The United States Coast Guard is a unique instrument of national security because of its multi-mission character as an armed force, law enforcement agency, and regulatory agency for maritime transportation. This multi-mission character is more relevant since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and as the Coast Guard undertakes its assigned role as the Lead Federal Agency for Maritime Security. The Coast Guard faces major challenges in executing its responsibilities and must leverage the capabilities of its specially trained boarding teams, small boat security forces, and hazardous materials response teams. However, the operational control, training, and doctrine of these specially trained forces are unfortunately fragmented. Furthermore, shipping is an inherently global venture, with thousands of ships operating under flags of convenience with little or no oversight by their national registries. Moreover, ports have traditionally been open to ensure the free flow of goods in international commerce. While major efforts are being undertaken to shore up international port security, many nations do not have the infrastructure, oversight, or response capability necessary for meaningful improvements. These realities require the Coast Guard to have a robust international program for cooperative security training and joint operations that can best be executed by an enhanced maritime capability, not unlike those forces conducting foreign internal defense and civil affairs assigned to the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Drawing on the precedent set by USSOCOM, this paper therefore advocates consolidating Coast Guard enhanced maritime capabilities under a central command - to be called the Coast Guard Enhanced Maritime Capabilities Command (CGEMCC) - as a more effective and efficient means of projecting the elements of national power. The paper also considers whether these capabilities should be further developed into a true Special Operations Force (SOF) for integration into USSOCOM, but ultimately concludes that it is premature to do so because the potential disadvantages and legal complexities are too great. However, the CGEMCC should maintain an active liaison with USSOCOM to promote greater interoperability and to begin a dialogue on what potential gaps and seams the Coast Guard could fill for SOF.