have such far-reaching implications as excessive government budget deficits and debt. It is almost universally agreed that fiscal imbalances retard economic growth, impose heavy burdens on future generations, and heighten the risk of financial market disruption. It is also agreed, however, that correcting such imbalances is a difficult task. Around the world, countries are attempting to address the problem of excessive deficits and debt. This issue is at the core of many political and economic debates. To gain a better understanding of the problem and to consider potential solutions, the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City sponsored a symposium on Budget Deficits and Debt: Issues and Options at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on August 31-September 2, 1995. A distinguished group of central bankers, finance ministers, academics, and financial market representatives shared their views and research results on this vital topic. The opening remarks are by Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

Designing a Simple Loss Function for Central Banks

Designing a Simple Loss Function for Central Banks
Author: Davide Debortoli
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
Total Pages: 56
Release: 2017-07-21
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 1484311752

Yes, it makes a lot of sense. This paper studies how to design simple loss functions for central banks, as parsimonious approximations to social welfare. We show, both analytically and quantitatively, that simple loss functions should feature a high weight on measures of economic activity, sometimes even larger than the weight on inflation. Two main factors drive our result. First, stabilizing economic activity also stabilizes other welfare relevant variables. Second, the estimated model features mitigated inflation distortions due to a low elasticity of substitution between monopolistic goods and a low interest rate sensitivity of demand. The result holds up in the presence of measurement errors, with large shocks that generate a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and resource utilization, and also when ensuring a low probability of hitting the zero lower bound on interest rates.

Optimal Monetary Policy Under Bounded Rationality

Optimal Monetary Policy Under Bounded Rationality
Author: Jonathan Benchimol
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
Total Pages: 52
Release: 2019-08-02
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 1498324584

The form of bounded rationality characterizing the representative agent is key in the choice of the optimal monetary policy regime. While inflation targeting prevails for myopia that distorts agents' inflation expectations, price level targeting emerges as the optimal policy under myopia regarding the output gap, revenue, or interest rate. To the extent that bygones are not bygones under price level targeting, rational inflation expectations is a minimal condition for optimality in a behavioral world. Instrument rules implementation of this optimal policy is shown to be infeasible, questioning the ability of simple rules à la Taylor (1993) to assist the conduct of monetary policy. Bounded rationality is not necessarily associated with welfare losses.

Monetary Policy Strategies

Monetary Policy Strategies
Author: International Monetary Fund
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
Total Pages: 28
Release: 1988-10-04
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 1451952570

The paper considers the merits of rules and discretion for monetary policy when the structure of the macroeconomic model and the probability distributions of disturbances are not well defined. It is argued that when it is costly to delay policy reactions to seldom-experienced shocks until formal algorithmic learning has been accomplished, and when time consistency problems are significant, a mixed strategy that combines a simple verifiable rule with discretion is attractive. The paper also discusses mechanisms for mitigating credibility problems and emphasizes that arguments against various types of simple rules lose their force under a mixed strategy.