Report Of The Select Committee On Intelligence On The Us Intelligence Communitys Prewar Intelligence Assessment On Iraq Together With Additional Views 108th Congress 2d Session
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Author | : United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence |
Publisher | : Select Committee on Intelligence |
Total Pages | : 534 |
Release | : 2004 |
Genre | : History |
ISBN | : |
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence presents its report on prewar intelligence regarding Iraq, which contains numerous documents from various U.S. intelligence agencies regarding possible weapons of mass destruction, and other issues relating to Iraq.
Author | : United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence |
Publisher | : Government Printing Office |
Total Pages | : 532 |
Release | : |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
S. Rept. 108-301. Unclassified edition. Together With Additional Views. Provides the Senate and the American public with a substantial record of the facts underlying the conclusions of the Committee regarding the intelligence community's prewar assessments of Iraq's programs for weapons of mass destruction and its ties to terrorism. Some text is blacked out. 108th Congress, 2d Session. Jacket 94-712 PDF.
Author | : John A. Gentry |
Publisher | : Georgetown University Press |
Total Pages | : 289 |
Release | : 2019-03-01 |
Genre | : Political Science |
ISBN | : 1626166552 |
John A. Gentry and Joseph S. Gordon update our understanding of strategic warning intelligence analysis for the twenty-first century. Strategic warning—the process of long-range analysis to alert senior leaders to trending threats and opportunities that require action—is a critical intelligence function. It also is frequently misunderstood and underappreciated. Gentry and Gordon draw on both their practitioner and academic backgrounds to present a history of the strategic warning function in the US intelligence community. In doing so, they outline the capabilities of analytic methods, explain why strategic warning analysis is so hard, and discuss the special challenges strategic warning encounters from senior decision-makers. They also compare how strategic warning functions in other countries, evaluate why the United States has in recent years emphasized current intelligence instead of strategic warning, and recommend warning-related structural and procedural improvements in the US intelligence community. The authors examine historical case studies, including postmortems of warning failures, to provide examples of the analytic points they make. Strategic Warning Intelligence will interest scholars and practitioners and will be an ideal teaching text for intermediate and advanced students.
Author | : Thomas Fingar |
Publisher | : Stanford University Press |
Total Pages | : 286 |
Release | : 2011-07-20 |
Genre | : Political Science |
ISBN | : 0804781656 |
An look at what Intelligence Community analysts do and how, and how they are affected by the political context that shapes, uses and abuses their outputs. The US government spends billions of dollars every year to reduce uncertainty: to monitor and forecast everything from the weather to the spread of disease. In other words, we spend a lot of money to anticipate problems, identify opportunities, and avoid mistakes. A substantial portion of what we spend—over $50 billion a year—goes to the US Intelligence Community. Reducing Uncertainty describes what Intelligence Community analysts do, how they do it, and how they are affected by the political context that shapes, uses, and sometimes abuses their output. In particular, it looks at why IC analysts pay more attention to threats than to opportunities, and why they appear to focus more on warning about the possibility of “bad things” happening than on providing the input necessary for increasing the likelihood of positive outcomes. The book is intended to increase public understanding of what IC analysts do, to elicit more relevant and constructive suggestions for improvement from outside the Intelligence Community, to stimulate innovation and collaboration among analysts at all grade levels in all agencies, and to provide a core resource for students of intelligence. The most valuable aspect of this book is the in-depth discussion of National Intelligence Estimates (NIE)—what they are, what it means to say that they represent the “most authoritative judgments of the Intelligence Community,” why and how they are important, and why they have such high political salience and symbolic importance. The final chapter lays out, from an insider’s perspective, the story of the flawed Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) NIE and its impact on the subsequent Iran nuclear NIE—paying particular attention to the heightened political scrutiny the latter received in Congress following the Iraq NIE debacle. Praise for Reducing Uncertainty “This is a well-documented, well-written piece by a former high-ranking member of the intelligence community . . . . Recommended.” —CHOICE “Fingar provides a clear and useful tour of how intelligence analysis is produced.” —Political Science Quarterly “Tom Fingar provides a frank, detailed examination of the challenges to and successes of the U.S. Intelligence Community. In doing so, he reveals insights and strategies that directly address our national security needs. High-stakes examples described by Fingar provide an insider-account only he can provide. The result is riveting and informative.” —William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense for the United States, 1994 to 1997
Author | : Thomas Fingar |
Publisher | : Stanford University Press |
Total Pages | : 317 |
Release | : 2021-03-16 |
Genre | : Political Science |
ISBN | : 150362868X |
In From Mandate to Blueprint, Thomas Fingar offers a guide for new federal government appointees faced with the complex task of rebuilding institutions and transitioning to a new administration. Synthesizing his own experience implementing the most comprehensive reforms to the national security establishment since 1947, Fingar provides crucial guidance to newly appointed officials. When Fingar was appointed the first Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis in 2005, he discovered the challenges of establishing a new federal agency and implementing sweeping reforms of intelligence procedure and performance. The mandate required prompt action but provided no guidance on how to achieve required and desirable changes. Fingar describes how he defined and prioritized the tasks involved in building and staffing a new organization, integrating and improving the work of sixteen agencies, and contending with pressure from powerful players. For appointees without the luxury of taking command of fully staffed and well-functioning federal agencies, From Mandate to Blueprint is an informed and practical guide for the challenges ahead.
Author | : |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 1102 |
Release | : 2004-07 |
Genre | : Government publications |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Helene Dieck |
Publisher | : Springer |
Total Pages | : 274 |
Release | : 2016-01-18 |
Genre | : Political Science |
ISBN | : 1137519231 |
Based on interviews with political decision-makers involved in post-Cold War case studies, this research reassesses the prevalent conclusion in the academic literature, according to which American public opinion has limited influence on military interventions, by including the level of commitment in the study of the decision-making process.
Author | : Iraq Study Group (U.S.) |
Publisher | : Vintage |
Total Pages | : 164 |
Release | : 2006-12-06 |
Genre | : History |
ISBN | : |
Presents the findings of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, which was formed in 2006 to examine the situation in Iraq and offer suggestions for the American military's future involvement in the region.
Author | : Bob Drogin |
Publisher | : Random House |
Total Pages | : 370 |
Release | : 2007-10-30 |
Genre | : History |
ISBN | : 1588367363 |
“A crucial study in the political manipulation of intelligence, understanding how Curveball got us into Iraq will arm us for the next round of lies coming out of Washington.”—Robert Baer, author of See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism Curveball answers the crucial question of the Iraq war: How and why was America’s intelligence so catastrophically wrong? In this dramatic and explosive book, award-winning Los Angeles Times reporter Bob Drogin delivers a narrative that takes us to Europe, the Middle East, and deep inside the CIA to find the truth—the truth about the lies and self-deception that led us into a military and political nightmare. Praise for Curveball “Just when you thought the WMD debacle couldn’t get worse, here comes veteran Los Angeles Times national-security correspondent Drogin’s look at just who got the stories going in the first place. . . . Simultaneously sobering and infuriating—essential reading for those who follow the headlines.”—Kirkus Reviews “In this engrossing account, Los Angeles Times correspondent Drogin paints an intimate and revealing portrait of the workings and dysfunctions of the intelligence community.”—Publishers Weekly “An insightful and compelling account of one crucial component of the war's origins . . . Had Drogin merely pieced together Curveball's story, it alone would have made for a thrilling book. But he provides something more: a frightening glimpse at how easily we could make the same mistakes again. . . . The real value of Drogin's book is its meticulous demonstration that bureaucratic imperative often leads to self-delusion.”—Washington Monthly “Drogin delivers a startling account of this fateful intelligence snafu.”—Booklist “By the time you finish this book you will be shaking your head with wonder, or perhaps you will be shaking with anger, about the misadventures that preceded the misadventures in Iraq. This book is so powerful, it almost refutes its subtitle: The man called Curveball did not cause a war; he became a pretext—one among many.”—George F. Will
Author | : Harvey Rishikof |
Publisher | : Georgetown University Press |
Total Pages | : 385 |
Release | : 2011 |
Genre | : History |
ISBN | : 9781589016989 |
Recent breakdowns in American national security have exposed the weaknesses of the nation's vast overlapping security and foreign policy bureaucracy and the often dysfunctional interagency process. In the literature of national security studies, however, surprisingly little attention is given to the specific dynamics or underlying organizational cultures that often drive the bureaucratic politics of U.S. security policy. The National Security Enterprise offers a broad overview and analysis of the many government agencies involved in national security issues, the interagency process, Congressional checks and balances, and the influence of private sector organizations. The chapters cover the National Security Council, the Departments of Defense and State, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Office of Management and Budget. The book also focuses on the roles of Congress, the Supreme Court, and outside players in the national security process like the media, think tanks, and lobbyists. Each chapter details the organizational culture and personality of these institutions so that readers can better understand the mindsets that drive these organizations and their roles in the policy process. Many of the contributors to this volume are long-time practitioners who have spent most of their careers working for these organizations. As such, they offer unique insights into how diplomats, military officers, civilian analysts, spies, and law enforcement officials are distinct breeds of policymakers and political actors. To illustrate how different agencies can behave in the face of a common challenge, contributors reflect in detail on their respective agency's behavior during the Iraq War. This impressive volume is suitable for academic studies at both the undergraduate and graduate level; ideal for U.S. government, military, and national security training programs; and useful for practitioners and specialists in national security studies.