Economic theory predicts that performance evaluation gains meaning and accuracy if the performance is compared to peers, as described by Relative Performance Evaluation theory (or: RPE). RPE can be deployed as a means for standard-setting based on peer group performance, by incorporating the performance of a reference group of agents in the compensation plan. Nonetheless, research on RPE suggests that peer comparison is not often a part of the performance evaluation, at least at the CEO level. This research proposal argues that RPE needs also to be studied at lower echelons. Amongst business unit-managers, we believe, RPE can make a significant contribution to opportunism-mitigation. By externally determining the performance standards, targets are less easily influenced by the managers whose compensation depends on them. This extends the interpretation of RPE, a phenomenon that has been analysed primarily from the perspective of efficient risk sharing and informativeness. Building on the literature on RPE, the objective of this research proposal is to study the incidence and form of relative performance evaluation at the business unit level, and to explore contingencies that are associated with empirical (non)-existence of RPE. Extant RPE models do not consider the influence of contingency factors on RPE's applicability or desirability. This proposal presents a preliminary contingency model which aims to further our understanding of RPE. An additional contribution of this study derives from its direct, survey based approach, as opposed to the mostly indirect, public data based prior research. This allows for a deeper examination of RPE in practice, yielding stronger tests.