Returnee Executives And Accounting Conservatism
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| Author | : Wu Keping |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 1 |
| Release | : 2018 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
Based on the data of Chinese listed companies, this paper examines the impact of returnee's executives on accounting conservatism. We find that employing returnee executives can significantly improve accounting conservatism, especially in companies with weak internal control, high proportion of large shareholders and weak investor protection. private enterprises and enterprises with weak external supervision mechanism are more conducive to play the positive role of returnee's executives in improving accounting conservatism. The results show that the employment of returnee executives should be further strengthened under the weak internal corporate governance. In addition, the role of external supervision governance should be brought into play in order to enhance accounting conservatism, thus helping to improve the quality of accounting information and resources rational allocation of securities market under the context of supply-side structural reform. As a result, it can promote steady development of China's capital market and benign operation.
| Author | : Timothy Bryan |
| Publisher | : Dissertation Discovery Company |
| Total Pages | : 104 |
| Release | : 2019-08-07 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : 9780530008417 |
Abstract: This paper empirically examines the relationship between conservatism and earnings management in chemical and allied products manufacturers via an analysis of the allowance for doubtful accounts and bad debt expense. Results indicate that the allowance for doubtful accounts is overstated and has become more overstated since 2004. In addition, results show that firms utilized the excessive conservatism to manage earnings to achieve earnings goals throughout the study period. An important overall inference from these results is that the traditional view of the allowance for doubtful accounts as unconditional conservatism is, in fact, conditional conservatism. Dissertation Discovery Company and Jacksonville University are dedicated to making scholarly works more discoverable and accessible throughout the world. This dissertation, "Accounting Conservatism or Earnings Management" by Timothy Gordon Bryan, was obtained from Jacksonville University and is being sold with permission from the author. The content of this dissertation has not been altered in any way. We have altered the formatting in order to facilitate the ease of printing and reading of the dissertation.
| Author | : Gholam Assadi |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 9 |
| Release | : 2015 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
The role of accounting conservatism in corporate governance to mitigate agency problems associated with managers' investment decisions is proposed by Watts (2003), Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and Ahmed and Duellman (2010). In this research, we hypothesize that if accounting conservatism reduces managers' incentives to take on negative NPV projects and it can lead to corrective actions such as abandonment of a negative NPV Project, firms with more accounting conservatism ought to have higher future profitability. So we examined this hypothesis in companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange over the period 2001-2010. The findings show no significant relationship between accounting conservatism and future profitability. These results are not consistent with Ahmed and Duellman's (2010) findings.
| Author | : Carlo D’Augusta |
| Publisher | : Springer Nature |
| Total Pages | : 89 |
| Release | : |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : 3031671457 |
| Author | : Bikki Jaggi |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : |
| Release | : 2019 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
It is argued in the literature that accounting conservatism may be used as a substitute for management earnings forecasts (MEFs) to reduce information asymmetry between investors and management (Hui et al., 2009). We document in this study that accounting conservatism serves as a substitute for informative MEFs and especially for pessimistic MEFs, but not for opportunistic and optimistic forecasts. Accounting conservatism may, however, be used as supplementary to optimistic MEFs. Additionally, we find that accounting conservatism is especially used by the firms that have strong corporate governance, suggesting that strong corporate governance encourages the use of accounting conservatism rather than issuance of MEFs to reduce information asymmetry and to minimize potential legal suits for the firm.
| Author | : Zining Li |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 102 |
| Release | : 2008 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
| Author | : Todd D. Kravet |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2014 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
Watts (2003) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005) argue that accounting conservatism decreases managerial incentives to make negative net present value investments. I develop and test a new hypothesis that accounting conservatism is associated with managers making less risky investments. I find that under more conservative accounting managers make less risky acquisitions and that firms with accounting-based debt covenants drive this association. This result is consistent with conservative firms avoiding risky investments because of the potential for large losses to trigger debt covenants. Conservatism reducing risk-shifting can in part explain debt holders' demand for conservative accounting.
| Author | : Ross L. Watts |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : |
| Release | : 2011 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
| Author | : Bikki Jaggi |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 53 |
| Release | : 2014 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
Accounting conservatism has been recognized as a reporting strategy that benefits shareholders and financial statement users. We hypothesize that managers in general are likely to sacrifice the benefit associated with accounting conservatism when adopting meeting/beating market expectations (hereafter MBME). Our findings show a negative association between MBME, proxied by analysts' consensus forecasts, and accounting conservatism, defined in terms of conditional conservatism (Basu, 1997; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005, 2006) and we show that such relationship is not a mechanical connection between reporting strategy and managerial incentives to report higher earnings. Further analysis show that the negative relationship still exists after controlling for expectation as well as accrual-based and real earnings management. However, we document that G-index (Gompers et al., 2003), reflecting corporate governance in terms of anti-takeover provisions, has a significant impact on the negative association between accounting conservatism and MBME. Such finding shows that firms with less anti-takeover provisions, proxied by G-index, are less likely to sacrifice the benefit associated with conservative accounting for MBME.
| Author | : Judson Caskey |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : |
| Release | : 2015 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
We develop a model to analyze how board governance affects firms' financial reporting choices, and managers' incentives to manipulate accounting reports. In our setting, ceteris paribus, conservative accounting is desirable because it allows the board of directors to better oversee the firm's investment decisions. This feature of conservatism, however, causes the manager to manipulate the accounting system to mislead the board and distort its decisions. Effective reporting oversight curtails managers' ability to manipulate, which increases the benefits of conservative accounting and simultaneously reduces its costs. Our model predicts that stronger reporting oversight leads to greater accounting conservatism, manipulation, and investment efficiency.
