Report On The Legislative And Oversight Activitiesjune 29 2012 112 2 House Report 112 572
Download Report On The Legislative And Oversight Activitiesjune 29 2012 112 2 House Report 112 572 full books in PDF, epub, and Kindle. Read online free Report On The Legislative And Oversight Activitiesjune 29 2012 112 2 House Report 112 572 ebook anywhere anytime directly on your device. Fast Download speed and no annoying ads. We cannot guarantee that every ebooks is available!
Report on Legislative and Oversight Activities of the Committee on Natural Resources of the House of Representatives During the ... Congress
Author | : United States. Congress. House. Committee on Natural Resources |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 80 |
Release | : 2012 |
Genre | : Natural resources |
ISBN | : |
Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States
Author | : United States. Congress. House |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 1424 |
Release | : 2014 |
Genre | : Legislation |
ISBN | : |
Some vols. include supplemental journals of "such proceedings of the sessions, as, during the time they were depending, were ordered to be kept secret, and respecting which the injunction of secrecy was afterwards taken off by the order of the House."
Legislative and Oversight Activities During the ... Congress by the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs
Author | : United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Veterans' Affairs |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 36 |
Release | : |
Genre | : Veterans |
ISBN | : |
Congressional Record
Author | : United States. Congress |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 1324 |
Release | : 1968 |
Genre | : Law |
ISBN | : |
The Defense Production Act of 1950, as Amended
Author | : United States |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 36 |
Release | : 1955 |
Genre | : Industrial priorities |
ISBN | : |
Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted Under Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act and on the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
Author | : Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board |
Publisher | : Createspace Independent Pub |
Total Pages | : 238 |
Release | : 2014 |
Genre | : Political Science |
ISBN | : 9781495319228 |
The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) is an independent bipartisan agency within the executive branch established by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. The Board is comprised of four part-time members and a full-time chairman, all appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. On June 5, 2013, the British newspaper The Guardian published the first of a series of articles based on unauthorized disclosures of classified documents by Edward Snowden, a contractor for the National Security Agency ("NSA"). The article described an NSA program to collect millions of telephone records, including records about purely domestic calls. Over the course of the next several days, there were additional articles regarding this program as well as another NSA program referred to in leaked documents as "PRISM." These disclosures caused a great deal of concern both over the extent to which they damaged national security and over the nature and scope of the surveillance programs they purported to reveal. In response to the congressional and presidential requests, the Board immediately initiated a study of the 215 and 702 programs and the operation of the FISA court. This Report contains the results of the Board's 215 program study as well as our analysis and recommendations regarding the FISC's operation.
Federal Grand Jury Secrecy: Legal Principles and Implications for Congressional Oversight
Author | : Congressional Research Service |
Publisher | : Independently Published |
Total Pages | : 54 |
Release | : 2019-01-21 |
Genre | : Law |
ISBN | : 9781794510456 |
Traditionally, the grand jury has conducted its work in secret. Secrecy prevents those under scrutiny from fleeing or importuning the grand jurors, encourages full disclosure by witnesses, and protects the innocent from unwarranted prosecution, among other things. The long-established rule of grand jury secrecy is enshrined in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), which provides that government attorneys and the jurors themselves, among others, ﷿must not disclose a matter occurring before the grand jury.﷿Accordingly, as a general matter, persons and entities external to the grand jury process are precluded from obtaining transcripts of grand jury testimony or other documents or information that would reveal what took place in the proceedings, even if the grand jury has concluded its work and even if the information is sought pursuant to otherwise-valid legal processes. At times, the rule of grand jury secrecy has come into tension with Congress' power of inquiry when an arm of the legislative branch has sought protected materials pursuant to its oversight function. For instance, some courts have determined that the information barrier established in Rule 6(e) extends to congressional inquiries, observing that the Rule contains no reservations for congressional access to grand jury materials that would otherwise remain secret. Nevertheless, the rule of grand jury secrecy is subject to a number of exceptions, both codified and judicially crafted, that permit grand jury information to be disclosed in certain circumstances (usually only with prior judicial authorization). Perhaps the most significant of these for congressional purposes are (1) the exception that allows a court to authorize disclosure of grand jury matters ﷿preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding,﷿ and (2) the exception, recognized by a few courts, that allows a court to authorize disclosure of grand jury matters in special or exceptional circumstances. In turn, some courts have determined that one or both of these exceptions applies to congressional requests for grand jury materials in the context of impeachment proceedings, though there is authority to the contrary. Additionally, because Rule 6(e) covers only ﷿matters occurring before the grand jury, courts have recognized that documents and information are not independently insulated from disclosure merely because they happen to have been presented to, or considered by, a grand jury. As such, even if Rule 6(e) generally limits congressional access to grand jury information, Congress has a number of tools at its disposal to seek materials connected to a grand jury investigation. Prior Congresses have considered legislation that would have expressly permitted a court to authorize disclosure of grand jury matters to congressional committees on a showing of substantial need. However, in response to such proposals, the executive branch has voiced concerns that the legislation would raise due-process and separation-of-powers issues and potentially undermine the proper functioning of federal grand juries. These concerns may have resulted in Congress declining to alter Rule 6(e). As a result, to the extent Rule 6(e) constrains Congress' ability to conduct oversight, legislation seeking to amend the rules governing grand jury secrecy in a way that would give Congress independent access to grand jury materials may raise additional legal and pragmatic issues for the legislative branch to consider.