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| Author | : Drew Fudenberg |
| Publisher | : World Scientific |
| Total Pages | : 417 |
| Release | : 2009 |
| Genre | : Mathematics |
| ISBN | : 9812818464 |
This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.
| Author | : George J. Mailath |
| Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
| Total Pages | : 664 |
| Release | : 2006-09-28 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 0198041217 |
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
| Author | : Drew Fudenberg |
| Publisher | : World Scientific |
| Total Pages | : 417 |
| Release | : 2009 |
| Genre | : Mathematics |
| ISBN | : 9812818472 |
This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.
| Author | : Drew Fudenberg |
| Publisher | : MIT Press |
| Total Pages | : 616 |
| Release | : 1991-08-29 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 9780262061414 |
This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory—including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information—in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises. The theory of noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agent's optimal choice may depend on a forecast of the opponents' choices. "Noncooperative" refers to choices that are based on the participant's perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science. The fourteen chapters are grouped in parts that cover static games of complete information, dynamic games of complete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of incomplete information, and advanced topics.
| Author | : Robert J. Aumann |
| Publisher | : MIT Press |
| Total Pages | : 372 |
| Release | : 1995 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 9780262011471 |
The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others.
| Author | : Lorenzo Sacconi |
| Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
| Total Pages | : 240 |
| Release | : 2012-12-06 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 3642573002 |
In order to survive as a social institution a firm needs a constitutional social contract, even though implicit, among its stakeholders. This social contract must exist if an institution is to be justified. The book focuses on two main issues: To find out the terms of the hypothetical agreement among the firm's stakeholders in an ex ante perspective and to understand the endogenous mechanism generating appropriate incentives that induce to comply with the social contract itself, as seen in the ex post perspective.
| Author | : Jean-François Mertens |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 597 |
| Release | : 2015-02-02 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1316060985 |
Three leading experts have produced a landmark work based on a set of working papers published by the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) at the Université Catholique de Louvain in 1994 under the title 'Repeated Games', which holds almost mythic status among game theorists. Jean-François Mertens, Sylvain Sorin and Shmuel Zamir have significantly elevated the clarity and depth of presentation with many results presented at a level of generality that goes far beyond the original papers - many written by the authors themselves. Numerous results are new, and many classic results and examples are not to be found elsewhere. Most remain state of the art in the literature. This book is full of challenging and important problems that are set up as exercises, with detailed hints provided for their solutions. A new bibliography traces the development of the core concepts up to the present day.
| Author | : George J. Mailath |
| Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
| Total Pages | : 664 |
| Release | : 2006-09-28 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 0195300793 |
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
| Author | : David M. Kreps |
| Publisher | : Princeton University Press |
| Total Pages | : 869 |
| Release | : 2020-06-23 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 069121574X |
David M. Kreps has developed a text in microeconomics that is both challenging and "user-friendly." The work is designed for the first-year graduate microeconomic theory course and is accessible to advanced undergraduates as well. Placing unusual emphasis on modern noncooperative game theory, it provides the student and instructor with a unified treatment of modern microeconomic theory--one that stresses the behavior of the individual actor (consumer or firm) in various institutional settings. The author has taken special pains to explore the fundamental assumptions of the theories and techniques studied, pointing out both strengths and weaknesses. The book begins with an exposition of the standard models of choice and the market, with extra attention paid to choice under uncertainty and dynamic choice. General and partial equilibrium approaches are blended, so that the student sees these approaches as points along a continuum. The work then turns to more modern developments. Readers are introduced to noncooperative game theory and shown how to model games and determine solution concepts. Models with incomplete information, the folk theorem and reputation, and bilateral bargaining are covered in depth. Information economics is explored next. A closing discussion concerns firms as organizations and gives readers a taste of transaction-cost economics.
| Author | : Luis M. B. Cabral |
| Publisher | : MIT Press |
| Total Pages | : 374 |
| Release | : 2000-08-14 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 0262303752 |
This book provides an issue-driven introduction to industrial organization. Over the past twenty years, the study of industrial organization—the analysis of imperfectly competitive markets—has grown from a niche area of microeconomics to a key component of economics and of related disciplines such as finance, strategy, and marketing. This book provides an issue-driven introduction to industrial organization. It includes a vast array of examples, from both within and outside the United States. While formal in its approach, the book is written in a way that requires only basic mathematical training. Supplemental materials posted on the Web make more extensive use of algebra and calculus.
