Responding to Capability Surprise

Responding to Capability Surprise
Author: National Research Council
Publisher: National Academies Press
Total Pages: 216
Release: 2013-12-31
Genre: Technology & Engineering
ISBN: 0309278406

From a military operational standpoint, surprise is an event or capability that could affect the outcome of a mission or campaign for which preparations are not in place. By definition, it is not possible to truly anticipate surprise. It is only possible to prevent it (in the sense of minimizing the number of possible surprises by appropriate planning), to create systems that are resilient to an adversary's unexpected actions, or to rapidly and effectively respond when surprised. Responding to Capability Surprise examines the issues surrounding capability surprise, both operational and technical, facing the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. This report selects a few surprises from across a continuum of surprises, from disruptive technologies, to intelligence-inferred capability developments, to operational deployments, and assesses what the Naval Forces are doing (and could do) about them while being mindful of future budgetary declines. The report then examines which processes are in place or could be in place in the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard to address such surprises. Today's U.S. naval forces continue to face a wide range of potential threats in the indefinite future and for this reason must continue to balance and meet their force structure needs. The recommendations of Responding to Capability Surprise will help to ensure more responsive, more resilient, and more adaptive behavior across the organization from the most senior leadership to the individual sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen.

Capability Surprise for U.S. Naval Forces

Capability Surprise for U.S. Naval Forces
Author: Committee on Capability Surprise for U.S. Naval Forces
Publisher: National Academies Press
Total Pages: 44
Release: 2013-12-31
Genre: Technology & Engineering
ISBN: 0309269105

A letter dated December 21, 2011, to National Academy of Sciences President Dr. Ralph Cicerone from the Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Jonathan W. Greenert, U.S. Navy, requested that the National Research Council's (NRC's) Naval Studies Board (NSB) conduct a study to examine the issues surrounding capability surprise—both operationally and technically related—facing the U.S. naval services. Accordingly, in February 2012, the NRC, under the auspices of its NSB, established the Committee on Capability Surprise for U.S. Naval Forces. The study's terms of reference, provided in Enclosure A of this interim report, were formulated by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in consultation with the NSB chair and director. The terms of reference charge the committee to produce two reports over a 15-month period. The present report is the first of these, an interim report issued, as requested, following the third full committee meeting. The terms of reference direct that the committee in its two reports do the following: (1) Select a few potential capability surprises across the continuum from disruptive technologies, to intelligence inferred capability developments, through operational deployments and assess what U.S. Naval Forces are doing (and could do) about these surprises while mindful of future budgetary declines; (2) Review and assess the adequacy of current U.S. Naval Forces' policies, strategies, and operational and technical approaches for addressing these and other surprises; and (3) Recommend any changes, including budgetary and organizational changes, as well as identify any barriers and/or leadership issues that must be addressed for responding to or anticipating such surprises including developing some of our own surprises to mitigate against unanticipated surprises. Capability Surprise for U.S. Naval Forces: Initial Observations and Insights: Interim Report highlights issues brought to the committee's attention during its first three meetings and provides initial observations and insights in response to each of the three tasks above. It is very much an interim report that neither addresses in its entirety any one element of the terms of reference nor reaches final conclusions on any aspect of capability surprise for naval forces. The committee will continue its study during the coming months and expects to complete by early summer 2013 its final report, which will address all of the elements in the study's terms of reference and explore many potential issues of capability surprise for U.S. naval forces not covered in this interim report.

Capability Surprise (Report of the Defense Science Board 2008 Summer Study). Volume 1: Main Report

Capability Surprise (Report of the Defense Science Board 2008 Summer Study). Volume 1: Main Report
Author:
Publisher:
Total Pages: 104
Release: 2009
Genre:
ISBN:

Instability and cultural complexities in today's world, the security challenges, and the capability of non-states and extremists to "make bad things happen" has reached new levels. As of yet the nation has found no simple form of deterrence to deal with this complex environment. Thus, the nation must be prepared to deal with surprise in new ways. This study addresses the issue of capability surprise - what it is, why it happens, what can be done to reduce the potential for its occurrence, and how the Department of Defense and the nation can be better prepared to respond appropriately. Capability surprise can come from many sources: scientific breakthroughs, rapid fielding of a known technology, or new use of an existing capability or technology. A review of the past century suggests that surprises tend to fall into two major categories: 1. "Known" surprises - those few that the United States should have known were coming, but for which it did not adequately prepare. We specifically include space, cyber, and nuclear. We might also have included bio, but chose not to. 2) "Surprising" surprises - those many that the nation might have known about or anticipated, but which were buried among other possibilities. In this case, the evidence and consequences are less clear, the possibilities many, and the nation cannot afford to pursue them all. In both cases, the biggest issue is not a failure to envision events that may be surprising. It is a failure to decide which ones to act upon, and to what degree. That failure results partially from the fact that there is no systematic mechanism in place within DOD or the interagency to help decide which events to act on aggressively, which to treat to a lesser degree, and which to ignore, at least for the time being. The principle recommendations of the study focus on developing the approaches and the talent to better manage surprise-to prevent it or, should surprise occur, to be in a position to rapidly mitigate its consequences.

Report of the Defense Science Board 2008 Summer Study on Capability Surprise

Report of the Defense Science Board 2008 Summer Study on Capability Surprise
Author: United States. Defense Science Board
Publisher:
Total Pages: 85
Release: 2009
Genre: Military planning
ISBN:

Addresses the issue of capability surprise-- what it is, why it happens, what can be done to reduce the potential for its occurrence, and how to better prepare the Department of Defense (DOD) and the nation to respond appropriately.

Report of the Defense Science Board 2008 Summer Study on Capability Surprise. Volume 2: Supporting Papers

Report of the Defense Science Board 2008 Summer Study on Capability Surprise. Volume 2: Supporting Papers
Author:
Publisher:
Total Pages: 223
Release: 2010
Genre:
ISBN:

The instability and cultural complexities in today's world, the breadth of security challenges, and the capability not only of states, but of non-states and extremists to "make really bad things happen" create an environment in which the potential for surprise has reached new levels. As of yet the nation has found no simple form of deterrence to deal with this complex environment. Thus, we as a nation must be prepared to deal with surprise in new ways. This study addresses the issue of capability surprise--what it is, why it happens, what can be done to reduce the potential for its occurrence, and how the Department of Defense and the nation can be better prepared to respond appropriately.

Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq, 2003-09

Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq, 2003-09
Author: Andrew Smith
Publisher: Strategic Studies Institute
Total Pages: 84
Release: 2011
Genre: Biography & Autobiography
ISBN: 1584874880

Introduction -- Operational surprise and response -- The contemporary IED experience -- Data sources -- U.S. experience in Iraq -- The U.S. response -- Recognition -- Institutional response -- Organizational -- Equipment -- Vehicles -- Electronic countermeasures -- Training and doctrine -- Research and development -- Industrial -- Funding -- Policy -- Summary assessment -- The Australian experience in Iraq -- The Australian response -- Recognition -- Institutional response -- Organizational -- Equipment -- Training and doctrine -- Research and development -- Industrial -- Funding -- Policy -- Comparative analysis of responses -- Leadership changes -- National interests and equities -- Adequacy of existing capabilities -- Countervailing assessments -- Conventional thinking -- Adequate agility -- Flexible force structure -- Other considerations -- Failure to anticipate and the risk of overreaction -- The focusing power of casualties -- Subsequent experience - Afghanistan -- Conclusions.

Coping with Surprise in Great Power Conflicts

Coping with Surprise in Great Power Conflicts
Author: Mark F. Cancian
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
Total Pages: 151
Release: 2018-03-23
Genre: Political Science
ISBN: 1442280727

Surprise has always been an element of warfare, but the return of great power competition—and the high-level threat that it poses—gives urgency to thinking about surprise now. Because the future is highly uncertain, and great powers have not fought each other for over 70 years, surprise is highly likely in a future great power conflict. This study, therefore, examines potential surprises in a great power conflict, particularly in a conflict’s initial stages when the interaction of adversaries’ technologies, prewar plans, and military doctrines first becomes manifest. It is not an attempt to project the future. Rather, it seeks to do the opposite: explore the range of possible future conflicts to see where surprises might lurk.